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Discounting scholars have studied decisions about monetary rewards, or gains, and found 
that the probability and delay of the receipt of those gains influence their subjective 
value. Plea-bargain decisions inherently contain the features of probability and delay in 
the decision context: Trial’s outcome is uncertain while the plea offer’s outcome is 
certain, and trial is delayed while the plea offer is relatively immediate. This 
dissertation’s four studies apply discounting paradigms to plea-bargain decision-making 
and find that probability of trial conviction and delay until trial influence decision-
making. Additionally, Studies 3 and 4 highlight how other situational features, Factual 
Innocence and Attorney Advice, influence plea decisions. Overall, the person-by-
situation approach from personality and social psychology adopted by this dissertation 
offers discounting scholars a richer understanding of the personal and situational factors 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Background 
Bargaining for Freedom: A Person-by-Situation Approach to Studying Plea-Bargain 
Decision-Making 
 The criminal justice system of the United States has long been the subject of 
cross-discipline analysis and critique (see, e.g., Butler, 1995; Clemens, 2014; Hagan, 
1973; Penrod & Hastie, 1979; Reitz, 2018; Tonry, 1998). Two contemporary concerns 
are the exceptionally high incarceration rates and continued use of the death penalty in 
the United States relative to the rest of the world (see, e.g., Reitz, 2017) as well as the 
racial inequity of the system (e.g., Eberhardt et al., 2006). This has evoked the broad two-
pronged question: How did we get here? And how do we change things? To date, scholars 
have focused largely on the bloated criminal codes in the U.S. (see, e.g., Manhattan 
Project, 2017) and the harshness of criminal sentences, disproportionately affecting 
people of color both in enforcement of criminal laws and in harshness of sentencing (see, 
e.g., Kutateladze et al., 2014). 
 In this dissertation, I take a different tack. If sweeping change in the criminal 
justice system is needed, then it is important to understand how people enter the criminal 
justice system in the first place. Criminal cases begin with the collection of factual 
evidence by law enforcement, which is passed on to government prosecutors, who choose 
whether to charge someone with a crime based on the evidence collected. Based on 
media depictions of the criminal justice system,1 and even psychology-and-law research 
(Devine et al., 2001; Kovera & Levett, 2015), one might think that the next step is a jury 
trial. To the contrary. “Plea bargaining is a defining, if not the defining, feature” of the 
 




criminal justice system (Brown & Bunnell, 2006).  In 2003, the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics reported 75,573 federal criminal cases, of which approximately 95% were 
disposed of by a guilty plea, or plea bargain (Devers, 2011). Because 95% of cases were 
disposed of by guilty plea, more than 95% of cases, likely nearly all cases, involved a 
plea-bargain decision. 
 In a plea-bargain decision, a person charged with a crime has the choice whether 
to accept an offer made by the prosecutor to accept guilt, forego a criminal trial, and go 
straight to the sentencing phase in which the offered sentence is the presumptive 
sentence. Most people accept that offer. But is that because they are guilty and the 
evidence is stacked up against them? Or are there other features of the plea-bargain-
choice context that influence that decision? 
 I use discounting as a theoretical starting point to understand plea bargain choices 
because discounting researchers study binary choices between one option that is 
uncertain and delayed and a second option that is certain and immediate. In the plea-
bargaining setting, trial is uncertain and delayed, and the plea bargain is relatively certain 
and immediate. I was drawn to the potential utility of discounting paradigms to explain 
plea-bargain decision-making because the general psychological patterns described by 
discounting research might help explain why so many people accept plea bargains. 
Specifically, discounting research has shown that, in general, people prefer certain and 
immediate outcomes (for reviews see Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; 
McKerchar & Renda, 2012), which if applied to a plea-bargaining setting could show 




 In addition, discounting scholars did not simply demonstrate a general pattern of 
preference for certain and immediate outcomes; they identified two contextual features 
that influence decisions: probability and delay. This dissertation project breaks new 
ground in two key ways. First, it is the continuation of my earlier work as a graduate 
student at the University of Minnesota in which I apply discounting theory and 
methodologies to plea bargaining. But there are some important differences between past 
discounting work and my work. Plea bargaining is a decisional situation in which the 
entity being decided about is a person’s own freedom. In most other discounting work, 
the entity, or commodity, being decided about is the receipt of money. Deciding about the 
receipt of money is different from deciding about the potential loss of freedom in the 
criminal justice system in that it involves a different commodity, but also the former 
commodity is relatively positive (referred to as a “gain” context) while the latter is 
negative (referred to as a “loss” context). Studying discounting in plea bargaining enables 
conclusions about discounting in a non-monetary loss context but also has implications 
for the most common method of resolving cases in the criminal justice system.  
Literature Review 
Social psychology embraces the possibility of complex causes of human behavior, 
encapsulated by Kurt Lewin’s conceptual formula: B = f(P, S). Although the field of 
judgment and decision making (JDM) is “something of an orphan field, lacking a 
dedicated and exclusive academic home” (Gilovich & Griffin, 2010, p. 542), it has a 
home within social psychology. Social psychologists have long been interested in human 




process by which those decisions are made, especially through persuasion and attitude 
change (e.g., Sherif & Hovland, 1961). 
JDM scholars have applied much of their effort to the systematic study of 
economic decisions.2 For example, loss aversion and the endowment effect are two 
staples within the JDM tradition, and they were empirically studied using situations 
involving monetary losses and gains, respectively (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Within JDM, and conceptually related to Lowenstein’s 
(1987) temporal framing, Buehler and McFarland’s (2001) temporal focus, and Tversky 
and Kahneman’s (1986) framing of risk aversion/seeking, scholars have studied a 
phenomenon called discounting. Certain features of monetary-decision contexts are 
especially important to predict behavior: probability of the outcome, delay/time of 
occurrence, and commodity valence (gains vs. losses, termed the “sign effect”3). 
Especially of interest to social psychologists, commodity type seems to matter, too, as 
revealed by research in the last decade. In the context of losses, Harris (2012) found 
descriptively different patterns of behavior when the commodity was lost money or lost 
property compared to non-monetary losses (e.g., bee sting, losing a friend). In particular, 
with monetary commodities, the median participant chose to put off losses as long as 
 
2 This is partly attributable to the influence of behavioral economics, and especially 
Herbert Simon, on the field (Gilovich & Griffin, 2010). At the birth of its field, 
behavioral economics challenged and tested economic assumptions and models, and the 
field continues to do so. 
3 Findings of the “sign effect” is within the field of behavioral economics because it 
challenges the rational-economic assumption that neither outcome valence nor outcome 
magnitude affects the impact of delay, and yet both have been empirically shown to 
affect decisions (see, e.g., Hardisty et al., 2013). Tversky and Kahneman (1992) also 
found different “risk attitudes” for gains and losses (p. 307), first described as risk 




possible and chose to experience gains without any delay. A non-monetary gain of 
receiving sincere praise from someone whose opinion means a great deal to you showed 
an overwhelming choice for immediate praise, but the non-monetary losses of a bee sting 
and losing an irreplaceable personal photograph, for example, showed bi-modality at the 
poles with many people choosing to get the losses over with and many others choosing to 
put off the loss as long as possible.  
In this dissertation, I argue that the phenomenon of discounting of uncertain and 
delayed outcomes is useful for understanding and studying plea-bargain decision-making. 
In addition, social psychology’s interactional strategy enables a more comprehensive 
conceptual framework of personal and situational factors influencing plea bargaining 
decisions. The proposed series of four studies provides an opportunity to replicate and 
expand a recent finding in classic discounting studies, that individuals discount criminal 
sanctions (i.e., the commodity in plea bargaining) in similar ways as monetary 
commodities. Consistent with the interactional strategy, in Study 1, using Clatch and 
Borgida’s (2021) Study 3 archival data, I will examine whether various individual 
differences and other person-level variables interact with the situational features of delay 
and probability. Study 2 will attempt to replicate Clatch and Borgida’s Study 3 (2021) 
finding that Probability and Delay interact to predict plea-bargain decisions and, in 
particular, to determine whether the outcome variable’s measurement method can be 
made more efficient without significantly altering the effect. Studies 3 and 4 will add key 
situational manipulations of attorney advice and factual innocence to determine whether 




Before describing the details of the series of studies, this literature review will (1) 
describe the technical methodological aspects of discounting research to set up 
subsequent sections, (2) explain how discounting paradigms can be applied to plea-
bargain decision-making, and then (3) elaborate on what social psychology’s person x 
situation framework adds to the study of discounting in plea-bargain decision making. 
Discounting 
 The traditional way of assessing discounting involves a complex series of 
questions to triangulate the subjective value that people assign to an offered outcome. In 
particular, experimentalists ask participants a series of binary, forced-choice questions, 
varying a feature of the choice context (e.g., delay or probability) to see how it affects 
decisions. For decades, however, the research on discounting has focused on single-
feature discounting of monetary gains (Clatch & Borgida, 2021; Harris, 2012). This 
means that participants were given choices between two monetary outcomes (e.g., $100 
vs. $20) that differed on a single feature (e.g., delay or probability), so the choice might 
be between receiving $100 in 1 month versus receiving $20 now (varying based on 
delay). By experimentally manipulating (most often varying within-participants) the 
length of delay of the $100 option, researchers can empirically determine the subjective 
value of $100 at different delays. The longer the delay of receipt of $100, the lower the 
payout a person is willing to accept as an immediate payout. In other words, the delay of 
a monetary gain is undesirable. The robust finding across the past two decades of 
research is that people prefer immediate gains over delayed gains, such that they are 
willing to accept lower amounts of money (e.g., $20) to receive the monetary gain 




termed delay discounting. An analogous paradigm has been applied to empirically 
examine probability discounting: choose between $100 with 50% of receipt versus $20 
with certainty of receipt. Again, for monetary gains, people prefer certainty and are 
willing to accept considerably less than even the “expected value”4 of 
Probability*Amount ($100*.5 = $50), demonstrating people’s risk aversion and how the 
subjective value of a risky outcome is different from the expected value. 
Methods of Experimentally Computing Subjective Value 
 Past research on discounting in both behavioral economics and cognitive 
psychology have produced various methods of determining the Subjective Value that 
participants assign to the offered delayed/uncertain outcome (see, e.g., Frederick et al., 
2002 Table 1 pp. 378-380). The goal of all the procedures is to identify a subjective value 
point, and a common method to do so is to ask a series of binary, forced-choice questions 
and to determine when a participant’s choice changed (e.g., from the immediate option to 
the delayed option). 
For example, in a delay discounting choice context, the adjusting-delay procedure 
systematically titrates, or changes, the delay [$100 in one week (adjusted to one month) 
versus $20 now] based on participant responses, whereas the adjusting-immediate-
amount procedure systematically titrates the immediate commodity amount [$100 in one 
month versus $20 now (adjusted to $18 now)]. Although these procedures produce 
similar patterns of results (i.e., participants discounted delayed gains), Holt et al. (2012) 
 
4 Expected value is based on the rational-choice model in economics (Frederick et al., 




found that the adjusting-immediate-amount procedures produce more consistent estimates 
of discounting, and unlike adjusting-delay procedures did not show order effects. 
Additionally, titration procedures attempt to more efficiently determine the 
Subjective Value that people assign to the offered outcome by adjusting the next choice 
based on a participant’s previous choice. For example, classic adjusting-immediate-
amount procedures might vary the “$X now” up or down within a specified range, say 
from $0 to $100 at increments of $5 or $10. Then, based on where the participant 
“flipped” from choosing the immediate (or delayed) option to the delayed (or immediate) 
option, the Subjective Value is computed. Say that a participant, starting at $100 in 1 
month vs. $0 now chose the delayed option, and stuck with the delayed option until 
confronted with $100 in 1 month vs. $20 now, then they chose the immediate option and 
stuck with that choice until the end of the block (i.e., when the immediate option was 
$100 now). The Subjective Value would be calculated as the average of the two options 
demarcating the “flip” (Rachlin et al., 1991). So if at $10 the participant chose the 
delayed option but at $20 the participant chose the immediate option, then that 
participant’s Subjective Value would be $15 (i.e., ($20 + $10)/2). Although this is a 
reliable way to measure Subjective Value, it is time consuming, and arguably 
unnecessarily time-consuming given that all of the choices the participant made after the 
$20 trial were essentially disregarded. Because of this inefficiency, the titration 
procedures emerged (e.g., Du et al., 2002) to proceed to the next block (e.g., a different 
delay than 1 month in delay discounting studies or a different probability in probability 
discounting studies) once a participant “flips” choices, termed indifference points or 




In addition to these adjusting- and titration procedures, sometimes Subjective 
Value is measured with a single, direct question, asking how much the participant would 
be willing to accept [or pay] now to forego the delayed or uncertain gain [or loss] offered 
(see, e.g., Lowenstein, 1987). To the best of this author’s knowledge, single-item 
measurement of Subjective Value has not been directly compared to the other methods.  
Dual Discounting 
 A recent methodological development in discounting scholarship has been to 
combine delay and probability features in the choice context (e.g., 50% chance of $100 in 
1 month vs. 100% chance of $20 now; Vanderveldt et al., 2015; Cox & Dallery, 2016) 
termed “dual discounting” (Clatch & Borgida, 2021). This has increased generalizability 
of studying discounting, because many life decisions vary on both features delay and 
probability, and it has enabled researchers to directly compare the magnitude of delay 
versus probability discounting and to detect multiplicative (i.e., interactive) effects of 
delay and probability on decision making. However, likely due to its complexity, to the 
best of this author’s knowledge, only three articles have used the experimental dual 
discounting paradigm (Vanderveldt et al., 2015; Cox & Dallery, 2016; Clatch & Borgida, 
2021). Vanderveldt et al. (2015) and Cox and Dallery (2016) studied monetary 
commodities, with the latter replicating the former’s findings for monetary gains and 
extending them to monetary losses. 
 Clatch and Borgida (2021) applied the experimental dual-discounting paradigm to 
plea-bargain decisions, a non-monetary loss. Study 1 showed that realistic criminal 
sanctions (i.e., criminal charge-sentence combinations such as “a felony associated with 




ordered. The rank-ordering—that is, knowing which criminal sanction is harsher than 
which other criminal sanctions—is a pre-requisite for the immediate-amount-adjusting 
titration procedure used by Vanderveldt et al. (2015) and Cox and Dallery (2016) because 
this procedure presents a harsher or more lenient criminal sanction based on the 
participant’s response to the previous criminal sanction.  
Whereas everyone knows that $12 is more than $10, it is less clear that there 
would be consensus about whether “a felony associated with 30 days in prison and 1 year 
probation” is harsher than “a gross misdemeanor associated with 60 days in prison and 1 
year probation.” After Study 1 showed that realistic criminal sanctions could be rank-
ordered, Study 2 utilized the criminal sanctions that were most clearly distinguishable 
from each other and rank-ordered. In Study 2, we experimentally tested whether 
probability (operationalized as Probability of Trial Conviction) and delay 
(operationalized as Delay until Trial) influenced decision making in the same way as 
expected with monetary outcomes. The short answer is that Probability influenced plea-
bargain decisions in much the same way as monetary decisions, but that Delay did not 
(neither as a main effect nor in interaction with Probability). Specifically, as Probability 
of Trial Conviction increased, participants were more likely to accept more plea bargains, 
but Delay had a nonsignificant effect on decisions. This result could be because, as noted 
by Harris (2012), non-monetary losses may be categorically different from monetary 
commodities (losses and gains) because they evoke more apprehension. Study 3 
addressed two key alternative explanations, finding that they did not explain Study 2’s 
findings: (1) Study 2’s ordinality of the criminal sanction commodity and (2) the 




new manipulation, Waiting-for-Trial-Location (Bail vs. Jail vs. Ambiguous, the latter of 
which was used in Study 2) as a manifestation of the apprehension hypothesis (i.e., 
greater apprehension when in jail than when out on bail). As expected, Delay influenced 
plea-bargain decisions of participants in the Jail condition, unlike the other two 
conditions; however, the direction of the effect was the reverse of what was expected 
based on the literature on monetary gains and losses. In plea-bargain decisions, people 
were averse to trial when it was associated with longer Delays, evidenced by accepting 
harsher pleas (i.e., having higher Subjective Trial Aversion); whereas with monetary 
losses and gains, as Delay increased Subjective Trial Aversion decreased. 
In sum, the work by Clatch and Borgida (2021) shows that the dual discounting 
paradigm can be applied to the plea-bargaining setting. This work also shows that in non-
monetary-loss contexts, like monetary-gain contexts, people prefer certainty, but in non-
monetary-loss contexts, unlike monetary-gain contexts, people do not always prefer 
immediacy. At least in the plea-bargain context, the preference for immediacy depends 
on whether the decision-maker is waiting for trial in jail or is out on bail. 
The next section first explains the centrality of plea-bargain decisions to the 
functioning of the criminal justice system. Then, the case is made for how plea 
bargaining represents a conceptually appropriate decision-context in which to study dual 
discounting effects.  
Plea Bargaining: Dual Discounting in an Intangible, Non-Monetary Loss Context 
 “Plea bargaining is a defining, if not the defining, feature of the present federal 
criminal justice system” (Brown & Bunnell, 2006).  In 2003, the Bureau of Justice 




disposed of by a guilty plea, or plea bargain (Devers, 2011). These high plea-bargain 
rates in federal cases are not qualitatively different from those in state cases 
(Rosenmerkel et al., 2010).  
Criminal sanctions often involve the loss of liberty and are the harshest sanctions 
society uses to deter and punish behavior. Because of the severity of the sanction, 
William Blackstone coined the well-known maxim: “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons 
escape, than one innocent suffer” (1826, p. 358). Although the real-world ratio of escaped 
guilty persons and wrongly convicted innocents is a known unknown, there is evidence 
that innocents are wrongly convicted through their own decision to accept a plea bargain: 
38 of the Innocence Project’s 351 people exonerated by DNA evidence accepted a plea 
bargain (Innocence Project, 2017). The prevalence and centrality of plea bargaining in the 
criminal justice system and the documented reality that innocent defendants accept plea 
bargains, provokes two broad and significant questions: (1) to what extent do defendants’ 
innocence/guilt influence their plea-bargain decision? And (2) what factors other than 
factual innocence/guilt influence their plea-bargain decisions? A new literature on plea 
bargaining, though not implicating the psychology of discounting, has revealed some 
initial answers to these questions by measuring plea-bargain decision-making as a single 
binary choice: accept X plea bargain or go to trial and face Y criminal sanction. 
First, studies involving methods including hypothetical scenarios (Edkins & 
Dervan, 2018; Helm, 2017; Helm et al., 2018; Helm & Reyna, 2017; Henderson & 
Levett, 2018; Quickel & Zimmerman, 2019; Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016; Tor et al., 
2010) as well as impact studies (Gregory et al., 1978) have consistently shown that guilty 




Second, the person variables of gender (Zimmerman & Hunter, 2018), age (Helm et al., 
2018), and risk-taking tendencies (Garnier-Dykstra & Wilson, 2019) significantly 
influence plea-bargain decisions. Additionally, situational variables including the trial 
sentence’s severity (Helm, 20175; Redlich & Shteynberg, 20166; Schneider, 20187; 
Zimmerman & Hunter, 20188), probability of trial conviction (Helm, 2017; Helm & 
Reyna, 2017; Zimmerman & Hunter, 2018), charge severity (Helm, 20179; Helm & 
Reyna, 2017), framing of the plea bargain (Garnier-Dykstra & Wilson, 201910), and 
pretrial detention (Edkins & Dervan, 2018) all influence binary plea-bargain decisions.  
To date, only Clatch and Borgida (2021) take advantage of dual discounting to 
examine plea bargaining. Utilizing dual discounting affords various advantages, 
including (1) providing a continuous dependent measure, which has wider variability than 
a binary measure and offers greater potential for person variables to explain a significant 
portion of the variance, (2) providing a series of binary plea-bargain decisions, which 
produces richer insight into the process of situational coercion/influence in the structure 
of the plea-bargain decision context, to answer the question “at what point would this 
same person switch his/her decision from plea to trial or vice versa,” (3) providing a 
paradigm to assess the influence of trial’s delay on plea-bargain decisions, and (4) the 
potential interaction of Delay until Trial and Probability of Trial Conviction interaction. 
 
5 Manipulated as same versus more severe trial sentence than plea option. 
6 Manipulated as jail versus no-jail. 
7 Manipulated using various percentages of trial sentence to determine the “plea 
discount.” 
8 Manipulated as a mandatory minimum trial sentence of 10 years versus judicial 
discretion of 4–6 years. 
9 Manipulating same charge of misdemeanor versus more severe trial charge of a felony. 




The person-by-situation (“P x S”) approach of social psychology (see next 
section) can be leveraged in conjunction with dual discounting to address a richer 
catalogue of factors that may influence plea-bargain decisions and provide a deeper 
understanding of the plea-bargaining decision process. In plea bargaining, the criminal 
defendant is offered a binary preference task: Plead guilty now to crime X and receive 
sentence A with 100% certainty or go to trial eventually and face crime Y associated with 
sentence B with a chance, C, of losing.11 Thus, plea-bargain decisions contain the feature 
of delay—plea bargain now or go to trial later—and they also contain the feature of 
probability—sign the plea agreement that the two attorneys have already agreed on, 
making it relatively certain, or go to trial, which is associated with a particular degree of 
uncertainty. The criminal sentence is the commodity in plea-bargain decisions.  
Although scholars have recognized the possibility of studying plea bargaining 
using a discounting framework (see e.g., Bibas, 2004; Wilford et al., 2019), most do not 
specifically point to dual discounting (but see Clatch, 2017; Clatch & Borgida, 2021). 
Additionally, empirical legal scholars have extolled the utility of empirical discounting 
studies and acknowledged that the actual empirical work is “notoriously difficult” to 
conduct (Jolls et al., 1998). Other legal scholars have noted the potential to test whether 
“probabilities of acquittal” (Easterbrook, 1983; Easterbrook, 2013, p. 553) and “time 
discounting” (Bibas, 2004; see also Covey, 2007) theoretically could influence plea-
bargain decisions, and the structure of plea bargains offers a new and engaging context to 
do so. Studying discounting in plea bargaining enables conclusions about discounting in a 
 
11 Note that X may be the same as Y, but often Y is harsher; and this practice is called 
charge bargaining (Piehl & Bushway, 2007). Also, as can be expected, harsher criminal 




non-monetary loss context but also has implications for the most common method of 
resolving cases in the criminal justice system. 
Person and Situation Variables: The Present Plea-Bargaining Project 
 The present work intends to leverage the P x S approach from personality and 
social psychology to study discounting in plea bargaining. Broadly, researchers have 
studied personality and social behavior using three distinct research strategies: the 
dispositional strategy, the interactional strategy, and the situational strategy (Snyder & 
Ickes, 1985; Snyder & Cantor, 1998). Researchers using the dispositional strategy assume 
that social behavior can be meaningfully understood based on relatively stable 
characteristics, such as dispositions and motives, residing within individuals. The 
interactional strategy assumes that models of social behavior can be meaningfully 
improved by utilizing moderator variables, and one manifestation of the interactional 
strategy is the use of situational moderating variables to understand the relations between 
person variables and an outcome (Snyder & Ickes, 1985, p. 897). The situational strategy 
not only seeks to understand social behavior through the study of situational cues but also 
how those situational cues themselves arise (e.g., are they hard-and-fast features of the 
environment like darkness during the night or are they socially constructed by individuals 
and their social interactions like the possibility of playing competitive games).  
This dissertation research adopts the spirit of the interactional strategy,12 
assuming that, as noted in a previous section, delay and probability are situational 
 
12 Rather than already heaving a clear picture of which personal variables influence plea 
bargaining and asking which situational features moderate the influence of those person 
variables on plea bargaining, and because dual discounting provides situational cues as 





features of many decisional contexts, including plea-bargain decisions. As the current 
plea-bargaining system exists, probability and delay are naturally-occurring situational 
cues. Factual innocence, however, is a situational variable that may depend more on 
individual perceptions and beliefs than the present plea-bargaining literature recognizes. 
As noted by Snyder and Ickes (1985), the experimental manipulation of key situational 
variables allows for internal validity but has the side effect of constraining individual 
behavior, limiting our view of the phenomenon of study. Although the factual innocence 
(and guilt) of certain crimes, such as possession of a controlled substance, may be easy to 
categorize into experimental factors without constraining the phenomenon, other crimes, 
like those involving negligence (i.e., unreasonable behavior) are more likely to be 
constrained by such experimental categorization. For example, experimentally bucketing 
behavior into extreme and obvious negligence relative to obviously reasonable, non-
negligent, behavior leaves the study devoid of the shades of gray that are arguably much 
more often present in the world. Moreover, when the crime itself has wider variance in 
both appropriate behavior (e.g., reasonable/non-negligent behavior) and behavior deemed 
criminal (i.e., negligent behavior can take a lot of forms), the individual defendant’s 
perception of their own innocence is given a larger foothold. Specifically, if it is 
ambiguous whether one’s behavior is in fact negligent, individual perceptions of 
innocence and blameworthiness may be more important to decision-making than the 
factorized situational cue of Factual Innocence. Thus, in addition to categorically parsing 
and manipulating Factual Innocence, the present work also measures individuals’ degree 
 
situational features. Statistically, this results in the same test (an interaction), but my 
focus is on discovering the person variables relevant to plea bargaining and the 




of self-blame and perceptions of innocence to recapture the variance lost in the 
experimental manipulation of the situational cue of Factual innocence. 
Although situational cues may directly influence decisions, of particular interest 
to researchers adopting the situational-moderators version of the interactional strategy is 
the interaction between person and situation variables. To date the discounting literature 
has not systematically tested the extent to which person variables may be a lens through 
which situational features (such as probability and delay) are viewed. Rather, research on 
discounting has only begun to scratch the surface by measuring person variables and 
testing their direct effects on decisions. For example, Myerson et al. (2017) compared 
participants’ decision-making in delay discounting of losses and gains, and in making 
decisions about monetary losses, people who were less impulsive (Eysenck, 1985; 
Ainslie, 1975 for a theoretical account) showed a very different pattern of responses 
compared to more impulsive others. Specifically, most participants preferred to lose 
money later, and this preference increased as delay was increased; whereas low-
impulsive participants were debt averse and actually preferred to pay off their debt 
immediately rather than later. Additionally, Molouki et al. (2019) showed that future (i.e., 
delayed) negative events were associated with strong negative contemplative (i.e., 
anticipatory) emotions, and as those strong negative emotions increased, people became 
more likely to prefer the immediate negative outcome over the delayed negative outcome. 
Furthermore, criminal experience and gender seem to influence plea-bargain decisions 
directly, though their explanatory power was washed out by the experimental factors of 




Moreover, the work that does test the interaction of person and situational 
variables has focused only on the situational feature of delay. Green et al. (1999) found 
age differences—that is person differences on the basis of age—in delay discounting of 
monetary rewards, and Lempert et al. (2012) found that trait-level perceptions of stress 
(measured using the Cohen et al., 1983, Perception of Stress Scale) predicted delay 
discounting of monetary rewards. No work to date has evaluated person-level variables in 
a dual discounting framework. Doing so not only adds the possibility to test how person-
level variables alone influence probability discounting (e.g., perception of risk), which 
has to date been neglected, but also the possibility to test the comparative impact of 
person variables on the key situation variables (Probability and Delay). This latter 
possibility suggests that person-variable lenses may differentially affect situational 
cues—for example perception of risk, rather than perception of delay, may be particularly 
susceptible to change depending on person-variable lenses. 
 Furthermore, a more complete approach to studying plea-bargaining behavior 
would allow for the interactive effect of person and situation variables. For example, 
highly impulsive individuals may view the features of delay and probability differently 
than will less impulsive individuals. Highly impulsive individuals may have greater 
tolerance for risk of losing at trial but less tolerance for delayed outcomes than will less 
impulsive individuals. Additionally, research at the intersection of psychology and law 
has described a “phenomenology of innocence” that counterintuitively, and tragically, 
often leads to false confessions because the innocent person thinks everything will work 
out and the truth will become apparent to everyone (see, e.g., Kassin, 2008). 




justification (Kay & Jost, 2003) to encourage beliefs of self-blame and worthiness of 
some jail time via a plea: A healthy, functioning criminal justice system would not 
convict a perfectly innocent person, but because they are being confronted with criminal 
charges, they must be worthy of some degree of blame. 
The present studies examine plea bargaining from a more integrated social-
psychological perspective—emphasizing person variables (including but not limited to 
impulsivity, negative contemplative emotions, beliefs about blameworthiness, and 
criminal experience), situation variables (including but not limited to delay until trial, 
probability of trial conviction, attorney advice, factual innocence/guilt, and waiting-for-
trial location), and their (P x S) interaction. My past research on plea bargaining (Clatch 
& Borgida, 2021) has detailed the relation between situation variables (Delay until Trial, 
Probability of Trial Conviction, and Waiting-for-Trial Location) on plea-bargain 
decision-making. Here, Study 1 will analyze a dataset (Clatch & Borgida, 2021, Study 3) 
to examine the relation between key person variables and plea-bargain decisions. Study 2 
is an important methodological study with two purposes: (1) to determine whether 
previous findings replicate across various forms of outcome variable measurement and 
study design and (2) to determine whether there are methodological tweaks that can be 
built into the dual discounting paradigm used previously to make data collection as 
reliable, valid, and efficient as possible. Study 3 examines the impact of a fourth 
situational variable: factual innocence versus guilt. Study 4 adds a fifth, more ecologically 
valid situation variable: attorney advice. Studies 2, 3, and 4 will all continue to measure 





Chapter 2: Study 1 – Person-Variable Predictors of Plea-Bargain Decision-Making 
 
The goal of this study is to assess whether person variables predict plea-bargain 
decision-making and qualify patterns of discounting, producing two broad research 
questions: (1) Under what circumstances do person variables interact with situational 
variables to influence plea-bargain decisions? and (2) In particular, do person variables 
influence people’s perceptions of probability and delay in a discounting task? These 
questions have not been tested to date and have the potential to contribute to both the 
psychology-and-law literature on plea bargaining as well as discounting scholarship. 
During the peer-review process of Clatch & Borgida (2021), we had to conduct a third 
study to further explain Study 2’s findings, which were summarized in the previous 
chapter. We expected that Study 3’s new experimental manipulation, Waiting-for-Trial 
Location, would explain the Study 2’s null delay findings (contrary to monetary 
discounting findings), but we also collected various person variables for future analyses.  
The purpose of Study 1 of my dissertation is to utilize the rich collection of unanalyzed 
person variables to determine whether there are individual differences that contribute to 
our understanding of the discounting of non-monetary losses as well as of plea-bargain 
decision-making. Including person variables in models of plea-bargain decision-making 
as both main effects and interaction terms with situational variables offers a more 
comprehensive psychological explanation of the plea-bargain decision-making process. 
Additionally, this dissertation research takes advantage of hierarchical modeling methods 





The individual-difference measures include traditional person variables such as 
personality traits including impulsivity (Eysenck et al., 1985) and need for cognitive 
closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The measures also include situated-person 
variables, which are person-specific reactions to the plea-bargaining situation including 
contemplative emotions, perceptions of innocence, and perceptions of blameworthiness.  
Trait-Level Individual-Differences 
The trait-level individual differences that may influence plea-bargain decision-
making include need for cognitive closure, system justification, and impulsivity. Webster 
and Kruglanski (1994) suggest that for people with high Need for Cognitive Closure 
(NFCC), decision making involves two main processes: seizing on information that is 
easy to process and freezing, or not changing one’s mind after forming an opinion. The 
process of seizing and/or freezing is relevant to the present study because participants 
make a series of plea-bargain decisions. These decisions are not particularly easy to 
process because they involve fluctuating plea-bargain criminal sentence offers, 
fluctuating delays until trial, and fluctuating probabilities of trial conviction. Individuals 
higher in Need for Cognitive Closure, rather than tracking the fluctuations of the various 
situational features, may simply anchor on their first plea bargain decision (plea vs. trial) 
and thus be influenced more by their first decision than by other situational cues like 
probability and delay. Accordingly, the following was hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a). Participants with higher NFCC scores will seize-and-
freeze, evincing “stickiness” of their first plea-trial choice (i.e., choose all “trial” or all 




H1b. Participants with higher NFCC scores will seize-and-freeze across the 
Delays, evincing smaller variation in plea decisions across the Delays. 
 Kay and Jost’s (2003) System Justification Scale measures the extent to which a 
person justifies social and political systems and policies. Individuals high in System 
Justification tend to comply with a system and its supporting ideologies rather than 
question the system. In the context of plea bargaining, it could be argued, on the one 
hand, that the criminal justice system stands on the criminal defendant’s Constitutional 
right to a trial of their peers, suggesting that individuals high in System Justification may 
be more likely to choose to go to trial because they have faith that the Constitutionally-
protected system is fair. On the other hand, plea bargains are by far the more common 
means of resolution of cases in the criminal justice system, and the plea bargain process 
starts with prosecutors (key criminal justice system actors) offering a plea deal, 
suggesting that individuals high in System Justification may be more likely to accept a 
plea deal than to choose to go to trial, as such a choice is seen as a standard feature of the 
“system.” No past work has assessed either possibility, but I suspect the former is most 
likely because I think that the abundance of criminal law movies and TV shows depicting 
criminal trials (as opposed to pleas) has inflated the public perception that trial is the 
“typical” or “right” way for a criminal case to be resolved. Accordingly, the following 
was hypothesized: 
 H1c. Individuals with high system justification will be more likely to choose to go 
to trial than will individuals with low system justification.  
Additionally, because there are two criminal processes associated with the 




about their own innocence/guilt will influence whether they choose trial/plea more when 
they have faith in the criminal justice system. Accordingly, the following was 
hypothesized: 
H1d. Participants’ system justification will interact with their perceptions of 
Innocence to predict their plea decisions, such that participants with high system 
justification who also believe they are innocent will evince the most willingness to go to 
trial, and participants with high system justification who also believe they are guilty will 
evince the most willingness to accept a guilty plea. 
 Impulsivity is common among many criminal defendants (see Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990), and Redlich et al. (2017) have conceptually linked it to plea-bargain 
decisions, arguing that defendants may focus on the short-term benefits that plea bargains 
provide, such as a reduced sentence, and undervalue the long-term consequences like 
waiving their trial rights. Although this is a possibility, research on impulsivity also 
suggests a relation between impulsivity and a propensity for risk-taking (Upton et al., 
2011). Because the plea bargain option is relatively certain and trial is associated with 
probabilistic risk, the following was hypothesized: 
 H1e. Highly impulsive participants will prefer the uncertain/risky option, trial, 
over the certain plea bargain option, relative to less impulsive participants. 
 Relatedly, if impulsivity makes people more likely to take risks, it may also make 
them more sensitive to cues of probabilistic uncertainty and chance. Accordingly, the 




H1f. Participants’ impulsivity will interact with probability of trial conviction, 
such that highly impulsive participants will be especially sensitive to probability, whereas 
less impulsive participants will be less sensitive to probability of trial conviction. 
Impulsivity is the personality feature most often mentioned in the discounting 
literature, especially to explain delay discounting (see, e.g., McKerchar & & Renda, 
2012; Steward et al., 2017). Myerson et al. (2017) found that individuals’ impulsiveness 
(but not Venturesomeness and Empathy, which are the broader personality scale’s two 
other subscales) was related to their delay discounting decisions. In particular, when 
Myerson et al., like Harris (2012), noticed that a substantial proportion of their sample 
actually preferred to pay a fine immediately rather than delay it, they termed the pattern 
“reverse discounting”, and called this group of participants debt averse. This debt-averse 
group had below-average Impulsiveness. Accordingly, the following was hypothesized: 
H1g. Participants’ impulsivity will interact with delay until trial, such that low-
impulsivity participants will be especially sensitive to the trial’s delay, whereas more 
impulsive participants will be less sensitive to the delay until trial. 
Situated-Person Reactions 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the interactional strategy of studying social 
behavior has helped researchers identify a downside of experimentally manipulating 
situations: Operationalizations of key variables into categorical experimental conditions 
artificially constrains participant intra-study reactions and behaviors. In the present study, 
having participants read a scenario in which they drove down a residential road and hit a 
child, resulting in a criminal charge of the participant, is relatively open to interpretation, 




self-blame, perceive themselves to be more or less innocent or guilty of the crime 
charged, and may have mixed (i.e., positive and negative) feelings about waiting for trial. 
Because these are beliefs and perceptions that are relatively individualized, and personal, 
to each participant, these beliefs and perceptions are akin to person variables, but they are 
very context-dependent. Specifically, they are study-dependent such that they are 
responses to the hypothetical scenario and the legal decision-making task with which the 
study confronts them. For these reasons I term them “situated-person” reactions.13 
 Based on questions and comments at conferences and past presentations as well as 
an informal qualitative assessment of participant responses to open-ended questions in a 
past study (Clatch & Borgida, 2021, Study 2), people seem to differ in their perceptions 
of innocence based on the scenario, their degree of self-blame for the events in the 
scenario, and how strongly those beliefs influenced their plea-bargain decisions. 
Accordingly, it was hypothesized: 
 H1h.  Participants experiencing more self-blame for the accident and child’s 
injury will accept more guilty pleas than will participants experiencing less self-blame.  
H1i. Participants who perceive themselves to be less innocent of the crime 
charged will accepted more guilty pleas than will participants who perceive themselves 
to be more innocent.  
Again, based on anecdotal evidence, including that Clatch and Borgida’s Study 2 
open-ended participant responses mentioned events from the driving scenario like 
 
13 These subjective, situation-specific assessments can also be understood as construals of 
the crime scenario. Situational construal has had a long and rich history in social 
psychology (see, e.g., Fazio, 1990; Griffin & Ross, 1991; Ross & Nisbett, 199l; Thomas 




whether they used their hands to type the text before the accident, I suspect that 
blameworthiness and perceptions of innocence develop during and immediately after 
participants read the hypothetical scenario rather than in direct response to the probability 
manipulation. The probability manipulation might suggest a degree of blameworthiness 
and guilt for participants in the high-likelihood-of-conviction conditions, but I believe 
that perceptions of blame and innocence have somewhat crystallized in participants by 
time they arrive at making their plea-bargain decisions. Accordingly, the following was 
hypothesized: 
H1j and 1k. Neither participants’ self-blame nor their perceptions of innocence 
will interact with probability of trial conviction to predict plea bargain decisions. That is, 
blameworthiness and innocence are more accurately described as individual perceptions 
and beliefs developed after reading the scenario rather than influenced by the situational 
cue of probability of losing at trial. 
 In addition to self-blame and perceptions of innocence, various anticipatory 
emotions may also predict plea-bargain decision-making. Harris (2012) found that people 
experience feelings of dread, also termed “anticipal unpleasure” (Lowenstein 1987), 
before negative events and those feelings increase as the event grows closer. 
Additionally, Lowenstein’s anticipatory utility model (1987) emphasizes how people’s 
psychological reactions to events often influence their economic decisions. The 
anticipatory utility model was designed to qualify the traditional economic model of 
expected utility by highlighting individual differences in “people’s abilities to imagine 




economics of decision-making involving delayed outcomes (Frederick et al., 2002, p. 
354). Accordingly, the following was hypothesized: 
 H1l. Participants with stronger negative anticipatory emotions about the delayed 
option (i.e., trial) will accept more pleas than will participants with weaker negative 
anticipatory emotions. 
 Furthermore, without formally testing it, Clatch and Borgida’s Study 3 (2021) 
argued that waiting for trial in jail would increase negative emotions regarding trial, 
making the longer delays until trial less appealing relative to waiting for trial while out on 
bail. Accordingly, in the present study the following was hypothesized: 
 H1m. Negative anticipatory emotions will moderate the relation between 
Waiting-for-Trial Location and plea-bargain decisions. Specifically, participants in the 
jail condition should exhibit the stronger negative anticipatory emotions and accept the 
most pleas because jail should make the wait until trial especially negative to contemplate 
relative to considering the wait until trial while living one’s life as usual (i.e., participants 
are out on bail). 
Similarly, for participants in the jail condition, the delay preceding trial is more 
costly for them relative to participants in the bail condition, so being in jail may make 
them especially sensitive to how long they must experience the negative emotions of 
apprehension/anticipation of trial. Clatch and Borgida (Study 2 versus Study 3; 2021) 
showed that the situational factor of being in jail made Delay until Trial a significant 
deterrent for the trial option. Accordingly, the following was hypothesized: 
H1n. In the jail condition, negative anticipatory emotions will moderate the 




participants in the jail condition, their negative anticipatory emotions about trial should 
determine the strength of the relation between Delays and their plea-bargain decisions 
because waiting in jail and having negative emotions sensitizes participants to the delay 
spent waiting for trial. 
Criminal Experience 
 Experience in the criminal justice system is a life experience that may be relevant 
to people’s subsequent plea-bargaining decisions. A previous study (Clatch & Borgida, 
Study 1, 2021) revealed that based on criminal justice system experience, people perceive 
criminal charges and sentences differently. Based on informal discussions with criminal-
law attorneys throughout my law school experience, their hunch, based on their work 
experience, was that experienced criminal defendants are much more likely to insist on 
going to trial. The purported reason for this is that experienced criminal defendants are 
more savvy about how much work the prosecutors have to do to convict them beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the following was hypothesized: 
H1o. Participants with Criminal Experience will choose the trial option more 
than their inexperienced counterparts. 
Method 
 Because Study 1 analyzes both experimental and non-experimental predictors of 
plea-bargain decisions, the experimental method of Clatch and Borgida’s Study 3 (2021) 





MTurk participants received $1 for their participation. After removing 63 
participants suspected of VPN-use to hide their lack of presence in the United States,14 
there were 524 MTurk participants. A shirker analysis (Berinsky et al., 2013) was 
conducted and 126 participants were excluded,15 leaving a total of 398 participants. SM 2 
shows scenario and attention check questions as well as the shirker analyses (Berinsky et 
al., 2013) based on those questions. The final dataset (N = 398) consists of 57.0% self-
identifying Hispanic-White participants (n = 227), 19.6 % (n = 78) Non-Hispanic-White 
participants, 11.3% (n = 45) Black participants, 6.0 % (n = 23) Asian participants, and the 
remaining 6.3% (n = 25) as not-specified, multi-racial, other, Native Hawaiian, or 
American Native. The mean age of participants was 36.62 (SD = 11.10). The final sample 
consisted of 44.7 % (n = 178) females, 51.5 % (n = 205) males, and 3.8% (n = 15) 
participants did not specify their gender or selected other.  
Procedure  
The survey contained a vignette describing an unfortunate hypothetical situation 
(see SM 3) in which the participant is asked to imagine driving down a residential road 
and while texting using voice activation, when they16 hit and injure a child. Participants 
then are instructed that they are being (hypothetically) charged with a criminal offense, 
 
14 Participants who named eggplants “brinjal” were deemed to be from East Asia and 
excluded. See SM 1. 
15 As discussed in Clatch and Borgida’s SM 12 (2021), a variety of exclusion criteria 
were used to increase the chances that the final sample included participants who were 
reasonably attentive and residing in the United States. For example, sixty-three 
participants who identified a photo of eggplants as “brinjal” were excluded, and 
participants who got two specific reading comprehension questions (one about the name 
of the criminal charge in the hypothetical scenario and one about the central occurrence 
in the hypothetical scenario—that a child got hit by a car) incorrect were excluded. 




and they answer a variety of binary, forced-choice questions in which they had to decide 
whether to accept a plea bargain or to go to trial. Last, participants completed a number 
of individual difference measures (e.g., an impulsivity scale), open-ended questions (e.g., 
why do most people accept pleas?), and demographic questions (e.g., gender). 
Design 
This study had a 4 (Probability of Trial Conviction) x 3 (Waiting-for-Trial 
Location) x 5 (Delay until Trial) mixed-factor design with two between-participant 
variables: Probability of Trial Conviction with four levels (5%, 50%, 95%, 99%) and 
Waiting-for-Trial Location with three levels (Jail, Bail, Ambiguous). Probability of Trial 
Conviction is the likelihood that participants will lose at trial. The scenario in the 
“Ambiguous” condition was left ambiguous as to where participants waited for trial. The 
Jail and Bail conditions contained explicit language in the vignette describing where 
participants were waiting. The one within-participants factor was Delay until Trial, the 
length of time that participants are told they would have to wait until their trial date, 
which had five levels (1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year). Probability of Trial 
Conviction and Waiting-for-Trial Location were fully crossed, and participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the 12 conditions. Each participant saw all five levels of 
Delay until Trial, and all five levels were presented in random order to reduce the chance 
of order effects. 
The sole outcome variable in this study was Subjective Trial Aversion, which is 
analogous to the subjective value of the trial option outcome, measured as the 
indifference or tipping point of each participant within each decision tree (one per 




figure shown in the SM 4, since this study used a titrated adjusting-immediate-amount 
procedure to measure Subjective Trial Aversion.17  
Materials and Measures 
 The data was originally collected by Clatch and Borgida (Study 3, 2021) but were 
not analyzed. The study materials consisted of an online survey, which contained 
attention checks (SM 2), data quality checks (SM 1 & 2), a vignette/scenario (SM 3), 
legal decision-making questions (see SM 4 for the higher-order structure of the legal 
decision-making questions and SM 5 for a single question example), and individual 
difference measures. The situated-person measures, including perceptions of 
blameworthiness, negative contemplative emotions questions (adapted from Molouki et 
al., 2019), an open-ended question, and a categorical perception of innocence question 
were presented in random order after the series of binary, forced-choice plea bargain 
questions. All of the situated-person measures are presented in SM 6. Then, the more 
trait-level individual-difference measures of Need for Cognitive Closure (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994), System Justification Scale (adapted from Kay & Jost, 2003), and 
Impulsivity (Eysenck et al., 1985) were presented in random order before the driving 
experience, criminal experience, and demographic questions. The trait-level individual-
difference measures are all presented in SM 7, and the experience and demographic 
questions are all presented in SM 8. 
 The remaining specifics of this Materials and Measures section will be organized 
into a group of trait-level predictors, a group of situated-person predictors, and 
 
17 See Chapter 1’s section named “Methods of Experimentally Computing Subjective 




demographic and experience predictors, but the sole dependent variable in this study is 
described first. 
Subjective Trial Aversion 
The term “subjective value” is most useful when describing participants’ 
decisions about positive things like receipt of money because an increase in money is 
easily understood as being of value. However, in a loss context, the valence of the 
outcome variable needs to be reversed too. Thus, this dissertation uses the variable name 
“Subjective Trial Aversion” to describe the outcome variable of this plea-bargain 
discounting study.  
Based on a series of four choices between plea bargains and trial (within a Delay-
specific decision tree), participants’ Subjective Trial Aversion was obtained for each 
Delay block. Because this study used the adjusting-immediate-amount procedure, the 
plea option’s jail amount increased when participants chose the plea (to incentivize 
“flipping” to trial). Accordingly, the Subjective Trial Aversion score is calculated by 
taking the average of the two closest plea-jail options in which the participant made 
different choices (e.g., trial then plea). For example, if the sequence of decisions across 
the four choices is Plea-Trial-Plea-Plea, then the Subjective Trial Aversion score for that 
decision tree would be 73 because the plea rejected by the participant (i.e., they chose 
trial) was 75 days and the highest plea accepted by the participant was 71. So the average 
of 75 and 71 is 73 (see SM 4 for the path to each Subjective Trial Aversion score). Note 
that a higher Subjective Trial Aversion score means that a person is more willing to 
accept the plea bargain (i.e., lose certain and immediate freedom) in order to avoid the 





The predictors in this section include need for cognitive closure, impulsivity, and 
system justification. 
Need for Cognitive Closure. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) suggest that for 
people with high Need for Cognitive Closure, decision making involves two main 
processes: seizing on information that is easy to process and freezing, or not changing 
one’s mind after forming an opinion. The present study used the shortened, 15-item 
version created by Roets and Van Hiel (2011), which contains three items from the five 
original factors: (1) desire for order and structure, (2) discomfort with ambiguity, (3) 
decisiveness, (4) desire for predictability about the future, and (5) close-mindedness. The 
Cronbach alpha associated with this sample’s Need for Cognitive Closure data is .89. 
Adapted System Justification Scale. Kay and Jost (2003) present the System 
Justification scale, which I adapted by modifying the questions’ referent so that they ask 
specifically about the criminal justice system (rather than society, policies, or the political 
system, broadly) and by adding three new items that specifically ask about plea bargain 
or trial options. For example, the item “In general, you find society to be fair” was 
changed to ‘In general, I find the criminal justice system to be fair,’ and the item ‘In 
general, the American political system operates as it should’ to ‘In general, the criminal 
justice system operates as it should.’ Additionally, the following three new items were 
added: “In America, a criminal defendant’s right to a criminal trial serves to protect the 
innocent”; “In America, the plea-bargaining system problematically pressures innocent 
criminal defendants to plead guilty”; “In America, a criminal defendant’s ability to make 




All of the changes are summarized in the SM 7. The full adapted scale with the three new 
items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .65, and the adapted scale without the three new items 
had an alpha of .51. Feygina et al. (2010) report reliabilities of .80, .81, and .77 across 
Studies 1 through 3 respectively for the original (Kay & Jost, 2003) system justification 
scale. However, Clatch and Borgida (2021; Study 2) reported a reliability of .67 for the 
original scale. Furthermore, the two adapted versions were significantly and positively 
correlated [r(40) = .77, p < .001]. Accordingly, the full adapted scale was used in the 
present study. 
 Impulsivity. The I-7 is a 54-item personality questionnaire (Eysenck et al., 1985) 
that assesses self-reported Impulsiveness, Venturesomeness, and Empathy. Myerson and 
colleagues (2017) found that varying levels of sub-scale-level Impulsiveness was related 
to participants’ discounting decisions (but not Venturesomeness and Empathy). 
Accordingly, the present study used the 19 items from the Impulsivity subscale (SM 7). 
This sample’s Cronbach alpha is .88. 
Situated-Person Predictors 
The predictors in this section include perceptions of blameworthiness, a 
categorical assessment of innocence, participant perceptions of the plea-bargaining 
decision-making process shared through an open-ended question, and negative 
contemplative emotions. 
Blameworthiness and Innocence. Two questions assessed the participants’ 
perceptions of blameworthiness for the accident and child’s injury, and one question 
assessed their “objective” perception of innocence (recoded as 0 = guilty, 1 = somewhere 




blameworthiness questions then the innocence question or vice versa. The correlation 
between the two blameworthiness questions was .81, so a single summed 
blameworthiness score was computed for each participant. 
 Open-Ended Decision-Making Questions. Because there anecdotally seemed to 
be individual differences in participants’ responses to these open-ended questions in a 
past study (Clatch & Borgida, Study 2), they were repeated in the present study. 
Participants answered (Question 1) why they think most people accept plea bargains, 
(Question 2) why they individually accepted plea bargains, (Question 3) why they think 
most people go to trial, and (Question 4) why they individually chose to go to trial. 
Participants’ responses were coded by two independent coders according to the Coding 
Manual (see SM 9 for the coding manual details). 
Negative Contemplative Emotions. Four questions assessed participants’ 
pleasant and unpleasant feelings that they experienced while imagining waiting for trial 
and during trial. Unpleasant feelings were coded as negative numbers and participants 
feelings toward waiting for trial were strongly correlated (r = .84) with their anticipated 
feelings during trial. Thus, the two subscales were summed into a single value. Molouki 
and colleagues (2019) named these feelings contemplation emotions and found that these 
marginally mediated (p = .053) the relation between their manipulations (e.g., the time of 
an outcome being in the future versus in the past) and discounting. The present study 
adapted their original questions to fit the present context so that rather than being asked 
about participants’ emotions about waiting to receive a jellybean they asked about 
anticipation of trial (see SM 6).  




The predictors in this section include demographic characteristics, criminal-
justice-system experience, and driving and car accident experience. 
 Criminal-Justice-System Experience. Two questions assessed participants’ 
criminal experience. The first question asked about their own, personal experience, and 
the second question asked about experience of someone close to them. The question 
about a participant’s own criminal-justice-system experience was related to participant 
reports of the criminal justice system experienced by someone close to them (c2(1) = 
38.24, p<.001) such that 59% of the sample has not had any type of criminal justice 
system experience. Accordingly, analyses were run using a composite measure of 
criminal justice system experience. 
Demographics and Driving/Accident Experience. Participants were asked their 
age, gender, race, and highest level of completed education. Then five questions queried 
whether participants drive, if they had ever been in a car accident (if so, how upsetting it 
was), and if they had been in a car accident in the last three months (if so, how upsetting 
it was). 
Hypotheses 
 Like the Materials and Measures section, this section is organized into trait-level 
predictors of Subjective Trial Aversion scores, situated-person predictors of Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores, and experience-based predictors. Although there are no formal 
hypotheses for demographic characteristics or for driving and accident experience, these 
variables are analyzed in preliminary analyses and a later series of hierarchical 
regressions, serving as controls when all significant variables are entered into a single 





Need for Cognitive Closure.  
Hypothesis 1a. Participants with higher Need for Cognitive Closure scores will 
seize-and-freeze, evincing more “stickiness” of their first plea-trial choice (i.e., choose 
all “trial” or all “plea,” corresponding to Subjective Trial Aversion scores of 88 or 32, 
see SM 4) than will participants with lower Need for Cognitive Closure scores.  
Hypothesis 1b.  Participants with higher NFCC scores will seize-and-freeze 
across the Delays, evincing smaller variation in Subjective Trial Aversion scores across 
the Delays. 
Adapted System Justification.   
Hypothesis 1c. Individuals with high System Justification will have lower 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores (i.e., be more likely to go to trial) than will individuals 
with low System Justification). 
Hypothesis 1d.  Participants’ system justification will interact with their ordinal 
perceptions of Innocence to predict their plea decisions, such that participants with high 
System Justification who also believe they are innocent will have lower Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores (i.e., evince the most willingness to go to trial), and participants with 
high System Justification who also believe they are guilty will have higher Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores (i.e., evince the most willingness to accept a guilty plea). 
Impulsivity.  
Hypothesis 1e.  Highly impulsive participants will prefer the uncertain/risky 





Hypothesis 1f.  Participants’ impulsivity will interact with Probability of Trial 
Conviction, such that highly impulsive participants will be especially sensitive to 
probability, evincing a stronger positive relation between Probability of Trial Conviction 
and Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will less impulsive participants. 
Hypothesis 1g.  Participants’ impulsivity will interact with Delay until Trial, such 
that low-impulsivity participants will be especially sensitive to the trial’s delay, evincing 
a stronger positive relation between Delay until Trial and Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores than will more impulsive participants. 
Situated-Person Predictors 
Blameworthiness and Innocence.  
Hypothesis 1h.   Participants experiencing more self-blame for the accident and 
the child’s injury will have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants 
experiencing less self-blame.  
Hypothesis 1i.  Participants who perceive themselves to be less innocent of the 
crime charged will have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants 
who perceive themselves to be more innocent.  
Hypotheses 1j and 1k.  Neither participants’ self-blame nor their perceptions of 
Innocence will interact with Probability of Trial Conviction to Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores. That is, blameworthiness and innocence are more accurately described as 
individual perceptions and beliefs developed after reading the scenario rather than 
influenced by the situational cue of probability of losing at trial. 




Hypothesis 1l.  Participants with higher Negative Contemplative Emotions will 
have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants with weaker negative 
anticipatory emotions. 
Hypothesis 1m.  Negative Contemplative Emotions will moderate the relation 
between Waiting-for-Trial Location and Subjective Trial Aversion scores. Specifically, 
participants in the Jail condition should exhibit stronger Negative Contemplative 
Emotions and have the highest Subjective Trial Aversion scores because jail should make 
the wait until trial especially negative to contemplate relative to considering the wait until 
trial while living one’s life as usual (i.e., participants are out on bail). 
Hypothesis 1n.  In the jail condition, Negative Contemplative Emotions will 
moderate the relation between Delay until Trial and Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
Specifically, for participants in the Jail condition, their negative anticipatory emotions 
about trial should determine the strength of the relation between Delays and their 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores because waiting in jail and having negative emotions 
sensitizes participants to the delay spent in jail while waiting for trial. 
Criminal Justice System Experience 
Hypothesis 1o. Participants with Criminal Experience will have lower Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores (i.e., evince more willingness to go to trial) than will their 
inexperienced counterparts. 
Results 
 This section is organized into preliminary analyses, hypothesis testing, and cross-
construct hierarchical modeling. The preliminary analyses section includes the testing of 




assessment of Subjective Trial Aversion scores. The hypothesis-testing section reports 
mixed-method regression results for each of the hypotheses for the trait-level predictors 
and the situated-person predictors as well as criminal experience. The cross-construct-
modeling section describes the hierarchical modeling done to determine the relative 
importance of the various predictors to plea-bargain decision-making. 
Preliminary Analyses 
 SM 10 is a comprehensive resource that shows the exploratory relations between 
demographic and trait-level predictors, which are provided for background. 
Subjective Trial Aversion 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of average Subjective Trial Aversion scores for 
the entire sample across all probability and delay conditions. The largest proportion of 
participants (22.1%, N=88) always accepted a plea bargain, but the second largest 
proportion of participants (11.3%, N=45) never accepted a plea deal and always chose to 
go to trial. Although the effect of Delay until Trial and Probability of Trial Conviction 
was reported in Clatch & Borgida’s Study 3 (2021), Figure 2 shows the change in the 
distribution based on the level of the two key experimental variables, probability and 
delay, to provide context to the later interactions between probability or delay and other 
predictor variables. Figure 2’s top panel shows the distribution broken down by level of 
Probability of Trial Conviction, descriptively presenting the experimental main effect of 
Probability of Trial Conviction on Subjective Trial Aversion scores. The proportion of 
participants who only chose trial (rejecting all pleas) ranged from 2% to 13% across 
conditions, and the proportion of participants who only accepted pleas (rejecting all trial 




Figure 2’s bottom panel shows the distribution broken down by Delay until Trial 
condition, descriptively presenting the experimental main effect of Delay until Trial on 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores, which runs counter to studies examining monetary 
outcomes. The proportion of participants who only chose trial (rejecting all pleas) ranged 
from 14.6% to 25.4% across conditions, and the proportion of participants who only 
accepted pleas (rejecting all trial options) ranged from 31.5% to 40.8%. 
Accident Analyses 
Table 1 shows the results of a series of simple linear regressions conducted to 
determine whether having ever been in a car accident or having been in a car accident 
within the last three months (as well as how upsetting those accidents were) influenced 
participants’ patterns of plea-bargain decisions (i.e., Subjective Trial Aversion scores), 
Blameworthiness, or Perceptions of Innocence. None of the regressions predicting 
Blameworthiness revealed significant effects. The only regression predicting Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores that revealed a significant effect involved recent car accident 
experience. Specifically, participants who had been in an accident in the last three months 
had significantly lower Subjective Trial Aversion scores (i.e., rejected the plea bargain 
and chose to go to trial more; M = 52.73, SD = 13.53) than did people who have not 
(t(384) = 2.62, p < .01; M = 61.68, SD = 20.93). Accordingly, having been in an accident 
in the last three months was entered into the hierarchical regressions as a control; see the 
cross-construct modeling section below for evidence that as a control variable, it did not 
increase predictive utility of the overall model with experimental variables. 
 Perceptions of Innocence were significantly influenced by ever having been in an 




both cases, people that had been in an accident (ever or recently) perceived that in the 
hypothetical scenario they were more innocent (ever: M = 1.05, SD = .86; recently: M = 
1.21, SD = .81) than did people who had not be in an accident (ever: t(354) = 2.03, p < 
.05, M = .86, SD = .85; or recently: t(41) = 1.92, p = .06, M = .92, SD = .85). 
Demographic Analyses 
Table 2 shows the results of a series of simple linear regressions conducted to 
determine whether various demographic features influenced participants’ plea-bargain 
decisions (i.e., Subjective Trial Aversion scores). Age and Race18 did not significantly 
predict patterns of plea-bargain decisions. In contrast, Gender and Education did 
significantly predict plea-bargain decisions. Specifically, men were more likely to choose 
to go to trial (i.e., have lower Average Subjective Trial Aversion scores; M = 58.09, SD = 
19.05) than women (t(384) = 2.03, p < .05, M = 62.18, SD = 20.45). Additionally, 
Education significantly predicted Subjective Trial Aversion scores; Table 4 shows the 
regression estimates and standard errors. Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that 
participants with a High school education were significantly less willing to go to trial 
(i.e., had higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores; M = 68.13, SD = 23.20) than College 
graduates (t(28) = 2.39, p < .05, M = 56.91, SD = 18.01). Moreover, Gender and 
Education did not interact to predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores; Table 2 also shows 
the regression estimates and standard errors for that multiple regression. Accordingly, 
Gender and Education were entered into the hierarchical regressions as controls; see the 
cross-construct modeling section below for the results of those hierarchical regressions. 
 
18 This was true regardless whether all Race categories were included, limited to three 
categories (White-Hispanic, White-Non-Hispanic, and Other), or limited to two 





 All of Study 1’s analyses not involving the experimental variables of Probability 
of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, or Waiting-for-Trial Location were conducted 
using linear regressions based on participants’ average Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
However, when one of the experimental factors interacted with another predictor, linear 
mixed effects models were conducted due to the mixed-factor design of the experiment. 
Trait-Level Predictors 
Need for Cognitive Closure. In order to test H1a, Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores were recoded into a binary variable and then an ordinal variable. First, 
participants’ Subjective Trial Aversion scores were recoded into the binary variable, 
Seize, by coding all-one-decision strategies (i.e., Trial-Trial-Trial-Trial or Plea-Plea-Plea-
Plea) as a 1, and all other decision patterns (e.g., Trial-Trial-Plea-Trial) as a 0. Table 3 
shows the results of the simple logistic regression on Seize. Counter to the hypothesis, 
participants with higher NFCC scores were less likely to exhibit all-one-decision 
strategies compared to participants with lower NFCC scores (B = -.04, SE = .01, p < 
.001).19  
Next, to test H1b, the range of each participant’s five Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores were calculated (i.e., across their five total Subjective Trial Aversion scores, one 
for each Delay). Counter to the hypothesis, participants with higher Need for Cognitive 
Closure scores had a wider range in their Subjective Trial Aversion scores rather than 
 




narrower range (B = .24, SE = .09, p < .01). Table 3 shows the regression coefficient and 
standard error.20 
Adapted System Justification. Table 4 shows the null results of the multiple 
linear regression conducted to test H1c and H1d. 
Impulsivity. First, as shown in Table 4, a simple linear regression confirmed 
H1e, revealing that higher Impulsivity scores would predict lower Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores (B = -3.44, SE = 1.20, p < .001). Second, a multiple linear regression 
confirmed an Impulsivity * Probability of Trial interactive effect on Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores (B = -2.88, SE = .42, p < .001). However, the interaction plot shown in 
Figure 3 reveals that participants with lower Impulsivity scores, based on a median-split, 
were more responsive to the feature of Probability of Trial Conviction than were 
participants with higher Impulsivity, directly counter to H1f. Third, as shown in Table 4, 
a multiple linear regression confirmed H7’s Impulsivity * Delay interaction effect on 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = -.08, SE = .03, p < .01). The interaction plot in 
Figure 4 reveals that participants with lower Impulsivity scores were more responsive to 
the feature of Delay until Trial than were participants with higher Impulsivity. 
Situated-Person Predictors 
 Blameworthiness and Innocence. Table 4 shows the results of the simple and 
multiple regressions conducted for these variables on Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
First, a simple linear regression confirmed H1h’s prediction—that higher 
Blameworthiness scores predict higher average Subjective Trial Aversion scores (i.e., 
 
20 SM 11’s bottom panel shows the upward sloping regression line in a scatterplot, if the 




accepted more pleas, avoided trial more; B = .07, SE = .02, p < .001). However, contrary 
to H1j, a multiple linear regression showed that Blameworthiness and Probability of Trial 
Conviction interacted to predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = -.09, SE = .04, p < 
.05).  Figure 5 shows the interaction between Blameworthiness and Probability of Trial 
Conviction based on a median-split of Blameworthiness. The figure illustrates that 
participants randomly assigned to one of the two highest Probabilities of Trial 
Conviction, 95% or 99%, did not differ in their patterns of plea decisions regardless of 
how much they blamed themselves, evinced by Subjective Trial Aversion scores that are 
very similar; however, for participants randomly assigned to the two lowest Probabilities 
of Trial Conviction, 5% or 50%, how much participants blamed themselves made a larger 
difference for their plea decisions such that when participants blamed themselves more, 
they accepted more pleas.  
Second, a simple linear regression confirmed H1i, predicting that participants 
who perceived themselves to be more guilty would report higher Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores (i.e., accepted more pleas, avoided trial more) than would participants 
who perceived themselves to be innocent (B = -3.44, SE = 1.20, p < .01). Additionally, a 
multiple linear regression confirmed H1k’s predicted lack of significant interaction 
between Innocence and Probability of Trial Conviction (see Table 4 for beta and standard 
errors of the multiple regression). 
 Negative Contemplative Emotions. First, a simple linear regression confirmed 
H1l’s prediction that higher Negative Contemplative Emotions predicted higher 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores (i.e., accepted more pleas, avoided trial more; B = -.07, 




interaction between Negative Contemplative Emotions and Waiting-for-Trial Location 
(see Table 4 for betas and standard errors). Third, using a subset of the data (Jail 
condition only),21 a multiple linear regression confirmed H1n’s predicted interaction 
between Negative Contemplative Emotions and Delay until Trial in predicting Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores (B = -.02, SE = .003, p < .001). Figure 6 shows an interaction such 
that for people with above-median Negative Contemplative Emotions, as Delay until 
Trial increased so did Subjective Trial Aversion scores (i.e., more plea-bargain 
acceptance), but for people with below-median Negative Contemplative Emotions, there 
was little effect of Delay until Trial on Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
 Open-Ended Decision-Making Questions. None of the qualitatively coded 
categories significantly predicted Subjective Trial Aversion scores, and the statistics 
produced by the series of simple linear mixed effects regressions are in SM 12. 
Criminal Experience 
Counter to H1o, the simple linear regression revealed no relation between 
Criminal Experience and Subjective Trial Aversion scores, despite attempts at recoding 
the predictor in various ways (see Table 4’s reference for the “Any,” “Own,” “Other,” 
and “Categorical” versions of the variable). 
Cross-Construct Modeling 
Although the foregoing analyses in this study demonstrate some relations between 
person variables and plea-bargain decision-making, their impact relative to the situational 
experimental variables is not yet clear. Thus, hierarchical linear mixed effect regressions 
 
21 As mentioned in this study’s introduction, participants in the Jail condition were likely 
to have the strongest negative feelings about trial, so this condition was the most likely 




were conducted to test whether the effects of independently significant person variables 
account for variance in plea-bargain decisions above and beyond experimental variables. 
To reduce the tables referenced in this section, the statistical information for any steps in 
the hierarchical regressions conducted that did not produce a significant improvement in 
the model were placed in supplemental materials. 
The preliminary step was to enter experimental variables (Probability of Trial 
Conviction, Delay until Trial, and Waiting for Trial Location) into a model predicting 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores (all models shown in in Table 5). Next, in Model 2a, the 
demographic variables of Gender and Education were entered into the model. Model 2a 
predicted Subjective Trial Aversion scores better than Model 1 (c2(2) = 19.90, p < .001; 
Model 1’s AIC was 16300 and Model 2a’s AIC was 16286). Model 2a’s betas and 
standard errors can be seen in SM 13. Next, because Gender was nonsignificant in Model 
2a, Model 2b was run excluding Gender. Model 2b was still significantly different from 
Model 1 (c2(1) = 16.84, p < .001; Model 1’s AIC was 16300 and Model 2b’s AIC was 
16285), but Model 2a with Gender in it was not significantly different from Model 2b 
(c2(1) = 3.06, p > .1). Model 2b is shown in Table 5. Next, Model 3a used Model 2b as a 
starting point since Models 2a and 2b did not differ in the amount of variance they 
explained but Model 2b uses fewer predictors. In Model 3a, the control variable of recent 
driving-accident experience was entered into the model. Model 3a was not significantly 
different than Model 2b (c2(1) = 0.32, p > .1; Model 2b’s AIC was 3150.1 and Model 
3a’s AIC was 3151.7). Model 3a’s betas and standard errors can be seen in SM 14. 
Next, in Model 3b, Impulsivity was entered into Model 2b. Adding in Impulsivity 




and Model 3b’s AIC was 16269), and Impulsivity significantly predicted Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores, containing the second largest effect size (r2 = .03) after PTC (r2 = .04; 
see Table 5). Last, in Model 4, the situated person variables of Blameworthiness, 
Negative Contemplative Emotions, and Perception of Innocence were entered into Model 
3b. Adding in the situated person variables significantly improved the model (c2(1) = 
37.51, p < .001; Model 3b’s AIC was 15370 and Model 4’s AIC was 15339). Model 4’s 
betas, standard errors, semi-partial correlation coefficients, and confidence intervals can 
be seen in Table 5. 
Discussion 
 Overall, Study 1 provides evidence that there are various person variables that 
independently and/or interactively affect plea-bargain decisions and may also affect 
discounting of non-monetary losses more generally. This discussion section will describe 
the impact of the following predictor categories’ impact on subjective trial aversion: (1) 
person variables, including demographic and trait-level individual differences, and (2) 
situated-person variables, including Blameworthiness and Perceptions of Innocence. 
Then, the discussion section will use two situated-person variables as outcome measures 
and describe how the hypothetical scenario impacted participants’ perceptions of 
innocence and blameworthiness. 
Person Variables 
First, men were more likely to choose to go to trial and participants with at least a 
college degree were more likely to choose to go to trial. Second, participants with higher 
impulsivity were more likely to choose to go to trial than were participants with lower 




situational variables of Probability of Trial Conviction and Delay until Trial than were 
participants with lower impulsivity.  
Consistent with findings by Myerson, Baumann, and Green (2017), Study 1 found 
that as delay increased, low-impulsivity participants were more likely to choose the 
immediate option—here, pleas, and in Myerson et al. (2017) a monetary payment—
relative to high-impulsivity participants. However, contrary to the reasoning of 
Hypothesis 6, that highly impulsive individuals would be more sensitive to situational 
cues of risk, like probability of trial conviction, than less impulsive individuals, the 
present data suggested the exact opposite. Rather than highly impulsive people being 
sensitive to probability of trial conviction and responding accordingly, highly impulsive 
people simply maintained a baseline degree of risk-taking, going to trial more often than 
less impulsive people on average, and less impulsive people were more sensitive to 
probability of trial conviction, seeing it as a strong deterrent of going to trial. Figure 3 
shows that once the Probability of Trial Conviction gets to 30% (at the intersection of the 
yellow and green lines) low-impulsivity participants avoid trial more than high-
impulsivity participants. 
Trait-level individual differences other than impulsivity did not predict plea-
bargain decisions, however. Participants’ levels of system justification were unrelated to 
the discounting of criminal sanctions. Although Clatch and Borgida (2021) did not 
specifically report regression statistics on this relation, unpublished analysis showed that 
system justification—in its original validated scale form—did not significantly predict 
plea decisions. And the present study, using an adapted version of system justification 




once the experimental variables were revealed to explain the lion’s share of the variance. 
These nonsignificant findings in part may be due to low reliabilities (.67 of the original 
system justification scale in Clatch & Borgida, 2021, and .65 of the adapted scale in the 
present study).  
The null findings may also be due to oversimplified predictions. In particular, 
individuals with higher adapted System Justification may be more likely to choose to go 
to trial than to accept a plea to effectuate their Constitutional rights, or they may be more 
likely to accept a plea because that is the “typical” way criminal cases are resolved. After 
computing a median-split of adapted System Justification Scale scores, distributions of 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores descriptively revealed, as shown in Figure 6, that 
individuals with above-median system justification had less extreme patterns of plea-
bargain decisions. Specifically, the modal categories of all- or almost-all pleas and all- or 
almost-all trials seen in the left panel’s histogram both are smaller in size relative to the 
right panel’s histogram, and the middle Subjective Trial Aversion scores, reflecting more 
nuanced, varied plea decisions increase in size. Thus, it may be that higher system 
justification in the current context is related to more nuanced decision-making and 
engagement in the series of plea-bargain decisions offered rather than related to a 
particular direction of decision (plea or trial). Study 2 will test this more nuanced 
hypothesis using the range of Subjective Trial Aversion scores as the key outcome 
variable. 
Additionally, it was expected that, consistent with Clatch and Borgida’s (Study 2, 
2021) findings, participants with criminal experience would tend to choose to go to trial, 




This may be because the effect of criminal experience is not robust, because the effect of 
criminal experience in the current dataset was wiped out because of data quality issues, or 
because the current measurement of criminal experience is too general to be reliably 
related to plea-bargain decisions. Continuing to measure participants’ criminal experience 
across future studies will help determine whether the first possibility is empirically 
supported. Data-quality issues in the current dataset, which was collected in the first 
month of the COVID shut-downs, are reflected in bot-like responses like “The federal 
criminal justice system handles crimes committed on federal” and “worked in the 
criminal justice system as a corrections officer, charged with a crime,” the latter of which 
was verbatim reported by multiple participants. Switching to Lucid and Prolific for this 
dissertation’s later studies was done to increase data quality. The original, broad criminal 
experience questions may have been overbroad since participants responded to follow-up 
open-ended questions with, for example, “I served on a jury” and “studied some criminal 
justice in college.” Adding specific criminal justice experiences questions will attempt to 
measure criminal justice experiences that pertain more specifically to plea-bargain 
decisions. 
 Need for cognitive closure has been theorized and empirically demonstrated to 
predict various operationalizations of the urgency (“seize”) tendency and permanency 
(“freeze) tendency across psychological processes including intrapersonal, interpersonal, 
and group processes (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). The current plea-bargain decision 
task is best understood as an intrapersonal process in which participants’ need for 
cognitive closure might influence their situational cue utilization such that participants 




decision and stick to that decision within a decision tree as well as across the five Delay 
decision trees. However, results were inconsistent with that expected pattern. In order to 
understand the pattern of results presented it is important to understand the key outcome 
variable in these analyses: Subjective Trial Aversion scores’ range. 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores’ range was calculated as range of the subjective 
scores across the five Delay decision trees, and because four plea-trial decisions 
determined each delay’s subjective value, Subjective Trial Aversion scores’ range took 
into account both within-delay decisional variation as well as across-delay decisional 
variation. Thus, follow-up analyses were conducted to determine patterns of plea-trial 
responses solely within delay decision trees (rather than within and across). Accordingly, 
each Delay decision tree’s Subjective Trial Aversion score was recoded to describe the 
series of four plea-trial decisions (e.g., plea-trial-trial-trial). Then, based on that recoding 
a Consistency count was calculated based on how many of the last three plea-trial 
decisions in the Delay decision tree were consistent with the first decision. So the pattern 
“plea-trial-trial-trial” would have a Consistency score of 0 because the participant 
selected trial for decisions two, three and four in the decision tree. Because Delay’s five 
levels were randomly ordered for each participant, Figure 8 shows the pattern of 
Consistency by “Delay Blocks” such that “Delay Block 1” is the first Delay decision tree 
seen by participants (regardless of the actual Delay presented) for participants with High 
and Low Need for Cognitive Closure scores (based on a median-split) in cross-tab form.  
Notably, participants with lower Need for Cognitive Closure scores showed more 
Consistency (with Consistency scores of 3 more often) than did participants with higher 




higher Need for Cognitive Closure scores more often had Consistency scores of 1 or 2 
relative to participants with lower Need for Cognitive Closure scores across all five 
Delay Blocks. On its face this pattern of responding does not seem to be consistent with 
NFCC theory, but the pattern of responding suggests that the referent of “seize and 
freeze” matters. The hypotheses assumed that the most salient aspect of the decision 
would be the final decision to accept a plea versus go to trial. However, the pattern of 
responses may suggest that the most salient aspect of the decision was the criminal 
sanction associated with the plea bargain. Making a series of binary decisions that always 
change via the criminal sanction associated with the plea bargain can be understood as a 
negotiation between the structure of the skip logic and the participant—titrating to the 
participant’s indifference point. De Dreu and colleagues (1999) found that participants 
with high NFCC put in the role of negotiators were more influenced by focal points when 
setting negotiation limits and making concessions than were participants with low NFCC. 
With the criminal sanction as the most salient feature being negotiated in a dual-
discounting plea-bargain decision scenario, it is possible to re-interpret the findings as 
consistent with NFCC theory such that participants with higher Need for Cognitive 
Closure scores “seized” on the focal point of “60 days (2 months) in jail” which was the 
initial plea-offer across all decision trees and then changed their decision once the plea 
amount adjusted via the titration procedure (i.e., if they chose the plea first then chose 
trial or if they chose trial first then chose the plea). Thus, the anchoring effects of 
participants with higher Need for Cognitive Closure scores of De Dreu and colleagues 
(1999) may be reflected in the current study. Study 2 will proceed with both the original 




participants with higher Need for Cognitive Closure scores reached indifference points 
earlier in the titration process than did participants with lower Need for Cognitive 
Closure scores because they were anchoring on the initial plea offer which systematically 
adjusts, seemingly compromising, via the titration procedure). 
Situated-Person Variables 
Participants who perceived themselves to be innocent were less likely to accept 
plea bargains, and participants who believed themselves more blameworthy for the car 
accident and child’s injury were more likely to accept guilty pleas. Moreover, because 
Perceptions of Innocence did not interact with Probability of Trial Conviction, this may 
indicate that perceptions of innocence are influenced more by features of the crime 
scenario than by participants’ between-participants assignment of purported likelihood of 
success at trial. 
Together, these results suggest that Perceptions of Innocence may be less 
influenced by Probability of Trial Conviction than perceptions of Blameworthiness. 
Figure 6’s intersection lines indicate that when Probability of Trial Conviction is high 
(95% and 99%) participants’ self-blame influences their decision less than when 
Probability of Trial Conviction is low. This may mean that when the evidence is stacked 
against a criminal defendant, resulting in a very high probability of trial conviction, 
defendants may be more willing to accept a plea regardless of their degree of self-blame; 
but when the evidence is not stacked against them, defendants may use their self-blame 
as a key factor to make their plea-bargain decisions. The lack of interactive effect of PTC 
and Perceptions of Innocence, on the other hand, suggests that their perception of 




of innocence a stable factor in their plea-bargain decision-making process, and less likely 
(than at least Blameworthiness) to be influenced by information about their likelihood of 
losing at trial. 
 The last situated-person variable, Negative Contemplative Emotions, had both a 
direct and interactive effect on plea-bargain decisions. Specifically, participants with 
highly negative emotions about trial were more likely to avoid trial and accept the plea. 
Additionally, when participants were told that their wait for trial would be spent in jail, 
participants’ willingness to accept a plea increased as the delay until trial increased only 
for participants with above-median negative emotions about trial—not for participants 
with below-median negative emotions about trial, which suggests that when participants 
do not have strong negative emotions about the wait for trial, they are more inclined to 
disregard Delay until Trial in making their plea bargain decisions. 
 However, the predicted interaction between Negative Contemplative Emotions 
(NCE) and Waiting-for-Trial Location (WTL) was nonsignificant, so in order to 
understand that result, two follow-up regressions were conducted. First, a replication of 
the interaction between NCE and Delay until Trial (DUT) was conducted using the full 
dataset, rather than only the Jail subset. This was done to determine whether the effect of 
negative emotions only influences participants’ sensitivity to delay until trial if they are 
waiting for trial in jail, or if that same pattern holds regardless of WTL condition. Table 4 
shows the significant interaction beta coefficient and standard error. Second, to 
understand why the NCE*DUT relation holds across WTL conditions but WTL does not 
interact with NCE without DUT in the model, their three-way interaction was tested. 




condition, and Figure 8’s dotted red line in the left panel depicts that participants in the 
Jail condition who had above-median negative emotions were especially sensitive to 
delay, whereas the two other dotted red lines associated with Bail and Ambiguous 
conditions and all pink lines associated with below-median negative emotions were fairly 
flat.  
Together, results of these regressions suggest that only waiting in jail and having 
especially negative emotions about trial made participants sensitive to the delay until 
trial. For these participants, as delay until trial increased, they were more likely to accept 
plea bargains. Thus, Study 1’s findings regarding negative contemplative emotions adds 
psychological context to Clatch and Borgida’s Study 3 (2021) finding that waiting-for-
trial location moderates delay in plea-bargain decisions. Specifically, although Clatch and 
Borgida found that delay only influences plea-bargain decisions when participants must 
wait for trial in jail, when people have strong negative contemplative emotions, they 
further accentuate the influence of delay on decisions.  
 This finding is also consistent with Harris’s (2012) dread hypothesis, which holds 
that anticipatory dread is a mechanism of delay discounting of non-monetary losses, as 
well as Molouki et al.’s (2019) finding that contemplative emotions increase the 
steepness of monetary delay discounting. 
Factual Innocence 
Notably, based on the vignette, all participants were arguably factually innocent, 
and yet 94.15% (n = 370) of participants reported feeling some degree of self-blame for 
the car accident or child’s injury. Additionally, 65.78% (n= 246) of participants believed 




the vast majority of participants accepted a false guilty plea, and Figure 2 shows how 
Probability of Trial Conviction and Delay until Trial shift the distributions of participants 
toward accepting more, and harsher, plea bargains. Thus, probability of trial conviction 
and delay until trial are situational features that push people toward accepting plea 
bargains despite factual innocence, which highlights the promise of discounting-plea-
bargaining studies for better understanding real-world plea bargaining. 
Limitations and Future Studies 
Limitations of Study 1 include the fact that the sample is not nationally 
representative, and national representation matters for research attempting to describe and 
explain universal cognitive patterns and research attempting to generalize to real-world 
phenomena that affect Americans from all walks of life. Study 1 also does not measure 
study-task personal involvement nor recent life stress, and these are two variables, if 
controlled for in the model, might reveal different effects of key experimental variables. 
For example, people who are more involved in the task might accept more pleas because 
they take seriously the possibility of jail time, and people who have experienced more 
recent life stress might also be eager to resolve the criminal matter and take the plea to 
avoid dealing with the distraction of preparing for trial.  
Also, in terms of the experimental manipulations, because Delay until Trial was 
manipulated within-participants, conclusions about how participants’ person variables 
interact with Delay-until-Trial, as a matter of psychological process, are slightly more 
internally valid  conclusions than conclusions about how participants’ person variables 




participants. To remove this asymmetry in conclusion validity, Study 2 will manipulate 
Probability of Trial Conviction within participants. 
Because this dissertation adopts the person-by-situation strategy, it is important to 
find individual differences that reliably (e.g., across sample sources, studies, and time-
space) predict plea-bargain decisions and discounting of non-monetary losses. 
Consequently, the following rule will be used to decide what individual difference 
measures to assess in Studies 2–4: If there is no evidence (across two studies) that an 
individual difference measure predicts Subjective Trial Aversion scores (either directly 
via the main effect or interactively with a manipulated variable), it will not be measured 
in future studies. Accordingly, all individual differences measured in Study 1’s dataset 
will be measured in Study 2. However, where there is evidence that a variable has a 
significant impact on Subjective Trial Aversion scores in the reverse direction than 
expected, competing hypotheses will be outlined. 
Impulsivity as a unitary personality construct (see Duckworth & Kern, 2011) has 
recently been critiqued (see, e.g., Sharma et al., 2014), and the present study admittedly 
utilized only the Impulsiveness subscale of a 54-item personality questionnaire (Eysenck 
et al., 1985) which assesses self-reported Impulsiveness, Venturesomeness, and Empathy. 
However, because Myerson, Baumann, and Green (2017) found that only the 
Impulsiveness subscale of the I-7 was related to participants’ discounting decisions, but 
not Venturesomeness or Empathy, and study length was at issue, Studies 2–4 will 
continue to use the I-7. However, conclusions about the Impulsiveness scale’s ability to 




Overall, although person variables reached statistical significance in various 
regression models, once the experimental (situational) variables were entered into the 
model with the person variables it became clear that the experimental variables 
influenced decisions the most. This points to the power of situational features on human 
decision-making, which to large extent was expected based on the robustness of 
probability and delay in monetary discounting studies. To some extent, however, it was 
somewhat surprising that person variables, especially trait-level person variables did not 
carry more weight than they did. The trait-level person variables like Education and 
Impulsivity seemed to be less important to decision-making relative to the situated-
person variables like Blameworthiness and Negative Contemplative Emotions.22 Thus, 
although the situational variables explained the most variance in plea-bargain decisions 
relative to trait-level and situated-person variables, person variables still added predictive 
utility to the decision-making model, and certain person variables seem to be a lens 
through which participants perceived and reacted to the situational variables. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6’s general discussion.
 
22 See Table 5’s Model 4 to see that the latter two variables were significant but the 






Study 1 Accident Regression Analyses 
 Subjective Trial Aversion Blame Innocence (ordinal) 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI B SE R2a 95% CI B SE R2a 95% CI 
Accident Ever   .002 .68    -.002    .006  
      Maybe -2.81 6.47   (-15.46, 9.85) 20.15 18.88  (-16.96, 57.27) .05 .28  (-.49, .60) 




  .001 .71    .008    -.001  
      Upsetting -.66 1.47   (-3.54, 2.22) 6.73 4.24  (-1.63, 15.09) -.06 .06  (-.18, .07) 
Accident 3-month   .02 .68    .008    .004  
      Maybe 1.10 4.54   (-7.78, 9.99) 13.45 13.35  (-12.81, 39.70) -.21 .21  (-.61, .20) 
      No 8.95** 3.42   (2.26, 15.64) -8.47 10.06  (-28.24, 11.30) -.28m .16  (-.59, .02) 
Accident 3-month 
Upsetting 
  .000 .41    .006    .02  
      Upsetting .04 1.88   (-3.63, 3.72) 6.41 5.38  (-4.32, 17.14) -.22 .13  (-.49, .05) 
 
Note. Models pertaining to how upsetting the accidents were only used data from participants who had reported “Yes” or “Maybe” 
to ever being in an accident and being in an accident in the last three months respectively because participants who responded 
“No” were not asked how upsetting their non-existent accident was. The reference category for Models 1 and 3 are “Yes.” For the 
Subjective Trial Aversion dependent variable, two R-squared statistics are provided for each model because generalized, mixed 
effects regression models were used, producing marginal R2 for the fixed effects, and R2 for the combined fixed and random 
effects. For the Blameworthiness and Perception of Innocence dependent variables, the adjusted R2 statistics were provided. 






Study 1 Demographics Regression Analyses 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Age .09 .09 .002 .67 (09, .27) 
Race   .003 .67  
     White, Non-Hispanic -3.56 3.65   (-10.7, 3.59) 
     White, Hispanic -3.83 3.16   (-10, 2.35) 
     Black, Non-Hispanic -2.22 3.16   (-10.3, 5.85) 
Education   .04 .68  
     Some College -.60 4.58   (-9.56, 8.36) 
     College Graduate -11.21** 4.03   (-19.08, -3.34) 
     Graduate School -6.83 4.49   (-15.61, 1.94) 
Gender   .008 .68  
      Male -4.09* 2.03   (-8.07, -0.12) 
      Other 3.97 10.02   (-15.65, 23.59) 
Gender*Education   .04 .68  
      Male -8.70* 4.24   (-16.98, -.42) 
      Education_binary -12.74*** 3.51   (-19.60, -5.88) 
      Male:Education_binary 5.90 4.80   (-3.47, 15.27) 
Gender*PTC   0.12   
       Male -3.19 3.50 0.002  (-10.0, 3.62) 
       Other -8.29 13.94 0.001  (-35.5, 18.89) 
       PTC 19.20*** 3.50 0.05  (12.4, 26.03) 
       Male:PTC -0.57 4.85  (-10.0, 8.88) 
       Other:PTC 28.25 20.25 0.004  (-11.2, 67.73) 
Gender*DUT   0.01   
       Male -3.16 2.09 0.003  (-7.25, 0.93) 
       Other 0.78 10.31  (-19.39, 20.96) 
       DUT 0.09*** 0.02 0.003  (0.05, 0.14) 
       Male:DUT -0.06m 0.03 0.001  (-0.12, 0.001) 
       Other:DUT 0.20 0.15  (-0.10, 0.49) 
Gender*DUT*WTL   0.02   
       Male -3.41 3.76 0.001  (-10.7, 3.89) 
       Other 28.45 20.62 0.002  (-11.6, 68.50) 
       DUT 0.04 0.04  (-0.04, 0.12) 
       Bail 1.84 3.79  (-5.53, 9.20) 
       Jail 1.14 3.93  (-6.48, 8.77) 
       Male:DUT -0.01 0.05  (-0.12, 0.10) 
       Other:DUT -0.04 0.30  (-0.62, 0.54) 
       Male:Bail -1.54 5.13  (-11.5, 8.42) 





       Male:Jail 2.78 5.13  (-7.43, 12.98) 
       Other:Jail -51.42m 29.14 0.004  (-108, 5.18) 
       DUT:Bail 0.04 0.05  (-0.07, 0.15) 
       DUT:Jail 0.12* 0.06 0.001  (0.008, 0.23) 
       Male:DUT:Bail -0.06 0.07  (-0.20,0.09) 
       Other:DUT:Bail -0.04 0.36  (-0.75, 0.67) 
       Male:DUT:Jail -0.08 0.08  (-0.22, 0.07) 
       Other:DUT:Jail 1.05* 0.42 0.001  (0.023, 1.86) 
Education*PTC   0.13   
       Education 1.57 2.20 0.001  (-2.73, 5.87) 
       PTC 48.68*** 12.12 0.03  (24.99, 
72.37) 
       Education:PTC -7.64* 3.08 0.01  (-13.65, -
1.62) 
Education*DTC   0.02   
       Education -3.62** 1.35 0.009  (-6.27, -0.98) 
       DUT 0.02 0.08  (-0.13, 0.17) 
       Education:DUT 0.01 0.02  (-0.03, 0.05) 
Education*DUT*WTL   0.02   
       Education -4.21m 2.26 0.004  (-8.62, 0.21) 
       DUT 0.002 0.13  (-0.25, 0.25) 
       Bail -4.32 12.96  (-29.58, 
20.94) 
       Jail 2.80 13.05  (-22.65, 
28.25) 
       Education:DUT 0.009 0.03  (-0.06, 0.07) 
       Education:Bail 1.52 3.28  (-4.88, 7.91) 
       Education:Jail 0.01 3.31  (-6.43, 6.46) 
       DUT:Bail -0.00003 0.19  (-0.37, 0.37) 
       DUT:Jail 0.08 0.19  (-0.29, 0.45) 
       Education:DUT:Bail 0.002 0.05  (-0.09, 0.10) 
       Education:DUT:Jail 0.002 0.05  (-0.09, 0.10) 
 
Note. The regressions using Gender as a predictor had “Female” as the reference 
category. The regressions using Race as a predictor had “Other” as the reference 
category. The regression using Education as a predictor had “High School” as the 
reference category. Note that the Gender*Education model with the original coding of 
Gender (with three levels: Male, Female, Other) and Education (with four levels High 
School, Part College, College Graduate, Graduate School) had ten parameters, so for this 





were in this category and Education was made binary with the 25 participants with a 
High school education grouped with the 59 participants with a part-of-college education 
and the 234 College graduates grouped with the 68 participants with a Graduate-school 
education. An R2 statistic for the marginal (i.e., fixed effects) is provided and denoted as 
“R2m” and the mixed effects model’s R2 is provided and denoted as “R2c”.  








Study 1 Need for Cognitive Closure Analyses 
 
Models/Variables B SE p Exp(B) R2a 95% CI 
Seize (binary) ~ NFCC -.04 .01 <.001*** .97 .03 (-.05, -.02) 
STA_range ~ NFCC .24 .09 .01* n/a .02 (.06, .42) 
 
Note. The adjusted R2 statistics were provided.  






Study 1 Hypothesized Relation Regressions 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Blameworthiness .07*** .02 .03 .67 (.04, .10) 
Blame*PTC   .13 .68  
      PTC 29.45*** 5.32 .05  (19.05, 39.86) 
      Blameworthiness .11*** .03 .04  (.06, .17) 
      PTC:Blame -.09* .04 .02  (-.17, -.01) 
Innocence_Categ   .02 .68  
      Guilty 6.86** 2.38   (2.20, 11.52) 
      Don’t Know -2.83 4.74   (-12.08, 6.43) 
      Between 2.65 2.63   (-2.48, 7.79) 
Innocence_Ordin*PTC   .12 .68  
      PTC 18.26*** 3.69 .05  (11.05, 25.46) 
      Innocence -3.65m 2.04 .04  (-7.63, .34) 
      PTC:Innocence 1.37 2.89 .01  (-4.28, 7.01) 
NCE -.07*** .01 .07 .67 (-.09, -.05) 
NCE*WTL   .09 .68  
      NCE -.06** .02 .02  (-.09, -.02) 
      Ambiguous -4.73 3.00 .004  (-10.59, 1.12) 
      Jail 2.28 2.89 .004  (-3.35, 7.91) 
      NCE: Ambiguous -.04 .03 .001  (-.09, .01) 
      NCE:Jail -.01 .03 .001  (-.06, .03) 
NCE*DUT [Jail only]   .10 .57  
      NCE -.04* .02 .05  (-.08, -.01) 
      DUT .09 .37 .05  (-.64, .82) 
      NCE:DUT -.02*** .003 .01  (-.02, -.01) 
NCE*DUT [All Locations]   .08 .68  
      NCE -.06*** .01 .04  (-.08, -.04) 
      DUT 2.66 1.90 .01  (-10.63, 63.81) 
      NCE:DUT -.05** .02 .004  (-.86, -.20) 
NCE*DUT*WTL [All Locations]   .1 .69  
      NCE -.05*** .02 .01  (-.09, -.02) 
      DUT 40.47 31.46   (-21.12, 102.05) 
      Ambiguous -4.67 3.10 .003  (-10.71, 1.37) 
      Jail 2.79 2.98 .001  (-3.02, 8.60) 
      NCE: Ambiguous -.04 .03 .003  (-.09, .01) 
      NCE:Jail .01 .03   (-.04, .06) 
      NCE:DUT -.04 .27   (-.58, .49) 
      DUT: Ambiguous -3.94 46.76   (-95.47, 87.59) 
      DUT:Jail -31.18 44.94   (-119.16, 56.78) 
      NCE:DUT: Ambiguous -.11 .40   (-.67, .90) 
      NCE:DUT:Jail -1.57*** .39 .001  (-2.34, -.81) 
SJS -.02 .09 .000 .67 (-.20, .16) 
SJS*Innocence_Ordin   .02 .68  
      SJS -.13 .15 .002  (-.43, .16) 
      Innocence -7.24 6.09 .003  (-19.15, 4.67) 
      SJS:Innocence .07 .11 .001  (-.15, .30) 
Impulsivity -.85*** .19 .04 .67 (-1.23, -.48) 
Impulsivity*PTC   .21 .67  





      PTC 40.82*** 3.75 .17  (33.49, 48.14) 
      Imp:PTC -2.88*** .42 .08  (-3.70, -2.07) 
Impulsivity*DUT   .04 .68  
      Imp -.72*** .20 .02  (-1.12, -.33) 
      DUT 1.30*** .27 .004  (.78, 1.82) 
      Imp:DUT -.08** .03 .001  (-.14, -.02) 
Impulsivity*DUT*WTL   0.05   
       Impulsivity -1.04** 0.36 0.01  (-1.73, -0.35) 
       DUT 0.04 0.05  (-0.05, 0.13) 
       Bail -1.49 4.31  (-9.89, 6.91) 
       Jail -0.26 4.48  (-8.98, 8.47) 
       Impulsivity:DUT -0.0006 0.005  (-0.01, 0.01) 
       Impulsivity:Bail 0.43 0.49 0.001  (-0.52, 1.38) 
       Impulsivity:Jail 0.45 0.49 0.001  (-0.51, 1.40) 
       DUT:Bail -0.007 0.06  (-0.13, 0.12) 
       DUT:Jail 0.39*** 0.07 0.004  (-0.17, 0.43) 
       Impulsivity:DUT:Bail 0.002 0.007  (-0.01, 0.02) 
       Impulsivity:DUT:Jail -0.03*** 0.007 0.002  (-0.04, -0.01) 
Criminal Experience (Any) -1.63 2.04 .001 .67 (-5.61, 2.36) 
Criminal Experience (Own) -1.80 2.37 .001 .67 (-6.43, 2.83) 
Criminal Experience (Other) .66 2.19 .000 .67 (-3.64, 4.95) 
Criminal Experience (Categorical)   .006 .68  
     Other Only -.99 2.78   (-6.41, 4.44) 
     Own Only -5.75m 3.41 .005  (-12.40, .91) 
     Both .79 .79   (-5.13, 6.71) 
Note. For the NCE*DUT [Jail only] model, DUT was rescaled by dividing by 10 to put it 
on a similar scale to NCE; for the NCE*DUT [All Locations] model, DUT was rescaled 
by dividing by 100 to put it on a similar scale to NCE; for the NCE*DUT*WTL model, 
DUT was rescaled by dividing by 1000 to put it on a similar scale to the other variables. 
The Imp*DUT model, DUT was rescaled by dividing by 10 to put it on a similar scale to 
Impulsivity. The reference group of the four-level Criminal Experience variable was 
“None” and the smallest p-value between the four groups was p = -.092. An R2 statistic 
for the marginal (i.e., fixed effects) is provided and denoted as “R2m” and the mixed 
effects model’s R2 is provided and denoted as “R2c”. The multiple regression predictor 
parameters’ semi-partial correlations that are greater than or equal to .001 appear in the 
R2m column but in the rows of each parameter rather than the model-specification row. 






   
Table 5. 
 
Study 1 Cross-Construct Multiple Regressions 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Model 1   0.14 0.69  
      PTC 25.18*** 4.20 .04  (17.00, 33.36) 
      DUT 0.12* 0.05 .001  (0.02, 0.20) 
      Ambiguous -2.16 4.30   (-10.54, 6.23) 
      Jail 6.34 4.32 .003  (-2.08, 14.77) 
      PTC:Delay -0.11 0.06 .001  (-0.23, 0.02) 
      PTC:Ambiguous 1.41 6.01   (-10.31, 12.14) 
      PTC:Jail -8.98 6.01 .003  (-20.69, 2.73) 
      DUT:Ambiguous -0.03 0.07   (-0.16, 0.10) 
      DUT:Jail 0.28*** 0.07 .003  (0.15, 0.41) 
      PTC:DUT:Ambiguous 0.04 0.09   (-0.15, 0.22) 
      PTC:DUT:Jail -0.33*** 0.09 .002  (-0.51, -0.15) 
Model 2b   0.16 0.69  
      PTC 24.89*** 4.12 .04  (16.88, 32.91) 
      DUT 0.11* 0.05 .001  (0.02, 0.20) 
      Ambiguous -2.28 4.22   (-10.50, 5.94) 
      Jail 6.23 4.24 .003  (-2.03, 14.48) 
      Education_binary -9.05*** 2.20 .03  (-13.34, -4.76) 
      PTC:Delay -0.11 0.06 .001  (-0.23, 0.02) 
      PTC:Ambiguous 0.74 5.90   (-10.75, 12.23) 
      PTC:Jail -8.77 5.89 .003  (-20.24, 2.71) 
      DUT:Ambiguous -0.03 0.07   (-0.16, 0.10) 
      DUT:Jail 0.28*** 0.07 .003  (0.15, 0.41) 
      PTC:DUT:Ambiguous 0.04 0.09   (-0.15, 0.22) 
      PTC:DUT:Jail -0.33*** 0.09 .002  (-0.51, -0.15) 
Model 3b          0.19 0.69  
       PTC 24.71*** 4.04 .04  (16.86, 32.56) 
       DUT 0.11* 0.05 .001  (0.02, 0.20) 
      Ambiguous -3.22 4.14 .001  (-11.27, 4.84) 
      Jail 6.16 4.15 .002  (-1.92, 14.24) 
      Education -6.48** 2.24 .02  (-10.84, -2.13) 
      Impulsivity -0.76*** 0.18 .03  (-1.12, -0.41) 
      PTC:Delay -0.11 0.06 .001  (-0.23, 0.02) 
      PTC:Ambiguous 1.94 5.79   (-9.32, 13.21) 
      PTC:Jail -8.07 5.78 .002  (-19.31, 3.17) 
      DUT:Ambiguous -0.03 0.07   (-0.16, 0.10) 
      DUT:Jail 0.28*** 0.07 .005  (0.15, 0.41) 
      PTC:DUT:Ambiguous 0.04 0.09   (-0.15, 0.22) 





Model 4   0.24 0.70  
       PTC 21.16*** 4.01 .03  (13.39, 28.92) 
       DUT 0.11* 0.05 .001  (0.02, 0.20) 
      Ambiguous -4.52 4.11 .001  (-12.47, 3.43) 
      Jail 2.40 4.20   (-5.73, 10.54) 
      Education -3.99m 2.33 .005  (-8.49, 0.52) 
      Impulsivity -0.34 0.23 .004  (-0.78, 0.09) 
      NCE  -0.05*** 0.01 .03  (-0.08, 0.09) 
      Blameworthiness 0.07*** 0.02 .03  (0.04, 0.11) 
      Innocence_Ordin -0.23 1.17   (-2.49, 2.03) 
      PTC:Delay -0.11m 0.07 .001  (-0.24, 0.02) 
      PTC:Ambiguous 4.03 5.74 .001  (-7.08, 15.15) 
      PTC:Jail -2.52 5.85   (-13.85, 8.81) 
      DUT:Ambiguous -0.03 0.07   (-0.16, 0.11) 
      DUT:Jail 0.32*** 0.07 .005  (0.19, 0.46) 
      PTC:DUT:Ambiguous 0.03 0.09   (-0.16, 0.21) 
      PTC:DUT:Jail -0.37*** 0.10 .003  (-0.56, -0.19) 
 
Note. An R2 statistic for the marginal (i.e., fixed effects) is provided and denoted as “R2m” 
and the mixed effects model’s R2 is provided and denoted as “R2c”. The multiple 
regression predictor parameters’ semi-partial correlations that are greater than or equal to 
.001 appear in the R2m column but in the rows of each parameter rather than the model-
specification row. 











Note. In Study 1, five Subjective Trial Aversion scores were computed—one for each 
level of Delay since it was manipulated within-participants. For each participant, these 5 
values were averaged and then graphed above. Notably, the distribution is bi-modal with 







Study 1 Subjective Trial Aversion by Levels of Probability and Delay 
 
    
 















































































Study 1 Within-Delay-Decision-Tree Decision Patterns by NFCC Score 
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Study 1 NCE*DUT Interaction on Subjective Trial Aversion by Waiting-for-Trial 
Location Condition 
 
    
 
 






Chapter 3: Study 2 – The Measurement of Discounting and Situational and the 
Person-Variable Predictors of Plea-Bargain Decision-Making 
 
Study 2 is a methodological study with the following primary goals: (1) to 
determine whether methodological changes affect discounting patterns and to use a 
nationally representative sample to replicate (2a) Clatch and Borgida’s (2021) 
experimental dual discounting findings and (2b) Study 1’s person-by-situation findings, 
as well as (3) to determine whether measuring Subjective Trial Aversion can be made 
more efficient. Because the overarching purpose of this program of research is to 
examine plea bargaining from a more integrated social psychological perspective, which 
requires measuring a variety of variables, extending the length of the survey, it raises 
practical concerns about survey length and participant focus. Thus Study 2 assess 
whether Subjective Trial Aversion scores can be measured by fewer than five questions 
per delay-probability combination, as done in Study 1.  
To determine whether certain methodological changes affect discounting patterns, 
Study 2 will vary two specific methodological features. First, Study 2 will manipulate 
probability within participants rather than between participants. Second, Study 2 will test 
three methods of measuring Subjective Trial Aversion scores. I was interested in making 
these methodological changes for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, 
testing these methodological changes allows for better comparison to past discounting 
studies. Practically, manipulating Probability and Delay variables within-participants 
allows for new between-participants variables to be manipulated without drastically 
increasing the requisite sample size, and manipulating the method of measuring 
participant Subjective Trial Aversion scores allows for the potential of more quickly (but 





As described in Chapter 1, the past dual discounting studies (Vanderveldt et al., 
2015; Cox & Dallery, 2016), which used monetary commodities, varied Probability and 
Delay within-participants, whereas Study 1 (data from Clatch & Borgida, 2021, Study 3) 
varies Probability between-participants and Delay within-participants. Thus, to close the 
methodological gap between the monetary discounting literature and past plea-
bargaining discounting research, Study 2 will vary both variables within-participants. A 
benefit of this methodological change, other than being more closely tied to past dual 
discounting literature, is that when trait-level individual differences are expected to 
interact with both Probability and Delay, parallel conclusions about the process of plea-
bargain decision making can be made with equal confidence. 
Clatch and Borgida’s (2021) studies 2 and 3 showed that as probability of trial 
conviction increased, participants accepted more pleas, and as delay until trial increased, 
participants accepted more pleas. In addition to confirming the statistical significance and 
direction of these Study 2 main effects, Study 3’s results explained Study 2’s null Delay-
by-Probability interaction, which was significant in monetary dual discounting studies 
(Cox & Dallery, 2016; Vanderveldt, et al. 2015), by manipulating the situational feature 
of Waiting-for-Trial Location. This manipulation revealed that the interactive effect of 
Delay and Probability, seen in monetary contexts, only existed when participants waited 
for trial in jail, as opposed to waiting for trial while out on bail. The present study 
anticipates that these patterns of delay and probability discounting will not differ from 
these previous studies, which manipulated Probability of Trial Conviction between 
participants, when both Probability and Delay are manipulated within participants. 





H2a. A significant Probability*Delay interaction should only appear in the Jail 
condition (i.e., not Bail condition), and the direction of probability and delay effects 
should be consistent with those found by Clatch and Borgida (2021). 
Also, Study 2 and 3 of Clatch and Borgida (2021) showed analogous results 
despite going from an ordinal to a continuous measurement of criminal sanctions. The 
consistency existed despite the transition of measuring Subjective Trial Aversion as an 
ordinal outcome variable in Study 2 involving jail time, probation time, and/or 
community service to measuring Subjective Trial Aversion as a continuous outcome 
variable in Study 3. Thus, the following was hypothesized: 
H2b. The three Subjective Trial Aversion measurement procedures tested in Study 
2 will not have significantly different effects on Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
To replicate Study 1’s person-by-situation findings, all of Study 1’s hypotheses 
are adopted in Study 2, except that H1f is modified as follows to predict the particular 
interaction effect found in Study 1: Participants’ level of Impulsivity will interact with 
Probability of Trial Conviction, such that less impulsive participants will be especially 
sensitive to Probability, whereas highly impulsive participants will be less sensitive to 
Probability of Trial Conviction. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited on the Lucid Fulcrum Exchange and received 
compensation from Lucid for their participation. The Lucid Fulcrum Exchange is a 
source of online convenience samples and is an increasingly-used alternative to Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Coppock and McClellan (2019) verified that demographic and 





final sample (N = 415) was nationally representative based on gender, age, race, and 
ethnicity.23 The final sample consisted of 51.08 % (n = 212) women and 48.92 % (n = 
203) men and had a mean age of 45.45 (SD = 17.02). The dataset consists of 67.71% self-
identifying White participants (n = 281), 14.22% (n = 59) Black participants, 5.54% (n = 
23) Asian participants, 1.2% (n = 5) Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander participants, 
0.7% (n = 3) Native American, and 10.6% (n = 44) multi-racial or other racial identity. 
Seventy-eight (18.80%) participants self-identified as Hispanic, with 337 (81.2%) 
identifying as Non-Hispanic. 
Eighty-eight (21.20%) participants completed High school only, 77 (18.55%) 
completed Some College only, 151 (36.39%) graduated from college only, and 99 
(23.86%) completed a Graduate degree. In terms of political affiliation, 169 (40.72%) 
participants were Democrats, 68 (16.39%) were Independents, 148 (35.66%) were 
Republicans, and 30 (7.23%) either left the question blank or selected “prefer not to 
answer.” 
Design 
This study employed a 3 (Measurement Procedure) x 2 (Waiting-for-Trial 
Location) x 4 (Probability of Trial Conviction) x 5 (Delay until Trial) mixed-factor 
design with 2 between-participants variables: Measurement Procedure with three levels 
 
23 Lucid utilizes the United States Census Bureau’s estimates for age, gender, race, and 
ethnicity categories of the United States population up to the year 2019. Using those 
estimates the following quotas were entered into Qualtrics: 18-24 aged people (13%), 25-
34 aged people (18%), 35-44 aged people (18%), 45-54 aged people (19%), 55-64 aged 
people (16%), over-65 aged people (17%); men (49%), women (51%); White-only 
(72%), Black/African American only (13%), Asian only (5%), Native American (1%), 
Other, including Native Hawaiian and people self-identifying with more than one race 





(Original Titration vs. Wider Titration vs. Slider) and Waiting-for-Trial Location with 
two levels (Jail, Bail). As in Study 1, the Jail and Bail conditions contained language in 
the vignette describing explicitly where participants were physically located (see SM 5 
for the manipulation language used). The two within-participants variables were 
Probability of Trial Conviction with four levels (5%, 50%, 95%, 99%) and Delay until 
Trial with five levels (1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year).  
Measurement Procedure and Waiting-for-Trial Location were fully crossed, and 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. Each participant was 
presented with all five levels of Delay until Trial, which were presented in random order 
to reduce the chance of order effects. Each participant received all four levels of 
Probability of Trial Conviction, and the blocks were shown in ascending order such that 
participants first proceeded through the series of five 5%-Probability-of-Trial-Conviction 
decision trees (one for each of the five Delays), then the series of five 50%-Probability-
of-Trial-Conviction decision trees (one for each of the five Delays), and so on. 
As in Study 1, the key outcome variable in this study is Subjective Trial Aversion. 
For the Original Titration condition of the Measurement Procedure variable, Figure 10 
shows the Subjective Trial Aversion score at each tipping point; for the Wider Titration 
conditions, Figure 11 shows the Subjective Trial Aversion score at each tipping point; 
and for the Slider Only conditions, the Subjective Trial Aversion score is directly entered 
by participants using a slider bar ranging from 0 to 120 (see SM 15). As described in the 
two previous chapters, the titration procedures involve a series of binary-forced choice 
questions to isolate a participant’s Subjective Trial Aversion score. The Slider, on the 





Titration procedure is associated with the most restricted range (32 to 88 days in jail), 
whereas the Wider Titration procedure has a range of 1 to 119 days in jail, and the Slider 
procedure is associated with a range of 0 to 120. The Wider and Slider procedures enable 
me to test the possibility of artificial range restriction in the Original Titration’s 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores (as published by Clatch & Borgida, 2021), especially at 
high Probabilities of Trial Conviction, since any realistic range of time in jail does not go 
below 0 days, can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. 
There is currently no feasible way to calculate standard effect sizes for individual 
model terms such as main effects and interactions in mixed effects models because of the 
way variance is partitioned in mixed models (Rights & Sterba, 2019). As a best 
approximation, G*Power was used based on a repeated measures ANOVA with 1 
between-participants variable and 1 within-participants variable interacted. Given an 
effect size f of .1 (taken from Clatch & Borgida, Study 3, 2021, highest order interaction 
model term, i.e., Delay*Probability*Waiting-for-Trial Location), an alpha of .05, power 
of .8, number of between-participants conditions equal to 6, number of within-
participants measurements equal to 5 (i.e., Delay with largest number of levels of the two 
within-participants variables), a correlation among the repeated measures of .03 
(calculated based on Clatch & Borgida, Study 3, 2021, correlation of Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores based on Delay’s level), and nonsphericity correction equal to 1, the total 
sample size required is 414 (see SM 16 for G*Power screenshot). In order to allow for a 
degree of missing data, 450 participants’ data was collected.24 
 
24 To this point I had never used Lucid, so I had no personal experience with the quality 
of their data regarding missingness. So I rounded to 450 in case there was around 10% 





Materials, Measures, and Procedure 
The study materials consisted of an online survey nearly identical to Study 1’s 
survey. As in Study 1, this survey contained the same attention and data quality checks 
(see SM 2 for the text of the checks), a vignette/scenario (SM 3), legal decision-making 
questions (SM 5), individual difference measures (e.g., Impulsivity), and demographic 
and experience questions. The original Study 1 materials are not described again in this 
study. In addition to the Study 1 measures, the following measures were added to the 
survey: Perceptions of Innocence (SM 17), Personal Involvement (SM 18), Specific 
Criminal Justice System Experiences (SM 19), and Cohen et al.’s (1983) Perceived Stress 
Scale (SM 20).  
The Blameworthiness and Innocence, Perceptions of Innocence, Open Ended, and 
Negative Contemplative Emotions questions were presented in random order after the 
series of binary, forced-choice plea-bargain questions. Then, the individual difference 
measures of Need for Cognitive Closure, the adapted System Justification Scale,25 
Impulsivity, and Perceived Stress Scale were presented in random order before the 
driving, personal involvement, criminal experience, and demographic questions. 
Perceptions of Innocence 
In addition to the categorical Innocence question (SM 6), which asked 
participants, from an objective, third-party standpoint, to report whether they were 
innocent or guilty, two additional questions assessed participants’ perceptions of 
 
25 Study 2’s reliabilities related to this measure were higher than Study 1’s but still not 
ideal. The eight modified items had a reliability of α = .58 (Study 1 it was α = .54), and 






innocence. Specifically, participants were asked to rate, on a slider ranging from 0 to 100, 
their innocence and their guilt (see SM 17). The order of these two sliders was randomly 
assigned.26 These two questions were measured to detect the possibility that there may be 
a difference between an objective, third-party standpoint and a participant’s personal 
beliefs as well as the possibility that even participants who believe they are mostly 
innocent (thus making them likely to select “innocent” on the categorical measure) may 
also believe they are partially guilty. This latter possibility, if empirically detected, may 
explain why even studies manipulating participants’ innocence/guilt find that a notable 
portion of innocent participants accept the plea deal (e.g., Edkins & Dervan, 2018, Study 
2 found 25% of innocent participants accepted a guilty plea). 
Personal Involvement 
Personal involvement has a rich theoretical and empirical history in social 
psychology going back to Gordon Allport (1943) and William James (Thomson, Borgida, 
& Lavine, 2014). The set of personal involvement questions included in the Study 2 
survey attempts to measure how attentive and involved participants were during the legal 
decision making (i.e., plea bargaining) task as well as how likely it is that the scenario’s 
facts leading up to the crime (i.e., driving in a residential area with access to a cell phone) 
are representative of their lives (SM 18). Participants were asked to what extent they 
were engaged with, interested in, attentive to, and involved in the legal decisions they 
made. Then, they were asked whether they own a cell phone, how often they look at it 
while driving (with and without picking the phone up), how often they use voice-
activation while driving, how often they use their hands to text, change music, check 
 





driving directions while driving. Rather than being used as a formal predictor variable, 
associated with substantive hypotheses, Personal Involvement will be used as a control 
variable (both as a main effect and moderator; see Göckeritz et al., 2010 for similar 
treatment). 
Specific Criminal Justice System Experiences 
Additional questions were added to the survey such that if a participant responded 
“yes” that they have had criminal justice system experience, they were then asked 
whether they had ever been criminally charged or had ever made a plea-bargain decision 
in their own lives (SM 19). 
Perceived Stress Scale 
Cohen and colleagues’ (1983) Perceived Stress Scale has 10 items measuring the 
perceptions of frequency of experienced stress in the last month (SM 20). The five-item 
response scale ranges from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). This variable was important to 
measure because these survey data were collected in December 2020 in the middle of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, shortly after the 2020 presidential election, during a time of civil 
unrest. Individuals’ recent life experiences and stressors may well influence their 
decisions. In particular, when recent life has been stressful, individuals may respond to 
additional, though hypothetical, stressors (being confronted with a decision to accept a 
plea bargain or go to trial) differently relative to when recent life is less stressful. 
Hypotheses 
This section first summarizes the methodological hypotheses, then as in Study 1, 
details the trait-level predictors’ hypotheses, the situated-person predictors’ hypotheses, 





formal hypotheses for demographic characteristics or for driving and accident experience. 
Additionally, there are no formal hypotheses for the new measures of personal 
involvement and perceived stress. These variables (in addition to demographic and 
experience variables) are analyzed in preliminary analyses and in a later series of 
hierarchical regressions as control variables when all significant variables are entered into 
a single model to determine their relative importance in explaining plea-bargain 
decisions.  
Methodological Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2a. Within the Original Titration condition, which is the same 
procedure used by Clatch and Borgida (2021), a significant interaction between 
Probability of Trial Conviction and Delay until Trial should only appear in the Jail 
condition (i.e., not Bail condition), and the direction of probability and delay effects 
should be consistent with those found by Clatch and Borgida (2021). 
Hypothesis 2b. The three Subjective Trial Aversion measurement procedures 
(i.e., Slider, Original Titration, and Wider Titration methods) will not have significantly 
different effects on Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
Trait-Level Predictors 
Need for Cognitive Closure.  
Hypothesis 2c. Consistent with Study 1’s Hypothesis 1a, participants with higher 
NFCC scores will seize-and-freeze, evincing more “stickiness” of their first plea-trial 
choice (i.e., choose all “trial” or all “plea,” corresponding to Subjective Trial Aversion 





Hypothesis 2d.  Participants with higher NFCC scores will seize-and-freeze 
across the Delays, evincing smaller variation in Subjective Trial Aversion scores across 
the Delays than will participants with lower NFCC scores. 
Adapted System Justification.   
Hypothesis 2e.  Individuals with high System Justification will have lower 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores (i.e., be more likely to go to trail) than will individuals 
with low System Justification.  
Hypothesis 2f.  Participants’ system justification will interact with their ordinal 
perceptions of Innocence to predict their plea decisions, such that participants with high 
System Justification who also believe they are innocent will have lower Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores (i.e., evince the most willingness to go to trial), and participants with 
high System Justification who also believe they are guilty will have higher Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores (i.e., evince the most willingness to accept a guilty plea). 
Impulsivity.  
Hypothesis 2g. Highly impulsive participants will prefer the uncertain/risky 
option, trial, evincing lower Subject Trial Aversion scores, relative to less impulsive 
participants. 
Hypothesis 2h. Participants’ impulsivity will interact with Probability of Trial 
Conviction, such that low-impulsivity participants will be especially sensitive to 
probability, evincing a stronger positive relation between Probability of Trial Conviction 
and Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will highly impulsive participants.  
Hypothesis 2i. Participants’ impulsivity will interact with Delay until Trial, such 





a stronger positive relation between Delay until Trial and Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores than will more impulsive participants. 
Situated-Person Predictors 
Blameworthiness and Innocence.  
Hypothesis 2j.   Participants experiencing more self-blame for the accident and 
child’s injury will have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants 
experiencing less self-blame.  
Hypothesis 2k.  Participants who perceive themselves to be less innocent of the 
crime charged will have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants 
who perceive themselves to be more innocent.  
Hypothesis 2l and 2m. Neither participants’ self-blame nor their perceptions of 
Innocence will interact with Probability of Trial Conviction to Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores. That is, blameworthiness and innocence are more accurately described as 
individual perceptions and beliefs developed after reading the scenario rather than 
influenced by the situational cue of probability of losing at trial. 
 Negative Contemplative Emotions.  
Hypothesis 2n.  Participants with higher Negative Contemplative Emotions will 
have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants with weaker negative 
anticipatory emotions. 
Hypothesis 2o.  Negative Contemplative Emotions will moderate the relation 
between Waiting-for-Trial Location and Subjective Trial Aversion scores. Specifically, 
participants in the jail condition should exhibit the stronger Negative Contemplative 





the wait until trial especially negative to contemplate relative to considering the wait until 
trial while living one’s life as usual (i.e., participants are out on bail). 
Hypothesis 2p.  In the Jail condition, Negative Contemplative Emotions will 
moderate the relation between Delay until Trial and Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
Specifically, for participants in the Jail condition, their negative anticipatory emotions 
about trial should determine the strength of the relation between Delays and their 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores because waiting in jail and having negative emotions 
sensitizes participants to the delay spent in jail while waiting for trial. 
Criminal Justice System Experience 
Hypothesis 2q.  Participants with Criminal Experience will have lower Subjective 




SM 21 is a comprehensive resource that shows the exploratory relations between 
demographic and trait-level predictors, which are provided for background. 
Subjective Trial Aversion 
In the Slider condition of the Measurement Method experimental variable, 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores ranged from 0 to 120, whereas the Wider condition’s 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores ranged from 1 to 119, and the Original condition’s 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores ranged from 32 to 88. Because the Measurement 





condition-specific figures and analyses are presented below in the Hypothesized 
Relations section rather than as a study-wide distribution. 
Accident Analyses 
 
 Table 6 shows the results of a series of simple linear regressions conducted to 
determine whether having ever been in a car accident or having been in a car accident 
within the last three months (as well as how upsetting those accidents were) influenced 
participants’ patterns of plea-bargain decisions (i.e., Subjective Trial Aversion scores), 
Blameworthiness, Perceptions of Innocence, and Perceptions of Guilt. The only 
regression predicting Subjective Trial Aversion scores that revealed a significant effect 
involved having ever experienced a car accident. Specifically, participants who had ever 
been in an accident had significantly higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores (i.e., 
accepted the plea bargain and avoided trial more; M = 68.02, SD = 41.89) than did people 
who have not (t(411)=2.16, p < .05; M = 62.28, SD = 39.09).  
 Blameworthiness was significantly predicted by having been in a recent accident 
as well as the degree of upset that the accident caused. Specifically, participants who had 
a recent car accident blamed themselves significantly more (M = 137.26, SD = 49.79) 
than did participants who did not have a recent accident (t(412)=2.32, p < .05; M = 
108.38, SD = 63.78). Additionally, the more upsetting their recent accident was, the more 
they blamed themselves in the hypothetical scenario presented in the current study (B = 
11.74, SE = 4.88). 
 Perceptions of Innocence and Guilt were significantly influenced by having been 
in a car accident. Participants who had been in a recent car accident perceived that in the 





(M = 62.92, SD = 33.12) than did people who had not be in an accident (respectively, 
t(412) = 3.42, p < .001, M = 59.15, SD = 32.87; t(412) = 2.44, p < .05,  p = .06, M = 
46.52, SD = 34.16). 
Demographic Analyses 
    
Table 7 shows the results of a series of simple linear regressions conducted to 
determine whether various demographic features influenced participants’ plea-bargain 
decisions (i.e., Subjective Trial Aversion scores). Age, Race,27 Education, Political 
Affiliation, and Ethnicity did not significantly predict patterns of plea-bargain decisions. 
Gender, however, did significantly predict plea-bargain decisions. As in Study 1, Men 
were more likely to choose to go to trial (i.e., have lower Subjective Trial Aversion 




 Replication of Clatch and Borgida’s (2021) Findings. First, to test the 
prediction that patterns of delay and probability discounting will be robust across 
different methodological designs—that is, regardless of whether they are manipulated 
between- or within-participants—a three-way interaction among the three experimental 
factors (Probability of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, and Waiting-for-Trial 
Location) was run in the Original Titration condition. Table 8’s left panel shows that 
there was no significant three-way interaction (B = -.001, SE = .0009, p > .1), unlike that 
 
27 This was true regardless whether kept all Race categories or limited it to three 





shown by Clatch and Borgida (2021, Study 3). However, Table 8 shows the predicted 
negatively-valenced interaction in the Wider Titration condition (right panel; B = -.01, SE 
= .002, p < .001). And Figure 15 depicts delay discounting curves at each level of 
Probability of Trial Conviction—with Clatch and Borgida’s figure (2021) in the top panel 
with Study 2’s Original and Wider Titrations’ delay discounting curves beneath. 
Outcome-Variable Measurement Procedures. Counter to expectation, 
Measurement Method significantly affected Subjective Trial Aversion scores, such that 
relative to the Original Titration (M = 66.01, SD = 24.21), the Slider condition yielded 
significantly lower Subjective Trial Aversion scores (M = 55.39, SD = 42.34), and the 
Wider Titration yielded significantly higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores (M = 74.25, 
SD = 49.53). Table 9 shows the simple linear regression’s betas and standard errors. 
Figure 12 shows the distributions of Subjective Trial Aversion scores by Measurement 
Method condition. The Slider condition’s distribution of Subjective Trial Aversion scores 
was distinct from the two titration procedures’ conditions, containing a mode at the low 
end of its range. The Wider condition’s distribution of Subjective Trial Aversion scores, 
like the Original condition’s, contained its primary mode at the high end of its range with 
a secondary mode at the low end.  
 To examine the impact of Measurement Method in the present experiment, a 
series of regressions was conducted examining the impact of Measurement Method on 
the other three experimental factors: Probability of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, 
and Waiting-for-Trial Location. First, three multiple regressions were conducted to 
determine whether Measurement Method interacted with any of the other experimental 





dual discounting theory and has been empirically demonstrated by Clatch and Borgida 
(2020) in the plea bargaining setting, the three-way interaction among Delay until Trial, 
Probability of Trial Conviction, and Measurement Method was conducted. Third, a series 
of simple linear regressions was conducted to determine whether any of the three 
experimental variables’ main effect on Subjective Trial Aversion scores was different in 
magnitude or direction depending on the Measurement Method condition. Fourth, 
because Clatch and Borgida (2020) found a three-way interaction among Delay until 
Trial, Probability of Conviction, and Waiting-for-Trial Location, three multiple 
regressions were conducted, one for each measurement method, to determine whether 
that three-way interaction was conditioned on Measurement Method. 
 First, a series of multiple linear regressions was conducted to determine whether 
Measurement Method interacted with the other experimental factors (i.e., Probability of 
Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, and Waiting-for-Trial Location). Table 10 shows that 
there were no significant two-way interactions between Measurement Method and the 
other experimental variables (i.e., Probability of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, and 
Waiting-for-Trial Location). However, there was a significant interaction between 
Measurement Method and Probability of Trial Conviction (Wider versus Original: B = 
.26, SE = .02, p < .001 and Slider versus Original: B = .07, SE = .02, p < .001). Figure 13 
shows that the Wider condition’s green line is steeper than the other two conditions’ 
lines, and the Original condition’s black line shows a simply linear effect whereas the 
other two conditions lines show a steeper increase between 95% and 99% probabilities. 





Original line, are quantified by statistically significant and positive beta values (B = .26 
and B = .07 respectively), shown in Table 10. 
 Second, because the multiplicative effect of Delay and Probability is theoretically 
pertinent and has been empirically demonstrated by Clatch and Borgida (2021), the three-
way interaction among Delay until Trial, Probability of Trial Conviction, and 
Measurement Method was conducted. Table 11 shows a significant three-way interaction 
among Delay until Trial, Probability of Trial Conviction, and the Wider Measurement 
Method, suggesting that the pattern of dual discounting is different in the Wider condition 
relative to the Original condition (B = .002, SE = .001, p < .05) and the Slider condition 
(B = .003, SE = .001, p < .001). Figure 14 shows the three-way interaction among the 
variables, but only a very subtle graphical difference could be detected between the three 
Measurement Methods: The Wider condition’s green line is consistently steeper than the 
other two conditions’ lines (indicating a stronger relation with probability) and its 
steepness changes across the graphs more than the other two conditions’ lines (indicating 
a stronger relation with delay). 
To follow up, the dataset was split into three datasets, Wider, Original, and Slider, 
and the multiplicative dual discounting model was conducted to see whether, in all 
Measurement Procedure conditions, Delay until Trial and Probability of Trial Conviction 
interactively predicted Subjective Trial Aversion scores—and they did. Table 12 shows 
that all three Measurement Method conditions contained a significant two-way 
interaction between Delay until Trial and Probability of Conviction (Original: B = -.0026, 





= .0007, p < .05). The titration procedures have much larger semi-partial correlation 
coefficients for the interaction term (r = .01) relative to the Slider procedure (r = .001). 
 Third, to determine whether any of the three experimental variables’ influence on 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores was different in magnitude or direction, a series of three 
simple linear regressions (i.e., one for each experimental factor: Delay, Probability, and 
Location) was done using each of the three subsets of data. Table 13 shows the positive 
and significant relations between Probability and Trial Conviction and Delay until Trial 
on Subjective Trial Aversion scores across all three subsets and the nonsignificant 
relations between Location and Subjective Trial Aversion scores across all three subsets. 
None of the effects differ in significance or direction based on the data subset (i.e., 
Measurement Method condition). 
Fourth, and last, three multiple regressions, one for each Measurement Method 
condition data subset, were conducted to determine whether the predicted three-way 
interaction shown by Clatch and Borgida (2021, Study 3), who used the Original titration 
procedure, was conditioned on measurement method. Table 8’s lowest row shows that the 
Wider Titration condition was the only one that showed the three-way interaction among 
Delay until Trial, Probability of Conviction, and Waiting-for-Trial Location (B = -.01, SE 
= .002, p < .001). Figure 15 shows the results graphically, compared to Clatch and 
Borgida’s (2021) Study 3, which used the Original Titration procedure. Figure 15 depicts 
that patterns of responses varied based on Measurement Method (in the lower panel) and 
the Original Titration condition produced a similar pattern as Clatch and Borgida (2021). 
In the following Hypothesis-Testing analyses, when Probability of Trial 





and another regression was conducted with Measurement Method to determine whether 
the results were consistent across Measurement Method conditions. 
Trait-Level Predictors 
Need for Cognitive Closure. First, Study 1’s Hypothesis 1a was re-tested using 
Study 2’s data.28 The range of each participant’s five Subjective Trial Aversion scores 
was calculated (i.e., across their five total Subjective Trial Aversion scores, one for each 
Delay). Counter to the hypothesis, and counter to what was found in Study 1 (see Table 
3), NFCC scores did not predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = -.01, SE = .16, p > 
.1; see more statistical details in Table 14). In Study 1’s Discussion it was suggested that 
people with higher NFCC scores may anchor on the first decision’s (in every decision 
tree) criminal sanction of “60 days” as a referent, causing them to change their decision, 
from a plea to trial or vice versa, at the first opportunity. 
To assess this, SM 24 shows 12 of the 40 distributions of the two Titration 
conditions’ Probability-by-Delay decision trees. Of note, first, is that both Original and 
Wider decision trees’ distributions are bi-modal with the vast majority of participants 
always choosing “plea” or always choosing “trial” (see Figure 12). But SM 24 also 
highlights that the third most common pattern of responses is that participants flipped at 
the first opportunity—that is, they accepted a plea then chose trial or chose trial then 
accepted a plea.  
 
28 Dependent variables “Seize” and “SV range” were both used in Study 1. SV range has 
all the empirical information, and more, that Seize does because a participant who seized 
would have a SV range of 0 but a participant who did not Seize could have a variety of 






Based on these descriptive observations, to test the prediction presented in Study 
1’s Discussion, a dependent variable “First Flip Count” was created indicating the 
number of decision tress (out of the 20 Probability*Delay possible decision trees) in 
which participants changed their plea decision at the first opportunity (i.e., in their second 
decision in each decision tree). Table 14 shows a significant relation between NFCC 
scores and First Flip Count, but in the direction opposite to what was predicted: people 
higher in NFCC had fewer First Flips than did people lower in NFCC (B = -.05, SE = .02, 
p < .05).  
In order to explain this counter-intuitive result, four new dependent variables were 
created: Count of All-Trial Trees, Count of All-Plea Trees, Count of Mixed Trees, and 
Count of Unique Decision Sequences. Count of All-Trial Trees is the total number of 
decision trees (out of 20 decision trees)29 in which each participant selected only trial. 
Count of All-Plea Trees is the inverse of Count of All-Trial Trees,30 and Count of Mixed 
Trees is the total number of decision trees (out of 20 decision trees) in which each 
participant selected a mixed of plea and trial decisions. Count of Unique Decision 
Sequences measures the number of unique sequences each participant had across the 20 
decision trees (e.g., T-T-T-P vs. T-T-P-T in Original Titration). 
 
29 Accordingly, this analysis was run in the Original and Wider conditions of 
Measurement Method, because the Slider condition only had one decision per Probability 
by Delay and no true “flip” point. 
30 Note that Count of All-Trial Trees and Count of All-Plea Trees is similar, but more 
fine-grained and liberal than Study 1’s Seize dependent measure that categorized 
participants as “seizing” if every single decision they made was to go to trial or every 
single decision they made was to accept the plea. The new dependent variables measure 
more behavior because there were some participants who used an all-trial strategy in 





Table 14 also shows the simple linear regression results of NFCC predicting the 
first three outcome variables, suggesting that people higher in NFCC had more All-Plea 
Trees (i.e., a series of plea decisions in a decision tree; B = .10, SE = .03, p < .01) and 
fewer Mixed-Decision Trees (B = -.08, SE = .03, p < .05), but there was no difference in 
All-Trial Trees based on participant NFCC scores (B = -.03, SE = .02, p > .1). 
Adapted System Justification Scale. A multiple linear regression was conducted 
to test if System Justification scores interact with Innocence Perceptions to predict 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores, and a simple linear regression was conducted to test 
whether higher System Justification predicts lower Subjective Trial Aversion scores (i.e., 
more likely to choose to go to trial). Null results were obtained for both analyses (see 
Table 15). 
Impulsivity. First, as shown in Table 15, a simple linear regression did not 
confirm Hypothesis 2g’s expectation (confirmed in Study 1, Hypothesis 1e) that higher 
Impulsivity scores would predict lower Subjective Trial Aversion scores. Second, 
however, a multiple linear regression confirmed the predicted Impulsivity * Probability 
of Trial interactive effect on Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = -.02, SE = .02, p < 
.001).31 Figure 16 shows a graph of the full dataset’s Impulsivity * Probability of Trial 
interactive effect, with the low-impulsivity group’s line being steeper than the high-
impulsivity group’s line. 
 
31 Because Probability of Trial Conviction was seen previously to interact with 
Measurement Method, three additional multiple regressions were run based on the three 
conditions’ data subsets: Original, Wider, and Slider. Consistent with the all-data 
analysis, all three Measurement Method conditions showed negative and significant 





Third, as shown in Table 15, a multiple linear regression did not confirm 
Hypothesis 2h’s predicted Impulsivity * Delay until Trial interactive effect on Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores. In order to understand this null result, a follow-up multiple 
regression was conducted using only the Location-Jail data, given that the effect of Delay 
on Subjective Trial Aversion scores is descriptively larger in Jail conditions. Table 15 
shows the significant relation, in the Jail data subset, between Impulsivity and Delay until 
Trial on Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = -.02, SE = .01, p < .01). Figure 17’s top 
panel shows the null interaction found using the full dataset, depicted by two very similar 
lines for High and Low Impulsivity, and the bottom-left panel shows the expected 
significant interactive effect between Impulsivity and Delay until Trial on Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores in the Jail data. 
Perceived Stress Scale. Table 15 shows the nonsignificant effect of Perceived 
Stress on Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
Situated-Person Predictors 
Blameworthiness and Innocence. Table 15 shows the results of the simple and 
multiple regressions conducted for these variables on Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
First, a simple linear regression confirmed that higher Blameworthiness scores predict 
higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = .13, SE = .02, p < .001). Additionally, 
consistent with Study 1’s results (but counter to Study 1 and Study 2’s hypotheses—
Hypothesis 1j and Hypothesis 2l) a multiple linear regression showed that 





Trial Aversion scores (B = .0003, SE = .0001, p < .05),32 such that in Figure 18, one can 
see a slight difference in line steepness at high probabilities. 
Second, to test Hypothesis 2k, a series of simple linear regressions was conducted 
using the various measurements of Perceptions of Innocence and Guilt.33 Regardless of 
the operationalization of Perceptions of Innocence, the hypothesis was confirmed. For 
example, participants who perceived themselves to be guilty on the categorical measure 
had higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores compared to participants who perceived 
themselves to be innocent (B = 15.62, SE = 3.58, p < .001; see Table 15). Table 15 also 
shows analogous results for the Perception of Innocence slider, the Perception of Guilty 
slider, and an ordinal recoding of the categorical Perception of Innocence variable.  
Additionally, a multiple linear regression performed to test Hypothesis 2m 
resulted in an unexpected significant interaction between Innocence and Probability of 
Trial Conviction (B = -.04, SE = .01, p < .001). However, the follow-up multiple 
regressions conducted to determine whether Measurement Method influenced the 
interactive effect (see SM 25) revealed that the two titration procedures’ conditions had a 
nonsignificant interactive effect (as expected in Hypothesis 2m and consistent with Study 
1’s findings using the original titration procedure). The significant interaction seen in the 
full dataset was caused by the significant interaction between the two variables in the 
 
32 Because Probability of Trial Conviction was seen to interact with Measurement 
Method, three additional multiple regressions were run based on the three conditions’ 
data subsets: Original, Wider, and Slider (see SM 25 for regression statistics; see SM 26 
for the associated figures). 
33 This includes categorical and ordinal operationalizations, which were also measured in 






Slider condition (B = -.09, SE = .02, p < .001).34 See SM 25 for all other betas and 
standard errors. 
Negative Contemplative Emotions. First, a simple linear regression, conducted 
to test Hypothesis 2n, did not confirm Study 1’s finding of a significant positive relation 
between Negative Contemplative Emotions and Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = -
.01, SE = .02, p > .1). Second, like Study 1, a multiple linear regression did not confirm 
the expected interaction term between Negative Contemplative Emotions and Waiting-
for-Trial Location (B = -.05, SE = .03, p > .1). Third, unlike Study 1, using a subset of the 
data (Jail condition only), the multiple linear regression only marginally confirmed the 
interaction between Negative Contemplative Emotions and Delay until Trial in predicting 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = -.05, SE = .03, p = .09). All of this variable’s 
regression statistics can be seen together in Table 15 for reference. 
Criminal Justice System Experience 
 
 Table 15 shows that neither personal criminal experience alone nor criminal 
experience of someone close to participants predicted Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
SM 27 shows the joint distribution of personal criminal-justice-system experience and 
criminal-justice-system experience of someone close to participants, and the two 
variables were significantly related (c2(1) = 49.52, p < .001). So, a binary variable (Any 
Criminal Experience) was created, and the simple linear regression conducted on that 
variable revealed a marginally significant relation between Criminal Experience and 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = -8.39, SE = 4.51, p = .07; see Table 15), suggesting 
 
34 Figure 20 contains figures for the all-data interaction as well as the Measurement-





that participants with criminal-justice-system experience reported lower Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores. 
Cross-Construct Modeling 
Like the findings reported by Clatch and Borgida (2021) and presented in Study 1, 
multiple regressions with experimental and non-experimental Person (and Situated 
Person) variables were conducted to test whether the effects of Person variables account 
for variance in plea-bargain decisions above and beyond experimental variables.35 Thus, 
the preliminary step was to enter experimental variables (Probability of Trial Conviction, 
Delay until Trial, Waiting for Trial Location, and Measurement Method) into a model 
predicting Subjective Trial Aversion scores (see Model 1 in SM 28).36 Next, in Model 2, 
the demographic variable of Gender was entered into the model. Model 2 was 
significantly better than Model 1 (c2(1) = 4.67, p < .05; Model 1’s AIC was 79212 and 
Model 2’s AIC was 79209). Model 2’s betas and standard errors can be seen in Table 16. 
Next, in Model 3, the controls of Personal Involvement and Behavioral Personal 
Involvement were entered into Model 2.37 Models 2 and 3 did not differ in their 
predictive utility (c2(2) = 0.52, p = .77); Model 3’s AIC was 79213, making it higher than 
Model 2’s AIC, and neither Personal Involvement nor Behavioral Personal Involvement 
were significant, so they were left out in the next model. Model 3’s betas and standard 
errors can be found in SM 29. 
 
35 Again, to reduce the tables referenced in this section, the statistical information for any 
steps in the hierarchical regressions conducted that did not produce a significant 
improvement in the model were placed in supplemental materials. 
36 Unlike Study 1, the starting point was a multiple regression testing the four-way 
interaction between all four experimental factors. 






Next, in Model 4, the individual difference measures of Impulsivity and Need for 
Cognitive Closure were added to Model 2. Models 2 and 4 did not differ in their 
predictive utility (c2(2) = 2.67, p = .26); Model 3’s AIC was 79211, making it higher than 
Model 2’s AIC, and neither Impulsivity nor Need for Cognitive Closure were significant, 
so they were left out moving forward. Model 4 can be found in SM 30. 
Next, in Model 5, the situated-person variables of Blameworthiness and Perceived 
Innocence were added to Model 2. Adding these variables significantly increased the 
Model’s predictive utility (c2(2) = 47.51, p < .001; Model 2’s AIC was 79209 and Model 
5’s AIC was 79166). Model 5’s betas and standard errors can be seen in Table 17. 
Discussion 
Overall, Study 2 provides evidence that certain methodological features influence 
dual discounting outcomes, whereas others do not. Additionally, there are various Person 
variables that independently and/or interactively affect plea-bargain decisions and may 
also affect the discounting of non-monetary losses more generally. This discussion 
section will describe the impact of the following predictor categories’ impact on 
Subjective Trial Aversion: (1) Methodological variables, (2) Situation variables including 
the experimental factors of Delay and Probability, (3) Person variables, including 
demographic and trait-level individual differences, and (4) Situated-Person Variables, 
including Blameworthiness and Perceptions of Innocence. 
Methodological Variables 
Study 2 directly connects the discounting of plea bargaining to the present 
literature on dual discounting through its within-subject manipulations of Delay and 





first dual discounting publication; Vanderveldt et al., 2015). This study contributes 
methodological innovations to the dual discounting literature by determining (a) whether 
relatively minor changes in the titration procedure—the most common measurement of 
discounting—significantly affects the measurement of Subjective Trial Aversion, (b) 
whether the polar modal categories of loss commodities are “true” subjective values or 
are the result of outcome variable range restriction, (c) whether titration procedures 
broadly are different from a single-item measure of Subjective Trial Aversion, and (d) 
whether the method of manipulation between- or within-participants makes a difference 
in the other experimental factors’ effects. This latter point is discussed in the following 
section on Situational Variables, and the three former points are discussed in the present 
section on Methodological Variables. 
First, the Original Titration procedure has four levels of decisions per decision 
tree, whereas the Wider Titration procedure has five levels of decisions per decision tree. 
This additional level of titration affords the Wider Titration procedure a wider range of 
measurement of Subjective Trial Aversion, relative to the Original Titration procedure. 
Table 9 shows that the Wider Titration condition’s Subjective Trial Aversion scores were 
significantly different from the Original Titration condition’s Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores. Differences between the Original and Wider Titration persisted regardless of 
whether Measurement Method was a main effect (see Table 9), a parameter in a two-way 
interaction with other experimental variables (see Table 10), or a parameter in a three-
way interaction with other experimental variables (see Table 11). The range restriction of 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores, seen in Figure 12 by comparing the Wider Titration’s 





the reason for these effects. The polar modes in both titration procedures seem to suggest 
that the titration method of measurement, as operationalized to date by Clatch and 
Borgida (2021), does not capture the full range of human preference. Thus, Study 3 will 
utilize an even Wider Titration decision tree (see Figure 19), described further in Study 
3’s Method section. 
Second, the Slider procedure produced a very different distribution of Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores (see Figure 12; also see Table 9’s negative beta coefficient) such 
that the most common response was to choose to go to trial (rather than accept the 
harshest plea). Additionally, in all the models in which Original Titration and Wider 
Titration conditions were shown to differ, the Slider condition also differed from the two 
Titration conditions (see Tables 10 and 11). On the one hand, this may be because the 
experience of answering a Slider question may be easier for participants, making it more 
subject to quicker, less deliberative decisions, relative to a series of binary choices. On 
the other hand, being asked explicitly how much you value a commodity, relative to a 
series of alternative options, might trigger more deliberative decision-making relative to a 
series of choices that glean that value judgment incrementally. Future work could 
examine the length of time participants spend on the various tasks to get insight into the 
relative speed (a presumptive proxy of deliberativeness) of their decisions under the 
various measurement methods. 
The Slider measure may also be a measure of criminal defendants’ initial 
reactions to being threatened with a criminal sentence at trial, rather than their true 
“subjective value,” and their underestimation of their own Subjective Trial Aversion (i.e., 





negotiation ranges (see, e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Conversely, the Titration 
procedures by their very nature negotiate with the participant, to triangulate their 
indifference point, which can be understood as a negotiation tipping point (i.e., a true 
subjective value). 
 Third, the methodological method of manipulation of Probability of Trial 
Conviction from Study 1 to Study 2, between- to within-participants, respectively, did not 
have a noticeable effect on the three-way interaction of the three other experimental 
factors. For example, using all of the Study 2 data, SM 31 shows the significant three-
way interaction among Delay until Trial, Probability of Trial Conviction, and Waiting-
for-Trial Location. Additionally, although Table 8’s Original Titration three-way 
interaction (left panel of columns) did not reach significance, all three two-way 
interactions were at least marginally significant, and the Wider Titration’s three-way 
interaction was significant. This difference in the significance of the three-way 
interactions can be explained by the potential destabilizing effect of range restriction in 
the Original Titration condition. 
Situation Variables 
Clatch and Borgida (2021; Study 3) found a three-way interaction among 
Probability of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, and Waiting-for-Trial Location, and 
although this finding was not replicated by use of all the Study 2 data (regardless of 
Measurement Method) or by the Original Titration subset, it was confirmed by the Wider 
Titration subset (see Tables 7 and 17). Range restriction in the Original Titration 





Figure 15 presents Clatch and Borgida’s (2021) Study 3 figures in the top panel, 
and compared to the graphs of the Original Titration condition in Study 2 of the present 
dissertation, on the left of the bottom panel in Figure 15, the Jail condition does not show 
as much of a two-way interaction between Delay until Trial and Probability of Trial 
Conviction as in the Clatch and Borgida (2021) figure above. The two-way interaction of 
Delay until Trial and Probability of Trial Conviction in the Jail condition may be unstable 
because of a large degree of noise in the manipulation of Waiting-for-Trial Location. In 
Clatch and Borgida (2021; Study 3, which was the data source for Study 1 here) only 
52% of the participants assigned to the Jail condition answered the question about where 
they were waiting for trial correctly, and in Study 2 there was a similar rate of 54%. 
 Despite this potential source of noise (i.e., error variance) in the data, the direction 
of effects in the Wider Titration condition are consistent with Clatch and Borgida’s 
(2021) findings. In particular, increases in Probability of Trial Conviction result in more 
accepted plea bargains; increases in Delay until Trial result in more accepted plea 
bargains (especially in the Jail condition when Probability of Conviction is 50% or lower; 
see Figure 15); and waiting in jail for trial results in more accepted plea bargains. Thus, 
all three experimentally manipulated situational variables had a significant impact on 
plea-bargain decisions, consistent with dual discounting theory and past empirical 
findings; and this consistency in results is not just across studies but across different 







In addition to the experimentally manipulated situational variables, Study 2 also 
assessed the descriptive impact of the hypothetical scenario on key participant 
perceptions. Specifically, based on the vignette, all participants were arguably factually 
innocent, and yet, consistent with rates in Study 1, 94.70% (n = 393) of participants 
reported feeling some degree of self-blame for the car accident and/or child’s injury. 
Additionally, 71.57% (n = 297) of participants believed that they were either guilty or 
somewhere in between innocent and guilty. Thus, in the context of the findings described 
above, Probability of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, and waiting in jail for trial, all 
push participants toward accepting more, and harsher, plea bargains despite factual 
innocence.  
 And when asked about their innocence and guilt using individual continuous 
sliding scales, 83.86% of participants felt that they were both somewhat innocent and 
guilty, revealing that the hypothetical scenario produced complicated, and possibly even 
conflicting, self-perceptions. 
Person Variables 
Study 2’s findings regarding person variables’ influence on Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores were mostly consistent with Study 1’s findings. This section will first 
discuss demographic variables then trait-level individual-difference variables like 
Impulsivity and Need for Cognitive Closure. 
Demographic Variables 
First, as was the case in Study 1, participant gender influenced plea-bargain 
decisions, such that men were more likely to choose to go to trial. Second, unlike Study 





finding that participants in the high school category had significantly different Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores than the College graduates category seems unreliable and may be 
attributable to the small size of Study 1’s High school sub-sample. The sample in Study 1 
had 26 participants whose highest completed education was high school, whereas Study 2 
had 88 participants in that category. Last, like Study 1, the demographic variables of Age, 
Race, and Political Affiliation did not predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores. Unlike 
the null effects of Age and Political Affiliation, the null effect of Race may be due to 
inadequately sized non-white groups in the nationally representative sample. 
Trait-Level Individual-Difference Variables 
Next, the individual-difference variable, Impulsivity, unlike Study 1, did not 
directly influence plea-bargain decisions; however, like Study 1, it did interactively (with 
one of two key experimental situational variables) influence plea-bargain decisions. 
Specifically, consistent with Study 1, participants with higher Impulsivity were less 
responsive to the situation variable of Probability of Trial Conviction than were 
participants with lower Impulsivity (see Figure 16). However, although, unlike Study 1, 
participants with higher Impulsivity were not less responsive to the Situation variable of 
Delay until Trial compared to participants with lower Impulsivity (see Figure 17’s top 
panel), follow-up analyses confirmed the interactive relation between Impulsivity and 
Delay until Trial in the Jail condition (see Figure 17’s bottom-left panel). This finding 
suggests that the situational feature of Waiting-for-Trial Location may influence the 
decisional expression of Impulsivity. Specifically, when participants are told they will be 
awaiting trial in jail—but not when they are out on bail until trial—participants with 





(depicted by the flat pink line in Figure 17’s bottom-left panel) and participants with 
lower Impulsivity were responsive to the Situation variable of Delay until Trial (depicted 
by the sloped purple line in Figure 17’s bottom-right panel). This implies that when 
waiting in jail, participants with higher impulsivity were not bothered by the length of the 
wait in jail—they were going to trial at the same rate regardless of the length of the wait 
in jail. Participants with lower impulsivity, in contrast, were willing to accept more pleas 
to avoid the longer waits in jail for trial. In this sense, higher Impulsivity may be 
understood as a personal characteristic that desensitizes individuals to the situational 
feature of delay in a decision context that makes delay salient. 
Need for Cognitive Closure, however, produced a much less consistent set of 
findings.38 The positive (but counter to prediction) relation between NFCC and 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores’ range in Study 1 was nonsignificant in this study. 
Additionally, Study 2’s results conflict with the evidence in Study 1 that higher NFCC 
scores were not related to “seizing” on a particular decision (plea or trial). Specifically, 
participants with higher NFCC scores not only “seized” on a decision, it was a particular 
decision: Accept the plea.39 Table 14 also shows the simple linear regression results of 
NFCC predicting Count of Unique Decision Sequences, demonstrating that people with 
higher NFCC had fewer unique patterns of decisions across the 20 decision trees (B = -
.04, SE = .03, p < .05, see Table 14). This implies that people with higher NFCC “seized” 
 
38 In fact, as a main effect, in Study 1, NFCC did not predict Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores (see Table 14), but in Study 2, higher NFCC scores were associated with more 
plea bargains. 
39 This pattern of decision-making led people with more NFCC to have higher Subjective 
Values (B = .33, SE = .12, p < .01). Because of this, NFCC was entered into the multiple 
regressions with the other significant individual-difference measure of Impulsivity in the 





and “froze” not only on a particular decision in a particular delay-probability combination 
but also varied less from that decision between decision trees (i.e., across the varying 
delay-probability combinations). And because the decision trees were different on the key 
experimental factors of Delay and Probability, this suggests that people with higher 
NFCC tended to be less influenced by Probability and/or Delay. 
To test this implication, NFCC was entered into two multiple linear regressions 
(one with Delay until Trial and one with Probability of Trial Conviction). Table 14 shows 
these regressions and reveals that NFCC interacted significantly only with Probability of 
Trial Conviction to predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = .02, SE = .001, p < .05). 
Interestingly mirroring the interactive effects of Impulsivity in this Study, these findings 
suggest that NFCC is expressed in this legal-decision context in terms of dealing with 
uncertainty (i.e., likelihood of conviction) rather than in terms confronting the delayed 
aspect of losses.40 Because Impulsivity and NFCC were not correlated (r = .06, p < .1), 
this suggests that Impulsivity and NFCC may be independent person-level desensitizers 
to the situational feature of Probability. 
 
40 SM 33 shows the significant interaction between NFCC and Probability of Trial 
Conviction on Subjective Trial Aversion, depicting that participants who were more 
moderate (i.e., in the middle 50% of the NFCC scores’ distribution) were more 
responsive to the increase in Probability of Trial Conviction between 5 and 50% than the 
participants in the outer tails of the NFCC distribution (i.e., in the lower and higher 25% 
of the distribution). This implies that NFCC is interacting with Probability of Trial 





Last, consistent with Study 1, adapted System Justification did not predict 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores, and the new individual differences of Perceived Stress 
Scale and Personal Involvement did not predict plea-bargain decisions.41 
Situated-Person Variables 
Consistent with Study 1, Perceptions of Innocence and Blameworthiness 
predicted plea-bargain decisions such that participants who perceived themselves to be 
more guilty (and less innocent) were more willing to accept guilty pleas, and participants 
who felt more blameworthy for the accident and the child’s injury were more willing to 
accept guilty pleas. Additionally, these two variables interacted with Probability of Trial 
Conviction to predict plea-bargain decisions (see Table 15 and Figures 18 and 20).42  
Although Study 2’s Original Titration Blameworthiness by Probability of Trial 
Conviction graph (Figure 18) does not seem consistent with Study 1’s (Figure 5), Study 
2’s Wider Titration interaction graph in SM 26 shows that as Probability of Trial 
Conviction increases, the High-Blameworthiness and Low-Blameworthiness lines grow 
closer, consistent with Figure 5, where the lines actually touch. This suggests that as the 
likelihood of losing at trial increases, perceptions of blameworthiness become less 
important to plea-bargain decision-making. 
Although Study 1 did not show the predicted Innocence by Probability of Trial 
Conviction interaction (Table 5), Study 2 did (Table 15). Figure 20 shows the most 
 
41 Perceived Stress Scale’s nonsignificant regression results can be seen in Table 15, and 
when entered as control variables, the two personal involvement measures’ beta estimates 
were non-significant (see SM 30). 
42 Because Measurement Method contributed to different patterns of probability 
discounting, SMs 25–26 and Figure 20 show the interaction between these situated 





pronounced effects, which, like many other effects, appeared in the Wider condition; and, 
the Wider condition’s effects carried enough weight that in the full dataset, the interaction 
still holds (bottom-right panel compared to top panel). The interaction between Innocence 
and Probability of Trial Conviction indicates that people who believed themselves to be 
Innocent were less responsive to Probability of Trial Conviction (the less steep green line 
in Figure 20’s top graph); people that believed themselves to be somewhere between 
Innocent and Guilty were most responsive to Probability of Trial Conviction (the steepest 
yellow line in Figure 20’s top graph); and people that believed themselves to be Guilty 
were somewhere between in terms of responsiveness to Probability of Trial Conviction 
(the red line in Figure 20’s top graph). This suggests that people that were less certain 
about their own innocence/guilt were more sensitive to the key situational cue that is a 
proxy for innocence/guilt: probability of being found guilty at trial. 
Last, Study 2’s findings regarding Negative Contemplative Emotions, 
participants’ emotions toward the trial option, were relatively inconsistent with Study 1’s 
findings. Despite having similar negatively skewed distributions (see SM 33), none of 
Study 1’s NCE findings replicated in Study 2. Despite there being a main effect in Study 
1 (see Table 4), there was no main effect of NCE on Subjective Trial Aversion scores in 
Study 2 (see Table 15). Despite there being a significant interaction in the Jail condition 
with Delay until Trial in Study 1 (see Table 4), no such interaction was significant in 
Study 2 (see Table 15). And despite there being a significant three-way interaction among 
NCE, Delay until Trial, and Waiting-for-Trial Location in Study 1 (see Table 4), this 
interaction, too, was nonsignificant in Study 2 (see Table 15).43 Because the sliders for 
 





NCE’s measurement had the slider marker’s starting position at 0, it is possible that 
anchoring effects are affecting the measurement of NCE in both Studies 1 and 2, creating 
the negative skew, and making the effects unreliable.  
Limitations and Future Studies 
Study 3 will query the possibility of range restriction of Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores further by, again, widening the range of the Subjective Trial Aversion scores 
measured, this time not by increasing the levels (i.e., decisions) in each decision tree, but 
by increasing the starting plea bargain offer (i.e., criminal sentence) from 60 days to 120 
days in jail (see Figure 19 for the decision tree starting at 120 days), which increases the 
range from 118 (1, 119 day) to 234 days (3, 237 days). Because the trial offer is 240 days, 
Study 3 will allow for not only a wider range of Subjective Trial Aversion scores, but 
will allow participants to demonstrate whether a mere three-day sentence reduction is 
worth the certainty and immediacy of the plea bargain, or put conversely, whether the 
certainty and immediacy of the plea is worth essentially no reduction in criminal 
sentence—meaning that some people may desire certainty and immediacy so much that 
they will plead guilty and take on what is essentially the trial sentence. 
To address the possibility of noise in manipulating Waiting-for-Trial Location, 
Study 3 simplifies the instructions in the materials and makes the Waiting-for-Trial 
Location equally salient as the Delay until Trial and Probability of Trial Conviction 
manipulations. 
Study 3 and 4 will manipulate Factual Innocence to compare the plea-bargain 





perceptions of innocence and guilt to determine whether patterns in those self-perceptions 
change when the factual innocence is manipulated. 
Study 3 and 4 will counterbalance the location of the slider marker of Negative 
Contemplative Emotions (at 0 for some and 100 for others) as well as the Continuous 
Innocence and Guilt measures through randomization. 
Overall, Study 2 methodologically informs Studies 3 and 4 in two ways. First, 
confirming that manipulating Probability and Delay variables within-participants does 
not change effects allows for new between-participants variables to be manipulated 
without drastically increasing the requisite sample size. Second, the measurement method 
manipulation determined that slider items likely tap different psychological processes, 
and range restriction of Subjective Trial Aversion scores may cause instability in effects. 
Accordingly, the Wider titration measurement procedure will be used in Studies 3 and 4 
to extend Subjective Trial Aversion’s measured range and tap the psychological 
processes consistent with the bulk of discounting research. Last, Study 1 and 2 together, 
suggest that Situational variables, Person variables, and Situated-Person variables all 
influence plea-bargain decision-making, often interactively, so all of the variables that 
were hypothesized to predict plea-bargain decisions and found to be significant in at least 















 Subjective Trial Aversion Blame Innocence (ordinal) 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI B SE R2a 95% CI B SE R2a 95% CI 
Model 1: Accident 
Ever 
  .005 .42    .005    .004  
      Maybe 7.75 26.98   (-45.1, 60.56) -105.67m 62.70  (-228.92, 17.58) 1.12 0.75  (-.35, 2.59) 
      No -5.73* 2.65   (-10.9, -.54) -7.38 6.16  (-19.50, 4.73) 0.10 0.08  (-.05, .24) 
Model 2: Accident 
Ever Upsetting 
  .0002 .42    .001    .005  
      Upsetting -0.52 1.81   (-4.05, 3.02) 4.80 4.29  (-3.66, 13.27) -0.01 0.05  (-.11, .09) 
Model 3: Accident 
3-month 
  .002 .42    .008    .001  
      Maybe -7.72 10.00   (-27.3, 11.85) -20.26 23.11  (-65.69, 25.17) -0.26 0.29  (-.82, .31) 
      No -6.23 5.38   (-18.8, 4.31) -28.88* 12.44  (-53.33, -4.44) -0.23 0.15  (-.52, .06) 
Model 4: Accident 
3-month Upsetting 
  .01 .37    .12    .01  






 Innocence (continuous) Guilt (continuous) 
Models/Variables B SE R2a 95% CI B SE R2a 95% CI 
Model 1: Accident Ever   .0002    .002  
      Maybe 40.79 32.34  (-22.79, 104.37) -49.65 34.11  (-116.71, 17.41) 
      No 2.40 3.18  (-3.86, 8.64) -2.77 3.35  (-9.36, 3.82) 
Model 2: Accident Ever Upsetting   .005    .02  
      Upsetting -0.56 2.15  (-4.80, 3.67) 4.59* 2.23  (.19, 9.00) 
Model 3: Accident 3-month   .02    .02  
      Maybe -20.45m 11.81  (-43.66, 2.76) 2.67 12.51  (-21.91, 27.26) 
      No -21.70*** 6.35  (-34.19, 9.21) -16.41* 6.73  (-29.64, -3.19) 
Model 4: Accident 3-month Upsetting   .21    .01  
      Upsetting 6.74** 2.05  (2.58, 10.90) 2.60 3.32  (-4.14, 9.35) 
 
Note. Models 2 and 4 only used data from participants who had reported “Yes” or “Maybe” to ever being in an accident and being in 
an accident in the last three months respectively because participants who responded “No” were not asked how upsetting their non-
existent accident was. The reference category for Models 1 and 3 are “Yes.” The “Maybe” category for ever having been in an 
accident only had 1 participant in it, and the “Maybe” category for having been in a recent accident only had 2 participants in it. 
Because Study 2 measured Perceptions of Innocence in two different ways (ordinal, like Study 1, and continuous) there are two sets of 
regressions for those two outcome variables. 






Study 2 Demographics Regression Analyses 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Age -0.06 0.08 .001 .42 (-.21, .09) 
Political Party Affiliation   .003 .40  
      Independent 1.07 3.79   (-6.34, 8.47) 
      Prefer Not to Respond -1.04 7.60   (-15.89, 13.82) 
      Republican 4.67 2.97   (-1.14, 10.47) 
Race   .001 .42  
     White -1.13 3.87   (-8.71, 6.45) 
     Other 1.31 4.71   (-7.91, 10.52) 
Race*DUT   .004 .42  
     Other 1.55 4.81   (-7.86, 10.97) 
     White -2.41 3.96   (-10.16, 5.34) 
     DUT .05 .05   (-.04, .14) 
     Other:DUT -0.02 .06   (-.13, .10) 
     White:DUT 0.08 0.05   (-.02, 0.18) 
Race*PTC   .12 .55  
     Other -2.17 5.02 .001  (-11,99, 7.65) 
     White -9.92* 4.13 .005  (-18.00, -1.85) 
     PTC 0.26*** 0.02 .02  (.22, .31) 
     Other:PTC 0.06* .03 .001  (.002,.11) 
     White:PTC .14*** .02 .005  (.10, .19) 
Ethnicity      
      Non-Hispanic  1.15 3.40    
Education   .004 .42  
    Some College -4.65 4.21   (-12.88, 3.58) 
    College Graduate 0.61    3.62   (-6.45, 7.69) 
    Graduate School -4.97 4.21   (-12.70, 2.76) 
Gender      
      Women 5.49* 2.64 .005 .42 (.32, 10.7) 
Gender*PTC   0.13   
     Women 1.90 2.82   (-3.62, 7.42) 
      PTC 0.34*** 0.01 0.06  (0.32, 0.36) 
     Women:PTC 0.06*** 0.02 0.001  (0.03, 0.09) 
Gender*DUT   0.007   
     Women 5.95* 2.70 0.003  (0.66, 11.24) 
      DUT 0.12*** 0.02 0.002  (0.07, 0.17) 
     Women:DUT -0.03 0.03   (-0.10, 0.04) 
Gender*DUT*WTL    0.02   
     Women 7.96* 3.77 0.003  (0.58, 15.34) 
      DUT 0.001 0.04   (-0.07, 0.08) 
      Jail 3.75 3.85 0.001  (-3.77, 11.28) 
     Women:DUT -0.01 0.05   (-0.11, 0.08) 
     Women:Jail -3.89 5.39   (-14.43, 6.64) 
      DUT:Jail 0.22*** 0.05 0.002  (0.13, 0.32) 
     Women:DUT:Jail -0.005 0.07   (-0.14, 0.13) 




Education*DUT*WTL   0.02   
       Graduate School -8.49 m 5.02 0.002  (-18.26, 1.29) 
       High School 4.54 5.28 0.001  (-5.74, 14.82) 
       Part of College -9.25 m 5.09 0.002  (-19.16, 0.65) 
       DUT -0.03 0.05   (-0.10, 0.05) 
       Jail 0.63 4.45   (-8.02, 9.29) 
       Graduate School:DUT 0.03 0.06   (-0.09, 0.16) 
       High School:DUT 0.07 0.07   (-0.06, 0.20) 
       Part of College:DUT 0.0001 0.06   (-0.13, 0.13) 
       Graduate School:Jail 3.66 7.07   (-10.09, 17.41) 
       High School:Jail -0.03 7.34 0.001  (-24.21, 4.35) 
       Part of College:Jail 10.65 7.75 0.001  (-4.43, 25.73) 
       DUT:Jail 0.24*** 0.06 0.001  (0.13, 0.35) 
       Graduate School:DUT:Jail 0.05 0.09   (-0.13, 0.22) 
       High School:DUT:Jail -0.14 0.09   (-0.32, 0.04) 
       Part of College:DUT:Jail 0.01 0.10   (-0.18, 0.21) 
Note. The regression using Gender as a predictor had “Men” as the reference category. 
The regressions using Race as a predictor had “Black” as the reference category. The 
regression using Education as a predictor had “High school” as the reference category. 
Education*PTC   0.13   
       College Graduate 3.85 3.72   (-3.42, 11.12) 
       High School 0.14 4.21   (-8.09, 8.38) 
       Part of College -9.38* 4.37 0.002  (-17.92, -0.84) 
       PTC 0.31*** 0.02 0.02  (0.28, 0.35) 
       College Graduate:PTC  0.03 0.02   (-0.01, 0.07) 
       High School:PTC 0.08*** 0.02 0.001  (0.03, 0.12) 
       Part of College:PTC 0.16*** 0.02 0.003  (0.11, 0.20) 
Education*DUT   0.01   
       Graduate School -6.58m 3.56 0.002  (-13.55, 0.38) 
       High School -0.74 3.70   (-7.97, 6.49) 
       Part of College -5.02 3.86 0.001  (-12.56, 2.53) 
       DUT 0.09** 0.03 0.001  (0.03, 0.15) 
       Graduate School:DUT 0.06 0.04   (-0.03, 0.15) 
       High School:DUT 0.007 0.05   (-0.08, 0.10) 
       Part of College:DUT -0.02 0.05   (-0.11, 0.08) 
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Table 8 
 
Study 2 Attempted Replication of Clatch and Borgida’s (2021) Plea-Bargain Discounting Effects (by Measurement Method Data 
Subset) 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
 Original Titration Slider Wider Titration 
Models/Variables Bo SEo R2m 95% CI Bs SEs R2m 95% CI Bw SEw R2m 95% CI 
WTL*PTC*DUT   .19    .10    .19  
  Jail -0.81 2.73  (-6.15, 4.52) 3.98 5.59  (-6.96, 14.9) -8.81 6.14  (-20.82, 3.21) 
  PTC  0.28*** 0.02  (.25, .32) 0.38*** 0.02  (.34, .43) 0.51*** 0.03  (.45, 57) 
  DUT 0.17*** 0.05  (.07, .25) 0.08 0.07  (-.06, .21) -0.04 0.09  (-.21, .13) 
  Jail:PTC 0.04m 0.02  (-.002, .08) -0.05 0.03  (-.12, .02) 0.18*** 0.04  (.09, .27) 
  Jail:DUT 0.16** 0.06  (.04, .29) 0.21* 0.10  (.02, .40) 0.96*** 0.13  (.71, 1.21) 
  PTC:DUT -0.002** 0.0006  (-.003, -.0006) -0.002m 0.0009  (-.004, .00004) 0.00004 0.001  (-.002, .002) 
  Jail:PTC:DUT -0.001 0.0009  (-.003, .0003) 0.0009 0.001  (-.002, .004) -0.01*** 0.002  (-.01, -.01) 
 
Note. “PTC” stands for Probability of Trial Conviction; “DUT” stands for Delay until Trial; and “WTL” stands for Waiting-for-Trial 
Location. The subscript “o” stands for Original Titration; the subscript “s” stands for Slider; and the subscript “w” stands for Wider 
Titration. 







Study 2 Measurement Method Effect on Subjective Trial Aversion 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Model/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Measurement Method   .04 .42  
     Slider -10.58*** 3.08   (-16.59, -4.56) 
     Wider 8.24** 3.15   (2.08, 14.39) 
 
Note. The Slider condition had a significantly lower average Subjective Trial Aversion 
than the Original titration condition, and the Wider titration condition had a significantly 
higher average Subjective Trial Aversion than the Original titration condition. 
 










Study 2 Measurement Method Two-Way Interactions with Other Experimental Factors 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
Measurement Method*PTC   .17  
      Slider -15.12*** 3.29  (-21.56, -8.68) 
      Wider -7.78* 3.36  (-14.37, -1.19) 
      PTC 0.26*** 0.01  (.24, .29) 
     Slider:PTC 0.07*** 0.02  (.04, .11) 
     Wider:PTC 0.26*** 0.02  (.22, .30) 
Measurement Method*DUT   .04  
     Slider -10.67*** 3.15  (-16.83, -4.51) 
     Wider 7.69* 3.22  (1.39, 13.99) 
      DUT 0.09** 0.03  (.03, .15) 
     Slider:DUT 0.01 0.04  (-.07, .08) 
     Wider:DUT 0.03 0.04  (-.05, .12) 
Measurement Method*WTL   .04  
     Slider -11.51** 4.35  (-19.99, -3.03) 
     Wider 6.06 4.39  (-2.51, 14.63) 
     Jail 3.00 4.33  (-5.45, 11.45) 
     Slider:Jail 2.12 6.14  (-9.85, 14.09) 
     Wider:Jail 5.08 6.29  (-7.19, 17.34) 
 








Study 2 Three-Way Interaction of Dual Discounting and Measurement Method 
Condition 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
PTC*DUT*Measurement Method   .17  
    PTC .59*** 0.02  (.56, .63) 
    DUT 0.41*** 0.05  (.31, .50) 
    Slider -3.68 3.56  (-.11, 3.28) 
    Original 10.30** 3.55  (3.36, 17.25) 
    PTC:DUT -0.005*** 0.0007  (-.01, -.003) 
    PTC:Slider -0.24*** 0.02  (-.28, -.19) 
    PTC:Original -.29*** -0.02  (-.34, -.24) 
    DUT:Slider -0.23** 0.07  (-.36, -.09) 
    DUT:Original -0.16* 0.07  (-.29, -.02) 
    PTC:DUT:Slider 0.003*** 0.001  (.0001, .004) 
    PTC:DUT:Original  0.002* 0.001  (.001, .005) 
 
Note. The Original condition is the reference category in the top regression, and the 
Slider condition is the reference category in the bottom regression 








Study 2’s Three Data Subsets to Test Dual Discounting 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
DUT*PTC [Original]   .19  
   DUT 0.25*** 0.03 .02 (.19, .31) 
   PTC 0.31*** 0.01 .16 (.28, .33) 
   DUT:PTC -.0026*** 0.0004 .01 (-.003, -.001) 
DUT*PTC [Wider]   .17  
   DUT 0.41*** 0.06 .01 (.28, .53) 
   PTC 0.59*** 0.02 .14 (.55, .64) 
   DUT:PTC -.0045*** 0.0008 .01 (-.006, -.003) 
DUT*PTC [Slider]   .09  
   DUT 0.18*** 0.05 .002 (.08, .28) 
   PTC 0.36*** 0.02 .07 (.32, .39) 
   DUT:PTC -.0013* 0.0007 .001 (-.003, -.00002) 
 










Study 2 Nine Simple Linear Regressions Testing Main Effects of Experimental Factors 
by Data Subset 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Datasets B SE R2m 95% CI 
PTC      
   Original dataset 0.26*** 0.01 .17 (.25, .28) 
    Slider dataset 0.34*** 0.01 .09 (.31, .36) 
    Wider dataset 0.52*** 0.02 .16 (.49, .56) 
DUT     
   Original dataset 0.09*** 0.02 .006 (.05, .13) 
    Slider dataset 0.10*** 0.03 .002 (.04, .15) 
    Wider dataset 0.12** 0.04 .002 (.05, .20) 
WTL     
   Original dataset 3.00 2.30 .004 (-1.50, 7.50) 
   Slider dataset 8.08 5.37 .004 (-4.85, 15.10) 
   Wider dataset 5.12 5.09 .007 (-2.43, 18.6) 
Note. “PTC” stands for Probability of Trial Conviction; “DUT” stands for Delay until 
Trial; and “WTL” stands for Waiting-for-Trial Location. The reference category for the 
WTL regressions was “Bail,” so the beta estimates in the WTL regressions were for the 
Jail condition. 








Study 2 Need for Cognitive Closure Analyses 
 
Models/Variables B SE R2 a[m]  95% CI 
STA_range ~ NFCC -0.01 0.16 .002 (-.32, .31) 
First Flip Count ~ NFCC  -0.05* 0.02 .01 (-.09, -.003) 
Count of All Trial Trees ~ NFCC -0.03 0.02 .0003 (-.07, .02) 
Count of All Plea Trees ~ NFCC 0.10** 0.03 .03 (.04, .17) 
Count of All Mixed Trees ~ NFCC -0.08* 0.03 .02 (-.14, -.02) 
Unique Seq Count ~ NFCC -0.04* 0.03 .02 (-.08, -.01) 
STA ~ NFCC*Delay   [.01]  
     NFCC 0.33* 0.13 .006 .08, .57 
     Delay 1.06 1.18  -1.26, 3.38 
     NFCC:Delay .00008 0.02  -.04, .04 
STA ~ NFCC*PTC   [.16]  
      NFCC 32.54 8.58 .001 -.05, .47 
      PTC 0.21*** 0.13 .003 .16, .38 
     NFCC:PTC 0.02* 0.001 .001 .0002, .003 
STA Average ~ NFCC 0.33** 0.12 .02 (.05, -.02) 
Note. Because this table contains both simple linear regressions and mixed method 
multiple regressions, R2 adjusted is provided for the simple linear regressions and R2 
marginal is provided for the mixed method multiple regressions with semi-partial 
correlations for individual parameters of the multiple regressions provided when they are 
greater than or equal to .001. 
 







Study 2 Hypothesized Relation Regressions 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
Blameworthiness 0.13*** 0.02 .04 (.09, .17) 
Blame*PTC   .16  
      PTC 0.34*** 0.02 .03 (.30, .37) 
      Blameworthiness 0.11*** 0.02 .01 (.07, .16) 
      PTC:Blame .0003* 0.0001  (.0001, .001) 
Innocence_Categ   .02  
      Between 12.21*** 3.35 .01 (5.67, 18.8) 
      Guilty 15.62*** 3.58 .02 (8.62, 22.6) 
      Don’t know 10.59 6.96 .003 (-3.01, 24.2) 
Innocence Slider  -0.15** 0.05 .03 (-.31, -.16) 
Guilt Slider 0.12* 0.04 .03 (.14, .29) 
Innocence_Ordin -7.58*** 1.78 .02 (-11.1, -4.1) 
Innocence_Ordin*PTC   .14  
      PTC 0.41*** 0.01 .08 (-8.88, -1.43) 
      Innocence -5.15** 1.90 .006 (.38, .43) 
      PTC:Innocence -0.04*** 0.01 .003 (-.06, -.02) 
NCE -0.01 0.02 .001 (-.04, .02_ 
NCE*WTL   .007  
      NCE 0.01 0.02  (-.03, .05) 
      Jail 1.53 3.53  (-5.37, 8.43) 
      NCE:Jail -0.05 0.03 .003 (-.1, .01) 
NCE*DUT [Jail only]   .02  
      NCE -0.27 0.02 .002 (-.07, .01) 
      DUT 17.95*** 3.32 .005 (1.14, 2.45) 
      NCE:DUT -0.05m 0.03  (-.01, .001) 
NCE*DUT [All Locations]   .003  
      NCE -0.01 0.02  (-.04, .02) 
      DUT 94.07*** 22.83 .001 (49.32, 138.84) 
      NCE:DUT -0.12 0.19  (-.49, .26) 
NCE*DUT*WTL [All Locations]   .01  
      NCE 0.01*** 0.02  (-.03, .05) 
      DUT 8.97 31.76  (-53.28, 71.22) 
      Jail -1.24 3.61  (-8.29, 5.81) 
      NCE:Jail -0.02 0.03 .001 (-.09, .03) 
      NCE:DUT 0.19 0.26  (-.33, .71) 
      DUT:Jail 170.52*** 45.57 .001 (81.22, 259.82) 
      NCE:DUT:Jail -0.67m 0.38  (-1.42, .08) 
PSS 0.17 0.24 .0005 (-.30, .64) 
ASJS 0.02 0.12 .00002 (-.22, .25) 
      ASJS*Innoc_Ordin   .02  
      ASJS -0.02 0.19  (-.38, .35) 
      Innocence -8.12 8.90 .001 (-25.52, 9.28) 
      ASJS:Innocence 0.01 0.15  (-.29, .30) 
Impulsivity -0.10 0.28 .0001 (-.66, .45) 
Impulsivity*PTC   .13  
      Imp 1.15*** 0.30 .006 (.56, 1.74) 
      PTC 0.49*** 0.01 .08 (.47, .52) 







Note. No matter how the Innocence variable was measured, categorical (Innocent, Guilt, 
In Between, I don’t know), ordinal (Innocent, somewhere in between, guilt), or on a 
continuous scale from 0-100, Perceptions of Innocence and Guilt influenced Subjective 
Trial Aversion. 
m.05 ≤ p ≤ .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Impulsivity*DUT [All Locations]   .003  
      Imp -0.034 0.29  (-.60, .53) 
      DUT 12.97** 2.87 .001 (7.35, 18.59) 
      Imp:DUT -0.42 0.36  (-1.14, .30) 
Impulsivity*DUT [Jail Only]   .02  
        Impulsivity -0.24 0.39  (-1.00, .52) 
         DUT 0.33*** 0.04 .001 (.24, .41) 
         Imp:DUT -0.02** 0.01  (-.03, -.01) 
Impulsivity*DUT*WTL   0.01  
        Impulsivity  0.16 0.40  (-0.64, 0.95) 
        DUT  -0.05 0.04  (-0.13, 0.03) 
         Jail 3.94 4.54 0.001 (-4.93, 12.81) 
        Impulsivity:DUT  0.01 0.01  (-0.003, 0.02) 
        Impulsivity:Jail  -0.39 0.58  (-1.52, 0.73) 
        DUT:Jail  0.38*** 0.06 0.003 (0.27, 0.49) 
        Impulsivity:DUT:Jail -0.02*** 0.01 0.001 (-0.04, -0.01) 
Criminal Experience (Own) -3.81 3.03 .002 (-9.74, 2.12) 
Criminal Experience (Other) -2.29 2.83 .0007 (-7.83, 3.25) 
Criminal Experience (Categorical)   .005  
     Other Only  -4.47 3.65 .002 (-11.60, 2.66) 
     Own Only  -8.39m 4.51 .007 (-17.21, .44) 







Study 2 Cross-Construct Multiple Regression Model 2  
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Model/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI  R2c 
Model 2   .19  .57 
   PTC 0.28*** 0.02 .009 (.24, .33)  
   DUT 0.17* 0.07  (.03, .30)  
   Jail -0.81 4.88  (-10.9, 8.10)  
   Slider -16.34*** 4.90 .003 (-27, -7.84)  
   Wider -6.65 4.95 .001 (-17.10, 2.16)  
   PTC:DUT -0.002m 0.001  (-.01, .00001)  
   PTC:Jail -0.04 0.03  (-.02, .11)  
   DUT:Jail 0.16m 0.10  (-.02, .35)  
   PTC:Slider 0.10** 0.03 .001 (.03, .17)  
   PTC:Wider 0.23*** 0.03 .003 (.16, .29)  
   DUT:Slider -0.09 0.10  (-.28, .10)  
   DUT:Wider -0.20* 0.10  (-.40, -.01)  
   Jail:Slider 4.79 6.92  (-6.92, 20.20)  
   Jail:Wider -7.99 7.09  (-21.00, 6.59)  
   PTC:DUT:Jail -0.001 0.001  (-.004, .001)  
   PTC:DUT:Slider 0.0001 0.001  (-.003, .003)  
   PTC:DUT:Wider 0.002 0.01  (-.001, .004)  
   PTC:Jail:Slider -0.09m .05  (-.19, .001)  
   PTC:Jail:Wider 0.15** 0.05 .001 (.05, .02)  
   DUT:Jail:Slider 0.04 0.14  (-.22, .31)  
   DUT:Jail:Wider 0.79*** 0.14 .002 (.52, 1.06)  
   PTC:DUT:Jail:Slider 0.002 0.002  (-.001, .006)  
   PTC:DUT:Jail:Wider -0.008*** 0.002 .001 (-.01, -.004)  
   Gender 5.51* 2.57 .006 (.51, 10.50)  
Note. R2 marginal is provided for this mixed method multiple regression with semi-
partial correlations in the same column for individual parameters when they are greater 
than or equal to .001. 







Study 2 Cross-Construct Multiple Regression Model 5 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Model/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI  R2c 
Model 5   .23  .57 
   PTC 0.28*** 0.02 .01 (.24, .33)  
   DUT 0.17* 0.07  (.03, .30)  
   Jail -0.81 4.88  (-9.67, 8.54)  
   Slider -16.34*** 4.90 .003 (-26.4, -8.07)  
   Wider -6.65 4.95  (-15.8, 2.74)  
   PTC:DUT -0.002m 0.00  (-.01, .00001)  
   PTC:Jail -0.04 0.03  (-.02, .11)  
   DUT:Jail 0.16m 0.10  (-.02, .35)  
   PTC:Slider 0.10** 0.03 .001 (.03, .17)  
   PTC:Wider 0.23*** 0.03 .003 (.16, .29)  
   DUT:Slider -0.09 0.10  (-.28, .10)  
   DUT:Wider -0.20* 0.10  (-.40, -.01)  
   Jail:Slider 4.79 6.92  (-5.87, 20.0)  
   Jail:Wider -7.99 7.09 .001 (-25.4, 1.19)  
   PTC:DUT:Jail -0.001 0.00  (-.004, .001)  
   PTC:DUT:Slider 0.0001 0.00  (-.003, .003)  
   PTC:DUT:Wider 0.002 0.00  (-.001, .004)  
   PTC:Jail:Slider -0.09m .05  (-.19, .001)  
   PTC:Jail:Wider 0.15** 0.05 .001 (.05, .24)  
   DUT:Jail:Slider 0.04 0.14  (-.22, .31)  
   DUT:Jail:Wider 0.79*** 0.14 .002 (.52, 1.06)  
   PTC:DUT:Jail:Slider 0.002 0.00  (-.001, .006)  
   PTC:DUT:Jail:Wider -0.008*** 0.002 .001 (-.01, -.005)  
   Gender 4.81* 2.44 .004 (.07, 9.55)  
   Blameworthiness 0.09*** 0.02 .02 (.05, .14)  
   Innocence_Ordin -0.12** 0.04 .01 (-.21, -.04)  
 
Note. R2 marginal is provided for this mixed method multiple regression with semi-
partial correlations in the same column for individual parameters when they are greater 
than or equal to .001. 
m.05 ≤ p ≤ .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 10 
 
Original Titration Procedure Example Decision Tree 
 
 
Note. “SV” stands for Subjective Value, or Subjective Trial Aversion. The rectangles represent decisions presented to the participant, 
but each participant only sees four decisions in this decision tree. Which decisions the participant sees depends on their pattern of 
responses. Specifically, each participant in the Original Titration condition saw the top decision (with probability and delay specified 
instead of “uncertain and delayed” in the trial option) and then, based on their response, they saw a second decision. If they selected 
the plea in the first decision, then they saw the second decision connected by the single line, running down to the left. If they selected 
trial in the first decision, then they saw the second decision connected by two lines, running down to the right. This continued for four 
 
  133 
decisions per probability-delay combination, and then reset for the next probability-delay combination, starting the participant back at 
the top of the decision tree. In Study 2, participants cycled through this 20 times, once for each probability-delay combination. The 
range of this measurement method is 32 to 88. 
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Figure 11 
 
Wider Titration Procedure Example Decision Tree 
 
 
Note. “SV” stands for Subjective Value, or Subjective Trial Aversion. The rectangles represent decisions presented to the participant, 
but each participant only sees five decisions in this decision tree. Which decisions the participant sees depends on their pattern of 
responses. Specifically, each participant in the Wider Titration condition saw the top decision (with probability and delay specified 
instead of “uncertain and delayed” in the trial option) and then, based on their response, they saw a second decision. If they selected 
the plea in the first decision, then they saw the second decision connected by the single line, running down to the left. If they selected 
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trial in the first decision, then they saw the second decision connected by two lines, running down to the right. This continued for five 
decisions per probability-delay combination, and then reset for the next probability-delay combination, starting the participant back at 
the top of the decision tree. In Study 2, participants cycled through this 20 times, once for each probability-delay combination. The 
















Study 2 Measurement Method x Probability of Trial Conviction Interaction 
 
 
   
  138 
Figure 14 
 
Study 2 Three-way interaction among Probability of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, and Measurement Method 
 














Study 2 Impulsivity*PTC Interaction on Subjective Trial Aversion 
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Figure 17 
 


































Chapter 4: Study 3 – To What Extent Does Factual Innocence Change Plea-Bargain 
Decision-Making Processes? 
 
The purpose of Study 3 is to determine whether another legally, and 
psychologically, relevant situational cue influences discounting in plea-bargain decisions. 
Specifically, the decision-maker’s factual innocence and guilt will be manipulated. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, criminal defendant’s factual innocence is another situational 
feature that is inherent to the plea-bargaining context. Manipulating another situational 
feature of the plea-bargain context enables a deeper query of under what conditions 
person variables matter for plea-bargain decision-making as well a richer understanding 
of whether the influence of probability and delay on plea-bargain decisions are 
conditioned on factual innocence. 
Recent work by psychologists has shown that situational factors like 
innocence/guilt influences plea bargain behavior. For example, Henderson and Levett 
(2018, p. 434) found that 71% of guilty participants accepted a plea deal, whereas 37% of 
innocent participants accepted one.44 The legal literature, however, assumes that very 
infrequently do innocents plead guilty (Scott & Stuntz, 1992, p. 1942; Easterbrook, 2013, 
p. 554). This study attempts to quantify the “innocence problem” based on the dual 
discounting approach developed in Studies 1 and 2, and this study differs from past work 
assessing innocence/guilt in plea-bargain decisions in two ways: (1) by both manipulating 
innocence/guilt and measuring perceptions of innocence and guilt and (2) by 
manipulating more situational variables than past work (probability, delay, location, and 
 
44 Other samples’ proportions of innocent participants accepting the plea deal include 
26% (Edkins & Dervan, 2018, Study 2), and 7% to 50% (Tor et al., 2010) depending on 
probability of trial conviction. However none of these studies utilized a discounting 




factual innocence) to determine whether certain situational effects (e.g., probability and 
delay) are conditioned on other situational features (e.g., innocence). 
Studies 1 and 2 provided quantitative evidence that participants’ perceptions of 
innocence (and guilt) influence their plea-bargain decisions in predictable ways: 
Participants believing strongly in their innocence choose to go to trial despite its 
uncertainty and delay. Importantly, Studies 1 and 2 presented participants with a 
hypothetical scenario in which they are factually innocent (i.e., the scenario has them 
imagine that did not commit the illegal act of typing a text with their hands while 
driving), and yet, the participants’ plea-bargain decisions indicate that the vast majority 
of these innocent participants accepted a plea bargain. This suggests that the plea 
bargain’s situational features of certainty and immediacy might overpower the most 
important legal distinction in the criminal justice system—guilt-innocence. 
In fact, Tor and colleagues (2010) found that although there is evidence of the 
“guilt hypothesis” that guilty participants accept more pleas, 20% of innocent participants 
pled guilty (Study 1). Then, in their Study 2, the researchers manipulated both 
Innocence/Guilt and Probability of Conviction and found that high levels of Probability 
of Conviction caused up to 50% of innocent participants to accept a guilty plea, and as a 
whole, guilty participants were less influenced by Probability of Conviction relative to 
innocent participants. Accordingly, the following was hypothesized in the present study: 
H3a. Consistent with the “guilt hypothesis,” guilty participants will accept 
significantly more guilty pleas than innocent participants. However, it is predicted that 
the plea-bargain-decision distributions of the two groups are largely overlapping, 




H3b. Probability of Trial Conviction and Factual Innocence will interactively 
predict plea-bargain decisions such that there should be a flattened (potentially non-
significant) effect of Probability of Conviction on guilty participants’ plea-bargain 
decisions relative to innocent participants. 
Next, the research testing the guilt hypothesis combined with research by Clatch 
and Borgida (2021) and Study 2 of this dissertation suggest the possibility of an 
interaction between Waiting-for-Trial Location and Factual Innocence to predict plea-
bargain decisions. In particular, Clatch and Borgida (2021; Study 3, see their Table 4) 
and Study 2 of this dissertation found that waiting for trial in jail results in participants 
being more likely to accept plea bargains. Additionally, other researchers including 
Henderson and Levett (2018) have found that guilty participants were more likely to 
accept a plea bargain than innocent participants. Last, Edkins and Dervan (2018) found a 
marginally significant effect between guilt/innocence and pretrial detention on single 
binary plea decisions, such that pretrial detention induced innocent participants to plead 
guilty more than it induced guilty participants to do so. Accordingly, the following was 
hypothesized: 
H3c. Guilty participants waiting in jail will be the most likely to accept pleas 
relative to the three other groups (Innocent-Jail, Innocent-Bail, and Guilty-Bail).  
H3d. Additionally, guilty participants, will have a weaker, or null, effect of 
Waiting-for-Trial Location on their plea decisions relative to the significant effect for 
innocent participants. If this prediction is true, it could mean that the Guilty-Jail group 




did have different plea decisions compared to the two Innocent groups (making one of the 
three comparisons in Hypothesis 3c null). 
Furthermore, to try and replicate the findings from Studies 1 and 2, many of Study 
2’s hypotheses are adopted in Study 3. The Measurement Method hypothesis (H2b) is 
moot in the present study because Study 2’s Measurement Method findings identified the 
Wider titration procedure as the best measurement method for the present purposes. 
Additionally, the Need for Cognitive Closure and Negative Contemplative hypotheses 
required extensive data manipulations and follow-up analysis and thus were not included 
in the core set of analyses performed in the present study. In addition to Study 2’s 
hypotheses regarding impulsivity, which involve predicting that, compared to relatively 
impulsive participants, those who are less impulsive will be more responsive to the 
situational features of probability and delay relative to high-impulsivity participants, the 
following was hypothesized because Factual Innocence is yet another situational feature 
of the plea-bargaining context: 
H3e. Impulsivity and Factual Innocence will interact such that guilty participants 
who have relatively low impulsivity scores will accept plea bargains more than their low-
impulsivity-innocent counterparts, and high-impulsivity participants will follow a similar 
pattern but with smaller difference between the innocent and guilty sub-groups. This 
suggests that high-impulsivity people’s plea-bargain decisions are less influenced by 
Factual Innocence than are their low-impulsivity counterparts. 
Last, with the introduction of a factual innocence/guilt manipulation in the present 
study, participants’ perceptions of fairness of their plea-bargain process and decisions are 




groups of participants (factually innocent and factually guilty) perceive their plea-bargain 
process and decisions similarly. On the one hand, one could expect that people who are 
factually innocent to feel that the plea-bargaining system is unfair, considering that in 
accepting a plea bargain they are falsely admitting guilt. On the other hand, one could 
expect that once people are criminally charged and forced to confront that reality and 
make plea-bargain decisions, they justify the system and their arguably rational decisions 
to accept less jail time to resolve the matter quickly (especially when probability of 
conviction at trial is high).  
Houlden (1980) showed that criminal defendants’ preference for participation in 
the plea-bargaining process is not affected by factual innocence and guilt, but that 
undergraduates’ preference for participation in the plea-bargaining process was only 
weakened when they were guilty and faced strong evidence (i.e., a high likelihood of 
conviction at trial). Additionally, Casper et al. (1988) found that criminal defendants’ 
criminal sentences (either through plea agreements or post-trial) influenced their 
perceptions of procedural justice. However, no research to date has assessed whether 
plea-bargain behavior influences perceptions of procedural justice. Thus, although 
procedural justice is a psychologically relevant construct for the present study, no 
directional hypotheses are made. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited on Prolific and received $4.90 for their participation. 
Prolific is a source of online convenience samples and is an increasingly-used alternative 




based on gender, race and age,45 except that Black Americans were oversampled to allow 
for better race sub-group comparisons. Roberts and colleagues (2020) have empirically 
demonstrated systemic inequality in psychological research in the last five decades. 
Specifically, despite the fact that race plays an important role in how people think, 
develop, and behave (e.g., Roberts & Rizzo, 2021), race is rarely highlighted in 
psychological publications, and even more rarely are non-White participants substantially 
represented in samples (Roberts et al., 2020). Roberts and colleagues recommend 
justifying racial demographics of study samples. Thus, this study strove to balance 
generalizability to the population of the United States (on the basis of gender and age) 
with collecting a large enough sample of Black Americans to make cross-race 
comparisons of plea-bargain decision-making. This latter purpose derives from a 
motivation to recognize that people of color, especially black men, have long been 
overrepresented in the U.S. criminal justice system (Spohn, 2011). 
The final sample consisted of 50.60 % (n = 169) women and 46.71 % (n = 156) 
men and had a mean age of 43.92 (SD = 14.61). The dataset consists of 62.78% self-
identifying White participants (n = 208), 23.35% (n = 78) Black participants, 5.39% (n = 
18) Asian participants, .6% (n = 2) Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander participants, 0.9% 
(n = 3) Native American, and 6.9% (n = 23) multi-racial or other racial identity. Twenty-
 
45 Using the same percentages as Study 2, which utilized the United States Census 
Bureau’s estimates for age, gender, race, and ethnicity categories of the United States 
population up to the year 2019. Using those estimates the following quotas were entered 
into Qualtrics: 18-24 aged people (13%), 25-34 aged people (18%), 35-44 aged people 
(18%), 45-54 aged people (19%), 55-64 aged people (16%), over-65 aged people (17%); 
men (49%), women (51%); White-only (72%), Black/African American only (13%), 
Asian only (5%), Native American (1%), Other, including Native Hawaiian and people 
self-identifying with more than one race category (9%); and Hispanic (18%), Non-




three (6.89%) participants self-identified as Hispanic, with 309 (92.51%) identifying as 
Non-Hispanic. 
One participant completed only Middle school, 39 (11.68%) participants 
completed only High school, 77 (23.05%) completed only Part of college, 132 (39.52%) 
completed only a College degree, and 83 (24.85%) completed a Graduate degree.  
Design 
This study employed a 2 (Factual Innocence) x 2 (Waiting-for-Trial Location) x 4 
(Probability of Trial Conviction) x 5 (Delay until Trial) mixed-factor design with 2 
between-participants variables: Factual Innocence with two levels (Innocent vs. Guilty, 
see SM 35 for the exact wording of the manipulation) and Waiting-for-Trial Location 
with two levels (Jail, Bail). As in Studies 1 and 2, the Jail and Bail conditions contained 
language in the vignette describing where participants were physically located (see SM 3 
for the exact wording of the manipulation). The two within-participants variables are 
Probability of Trial Conviction with four levels (5%, 50%, 95%, 99%) and Delay until 
Trial with five levels (1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year).  
Factual Innocence and Waiting-for-Trial Location were fully crossed, and 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. Each participant 
received all five levels of Delay until Trial presented in random order to reduce the 
chance of order effects. Within each Delay, each participant received all four levels of 
Probability of Trial Conviction, and the blocks were shown in ascending order. The key 
outcome variable, as in Studies 1–2, was Subjective Trial Aversion.46  Like Study 2’s 
Wider Titration procedure, the procedure used in the present study involved five 
 




decisions per decision tree, but rather than having a range of 1 to 119 days, this study’s 
Subjective Trial Aversion ranged from 3 to 237 days (see Figure 19 in Chapter 3 for the 
full example decision tree). 
The second outcome variable in this study is Procedural Justice, and this new 
variable will be discussed in more detail in the Materials and Measures section.  
There is currently no feasible way to calculate standard effect sizes for individual 
model terms such as main effects and interactions in mixed effects models because of the 
way variance is partitioned in mixed models (Rights & Sterba, 2019). As a best 
approximation, G*Power was used based on a repeated measures ANOVA with 1 
between-participants variable and 1 within-participants variable interacted. Given an 
effect size f of .1 (taken from Clatch & Borgida, Study 3, 2021, highest order interaction 
model term, i.e., Delay*Probability*Waiting-for-Trial Location), an alpha of .05, power 
of .8, number of between-participants conditions equal to 4, number of within-
participants measurements equal to 5 (i.e., Delay with largest number of levels of the two 
within-participants variables), a correlation among the repeated measures of .03 
(calculated based on Clatch & Borgida, Study 3, 2021, correlation of Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores based on Delay’s level), and nonsphericity correction equal to 1, the total 
sample size required is 340 (see SM 37 for G*Power screenshot). In order to allow for a 
degree of missing data, 350 participants’ data were collected.47 
Materials, Measures and Procedure 
 
47 To this point I had never used Prolific to collect data, but various other colleagues 
informed me that they had less than 1% missingness using Prolific. In case my 
experience with Prolific produced slightly more missingness than my colleagues I 




The study materials consisted of an online survey very similar to Study 2’s 
survey. As in Study 2, this survey contained the same attention and data quality checks 
(see SM 2), a vignette/scenario (SM 3), legal decision-making questions (SM 5), 
individual difference measures (e.g., Impulsivity, but adapted System Justification was 
not measured), and demographic and experience questions. The Study 2 vignette/scenario 
was altered consistent with the creation of the Factual Innocence manipulation as 
described in this study’s Design section. In addition, the legal-decision-making 
instructions and question set-up was edited to increase the salience of Waiting-for-Trial 
Location and to generally make the instructions simpler and clearer (see SM 38 for the 
exact wording). In addition to the Study 2 measures, the following measures were added 
to the survey: Legal Experience (SM 39) and Procedural Justice (SM 36). 
The Blameworthiness, Perceptions of Innocence (categorical innocence followed 
by continuous measurement of innocence), Negative Contemplative Emotions, and 
Procedural Justice questions were presented in random order after the series of binary, 
forced-choice plea-bargain questions. Then, the measures of Need for Cognitive Closure, 
Impulsivity, and Personal Involvement were presented in random order before the driving 
and accident, criminal experience, legal experience, and demographic questions. 
The new Factual Innocence manipulation was pilot tested. Using 61 Lucid 
Theorem participants, the Innocence manipulation was tested and validated. Innocent 
participants perceived themselves to be more innocent (M = 45, SD = 34.75) and less 
guilty (M = 54.09, SD = 34.07) than did Guilty participants (innocence ratings t(57) = -
2.55, p < .05; M = 23, SD = 32.46); guilt ratings t(58) = 3.49, p < .001; M = 82.74, SD = 




participants in the Innocent condition perceived themselves to be significantly more 
innocent (M = 62.86, SD = 32.66) than did participants in the Guilty condition (t(324) = 
10.95, p < .001; M = 24.61, SD = 30.67), and participants in the Guilty condition 
perceived themselves to be significantly more guilty (M = 75.93, SD = 31.51) than did 
participants in the Innocent condition (t(325) = -10.92, p < .001; M = 37.01, SD = 33.13). 
Procedural Justice 
Lind and Tyler (1988) outline various ways in which procedural justice has been 
measured by researchers, including a single-item measure asking how fair a particular 
procedure is that the participant experienced or a collection of questions asking closely 
related questions like how satisfied the participant is with the procedure. SM 36 shows 
the Procedural Justice (PJ) measure used in Study 3, which included five items that asked 
about the fairness of the plea-bargaining process and outcomes, as well as how much 
control the participant felt over their decisions and if they would trust the plea-bargaining 
system in the future. The five-item measure had a reliability of α = .87.  
Legal Experience 
 The additional questions were both broader and more specific than Study 1 and 
Study 2’s Criminal Justice System Experience measures. Specifically, participants were 
asked whether they had had any legal system experience, including either civil and/or 
criminal. Then, based on their answer, they were asked to explain their role in the legal 
system (e.g., party in a case or a juror). They were also asked to what extent they trusted 
the judge and attorney involved in the case. Additionally, if participants responded to the 
questions asked in Study 2 (Specific Criminal Experience questions) by saying that they 




then they were asked how much they trusted the judge and jury in their case as well as 
their attorney. They were also asked whether they chose to testify at trial and where they 
were while waiting for trial (jail vs. bail). Last, all participants who had responded that 
they personally had criminal justice system experience or someone they are close with 
had criminal justice system experience were asked whether and to what extent their 
experiences affected their thoughts or feelings about the criminal justice system.  
Decision-Making Reasons 
 In order to capture potential group differences in reasons for their plea-bargain 
decisions, a variety of questions were asked. Participants were asked to rate the 
importance (1 = least important, 7 = most important) of the following factors to the plea-
trial decisions they made previously in the survey: my innocence/guilt, my probability of 
losing at trial, the delay until trial, the length of my criminal sentence (i.e., days in jail), 
and where I awaited trial (e.g., in jail or out on bail). 
Hypotheses 
As mentioned in Study 3’s introduction, because no research has assessed whether 
plea-bargain behavior influences perceptions of procedural justice no formal hypotheses 
were specified for Procedural Justice (PJ) or Legal Experiences. However, the relations 
between PJ and Subjective Trial Aversion, PJ and Legal Experiences, and PJ and Factual 
Innocence were examined. Additionally, the relation between participant Race and their 
Legal Experiences was examined. 
Situation Predictors 
 Factual Innocence. The new situational manipulation of factual innocence 




Hypothesis 3a. Consistent with the “guilt hypothesis,” guilty participants will 
have significantly higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will innocent participants. 
However, it is predicted that the two groups’ Subjective Trial Aversion scores 
distributions will be largely overlapping, suggesting that the phenomenology of 
innocence/guilt are not categorically distinct. 
Hypothesis 3b. Probability of Trial Conviction and Factual Innocence will 
interactively predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores such that there should be a 
flattened (potentially non-significant) effect of Probability of Conviction on guilty 
participants’ Subjective Trial Aversion scores relative to innocent participants. 
Hypothesis 3c. Guilty participants waiting in jail will have the highest Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores relative to the three other groups (Innocent-Jail, Innocent-Bail, 
and Guilty-Bail).  
Hypothesis 3d. Additionally, guilty participants, will have a weaker, or null, effect 
of Waiting-for-Trial Location on Subjective Trial Aversion scores relative to the 
significant effect for innocent participants. If this prediction is true, it could mean that the 
Guilty-Jail group did not have statistically different plea decisions compared to the 
Guilty-Bail group but did have different plea decisions compared to the two Innocent 
groups (making one of the three comparisons in Hypothesis 3c null). 
Hypothesis 3e. Impulsivity and Factual Innocence will interact such that guilty 
participants with relatively low impulsivity scores will have higher Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores than will their low-impulsivity-innocent counterparts, and high-
impulsivity participants will follow a similar pattern but with smaller difference between 




Subjective Trial Aversion scores is less influenced by Factual Innocence compared to 
their low-impulsivity counterparts. 
Other Experimental Effects. The previously-manipulated situational features of 
Delay, Probability, and Waiting-for-Trial Location produced the following three-way 
interaction prediction: 
Hypothesis 3f. A significant interaction between Probability of Trial Conviction 
and Delay until Trial should only appear in the Jail condition (i.e., not the Bail condition), 
and the direction of probability and delay effects should be consistent with those found 
by Clatch and Borgida (2021) and Study 2 findings reported in Chapter 3. 
Trait-Level Predictors 
Impulsivity.  
Hypothesis 3g. Highly impulsive participants will prefer the uncertain/risky 
option, trial, evincing lower Subject Trial Aversion scores, relative to less impulsive 
participants. 
Hypothesis 3h. Participants’ impulsivity will interact with Probability of Trial 
Conviction, such that relatively less impulsive participants will be more sensitive than 
more impulsive participants to probability information, evincing a stronger positive 
relation between Probability of Trial Conviction and Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
Hypothesis 3i. Participants’ impulsivity will interact with Delay until Trial, such 
that low-impulsivity participants will be especially sensitive to the trial’s delay, evincing 
a stronger positive relation between Delay until Trial and Subjective Trial Aversion 





 Blameworthiness and Innocence. 
Hypothesis 3j.   Participants experiencing more self-blame for the accident and 
child’s injury will have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants 
experiencing less self-blame.  
Hypothesis 3k.  Participants who perceive themselves as less innocent of the 
crime charged will have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants 
who perceive themselves to be more innocent.  
Hypothesis 3l and 3m. Neither participants’ self-blame nor their perceptions of 
Innocence will interact with Probability of Trial Conviction to influence Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores. That is, blameworthiness and innocence are more accurately described 
as individual perceptions and beliefs developed while reading the scenario rather than 
being influenced solely by the situational cue of probability of losing at trial, which is 
embedded in the plea-bargain decisions. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
SM 40 is a comprehensive resource that shows the exploratory relations between 
demographic and trait-level predictors, which are provided for background. The accident 
analyses presented in Studies 1 and 2 will be omitted from the present study because they 
produced only peripheral findings that did not contribute to core findings in the cross-
construct modeling. 




 In the present study, Subjective Trial Aversion scores ranged between 3 and 237 
days in jail, and the upper limit of 237 days was just 3 days short of the trial sentence of 
240 days (8 months).48  
Demographic Analyses 
 Table 18 shows the simple linear regressions of gender, race, age, and education 
predicting Subjective Trial Aversion scores. Non-binary-gender-identifying individuals 
had significantly higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than did men (B = 42.19, SE = 
20.47, p < .05), but that group only contained seven participants. SM 41 shows the 
boxplot of the gender categories’ distributions of Subjective Trial Aversion scores, and 
the Other category’s distribution is skewed to the top of the variables range. Men and 
women’s Subjective Trial Aversion scores had very similar distributions. Also, people in 
the Other race category had significantly higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than did 
Blacks (B = 25.18, SE = 9.81, p < .05), and Whites had marginally higher Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores than did Blacks (B = 11.88, SE = 7.01, p = .09). Figure 21 shows 
the boxplot of the race categories’ distributions of Subjective Trial Aversion scores, and 
the mean differences are visibly apparent. Age and Education did not predict Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores. 
Procedural Justice 
 
48 This change in the measurement of Subjective Trial Aversion relative to Study 2 did 
not result in a differently shaped distribution. SM 34’s top-right graph shows that the 
distribution of Subjective Trial Aversion scores is still bi-modal despite increasing the 
plea-bargain sentence to just three days less than the trial sentence. SM 34’s top-left 
graph displays Study 2’s Wider Titration data for comparison. SM 34’s bottom-right 
graph shows that participants’ average Subjective Trial Aversion scores across the twelve 
decision trees they each went through. SM 34’s bottom-left graph displays Study 2’s 




 Table 19 shows the series of regressions run using Procedural Justice as an 
outcome measure. None of the demographic variables predicted Procedural Justice, and 
the one-item legal experience and one-item criminal experience questions did not predict 
Procedural Justice. However, participants who had legal experience and trusted the judge 
to whom they were previously exposed also perceived more procedural justice in their 
plea-bargaining process (B = .01, SE = .003, p < .01). Additionally, participants who had 
legal experience and rated that experience as more positive also perceived more 
procedural justice in their plea-bargaining process (B = .01, SE = .003, p < .01). 
 Table 19 also shows that participants’ perceptions of guilt were related to their 
perceptions of procedural justice in their plea-bargaining process: As participants’ 
perceptions of innocence increased, their perceptions of procedural justice in their plea-
bargaining process decreased (B = -.0005, SE = .0006, p < .001). Moreover, the 
manipulated factors of Factual Innocence and Waiting-for-Trial Location influenced 
participants’ perceptions of procedural justice. More specifically, factually innocent 
participants had significantly lower perceptions of procedural justice in their plea-
bargaining process (M = 2.50 SD = .88) than did factually guilty participants (M = 3.01 
SD = .90; B = -.50, SE = .10, p < .001). Second, participants who had to wait in jail for 
trial had significantly lower perceptions of procedural justice in their plea-bargaining 
process (M = 2.63 SD = .89) than did participants who awaited trial out on bail (M = 2.90 
SD = .94; B = -.27, SE = .10, p < .01). 
 Last, because participants completed the plea-bargaining questions before they 
responded to the Procedural Justice measure, average Subjective Trial Aversion was used 




scores predicted Procedural Justice.49  As participants’ Subjective Trial Aversion scores 
increased, they perceived more Procedural Justice about the process (B = .003, SE = 
.0009, p < .01).50 
Race-Based Differences: Legal Experiences, Reported Decision-Making Reasons, and 
Experimental Factors 
 Because Study 3’s Demographic Analyses section indicated that there were race 
differences in participants’ patterns of plea-bargain decision-making, follow-up analyses 
were conducted to explain why this might be. First, a series of analyses was conducted to 
determine whether the racial groups differed in their legal experiences (valence of open-
ended responses, overall legal system evaluation, trust in lawyers, or trust in judges), 
which would suggest that differences in real-world criminal justice system experience 
was a lens through which participants may have viewed the hypothetical plea-bargaining 
situation. Second, a series of analyses was conducted to determine whether the racial 
groups differed in their reported Decision-Making Reasons. Third, because the racial 
groups did differ in their reported Decision-Making Reasons, the interactions between 
Race and key experimental factors were conducted to determine the direction of Race’s 
influence. 
 First, Table 20 shows that Race did not predict Legal Experience, their trust of the 
judge, or their trust of the lawyer(s) (ps > .1). Participants’ open-ended responses to 
whether their experiences affected their thoughts or feelings about the criminal justice 
 
49 And keeping Subjective Trial Aversion as the outcome variable still revealed a 
significant relation: as Procedural Justice increased, Subjective Trial Aversion increased 
(B = 8.81, SE = 3.14, p < .01). 
50 Figure 22 presents the scatterplot of the two variables with a blue regression line that 




system were coded by a single research assistant for general positivity, general negativity, 
or neutral/evenly-mixed responses, but participant Race did not predict their valence-
coded responses (χ2(4, 123) = 1.98, p > .1). 
 Second, the comparison between Whites and Blacks was focused on regarding 
their Decision-Making Reasons to simplify analyses and for two other reasons: (1) Blacks 
are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system and thus might view the 
criminal justice system differently than the historically advantaged group (i.e., Whites) 
and (2) the Other-race group, containing 46 participants, had a plurality of Asian 
participants, who are not an overrepresented group of color in the criminal justice system. 
 SM 42 shows the Decision-Making Reasons’ correlations with each other, and the 
reliability of four factors’ importance ratings (probability, delay, criminal charge and 
sentence, and waiting-for-trial location) was α = .71.51 Whites rated this constellation of 
situational features (probability, delay, criminal charge and sentence, and waiting-for-trial 
location) as significantly less important to their plea-bargain decisions than did Blacks (B 
= -3.12, SE = 1.45, p < .05). Additionally, Whites rated their factual innocence as 
significantly less important to their plea-bargain decisions than did Blacks (B = -.55, SE = 
.28, p < .05).  
Because of these race-based differences, a series of multiple regressions was 
performed to determine whether the experimental factors did in fact influence plea-
bargain decisions differentially for Blacks and Whites. Two-way interactions between 
Race and the experimental variables of Probability of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, 
 
51 But when the Innocence factor was added, reliability dropped to α = .51, so it was left 




Waiting-for-Trial Location, and Factual Innocence were performed. Whites’ plea-bargain 
decisions were more influenced by Probability of Trial Conviction relative to Blacks’ (B 
= .25, SE = .05, p < .001), and no other experimental variable interacted with Race alone 
(see Table 21 for other interactions’ null effects). Figure 23 shows a steeper gray line for 
White than the black line for Blacks.  
Next, a series of three-way interactions among Race and the experimental 
variables were conducted. Whites’ plea-bargain decisions were more influenced by the 
multiplicative combination of Probability of Trial Conviction and Waiting-for-Trial 
Location than were Blacks’ plea-bargain decisions (B = .29, SE = .09, p < .01; see Table 
21). Figure 24’s top panel shows that White and Black participants responded similarly 
when they were out on Bail (overlapping dashed lines), but when they were waiting in 
Jail, Black participants became less responsive to Probability relative to White 
participants and relative to their Black counterparts in the Bail condition.52 Additionally, 
Whites’ plea-bargain decisions were more influenced by the multiplicative combination 
of Probability of Trial Conviction and Factual Innocence than were Blacks’ plea-bargain 
decisions (B = .61, SE = .09, p < .001; see Table 21). Figure 24’s bottom panel shows a 
number of differences in how Black and White participants responded to Factual 
Innocence and Probability. First, overall, across conditions, White participants were more 
influenced by the manipulations because their Subjective Trial Aversion averages ranged 
from 41 to 203 whereas Black participants’ Subjective Trial Aversion averages range 
from 63 to 190. Second, the groups responded to Factual Innocence/Guilt very 
 
52 A four-way interaction was run, but the interaction term that was on interest was 




differently. White participants in the Innocent condition, with the steepest of the four 
lines, were most responsive to Probability, whereas Black participants in the Innocent 
condition, with the flattest of the four lines, were the least responsive to Probability. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Situation Predictors 
 Factual Innocence. This new experimental manipulation involved four 
predictions (H3a-H3d). Consistent with H3a, Factually Guilty participants had 
significantly higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than did Factually Innocent 
participants(B = -19.05, SE = 5.75, p < .01). It may be seen in Figure 25, however, that as 
predicted, the distributions were substantially overlapping. 
 Additionally, consistent with H3b, Probability of Trial Conviction and Factual 
Innocence interacted to predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = .24, SE = .04, p < 
.001). Figure 26 shows that the red Guilty line is shallower than the green Innocent line, 
consistent with the descriptive expectation that for guilty participants the probability 
effect on Subjective Trial Aversion scores should be weaker than that for innocent 
participants. 
 Three t-tests were conducted to test H3c’s prediction that Guilty-Jail participants 
would have the highest Subjective Trial Aversion scores. Figure 27 shows the 
distributions of the four groups’ Subjective Trial Aversion scores. As expected, the 
Guilty participants in Jail had significantly higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores (M = 
165.08 SD = 48.27) than Guilty participants out on Bail (M = 144.60 SD = 57.36; t(169) 




.05), and Innocent participants out on Bail (M = 116.29 SD = 53.64; t(139) = 5.81, p < 
.001). 
 Because prediction H3d makes predictions about the differential influence of 
Waiting-for-Trial location on Subjective Trial Aversion scores in Innocent and Guilty 
groups, the interaction of the two variables was tested and found to be nonsignificant (B = 
12.72, SE = 11.21, p > .1).53 Last, counter to H3e, Impulsivity and Factual Innocence did 
not interact (B = .57, SE = 1.61, p > .1). 
Other Experimental Factors. As may be seen in Table 22, the anticipated three-
way interaction among Probability of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, and Waiting-
until-Trial Location was found (B = -.17, SE = .02, p < .001). Figure 28 shows this three-
way interaction: the lack of Delay effect in the Bail condition, evinced by the flat lines in 
the right graph combined with the interactive Probability-by-Delay effect in the Jail 
condition, evinced by the left graph’s upward sloping lines that decrease in their 
steepness as Probability of Trial Conviction increases. 
Trait-Level Predictor: Impulsivity 
 A simple linear mixed-effects regression was run to test H3g, but Impulsivity’s 
parameter estimate was nonsignificant (see Table 22). A mixed-effects multiple 
regression was run to test the interaction between Probability of Trial Conviction and 
Impulsivity (H3h), and, as expected, participants with higher impulsivity showed less of a 
probability effect (B = -.03, SE = .02, p < .001; see Table 22). Figure 29 shows a steeper 
 
53 In order to understand this null effect, it was graphed. Figure 27 shows this null 
interaction: the increase from Guilty-Bail’s median Subjective Trial Aversion Value 
(represented by the thick black line in the middle of the bar) to Guilty-Jail’s median is 




purple probability regression line for low-impulsivity participants relative to the pink 
high-impulsivity regression line suggesting that low-impulsivity participants were more 
sensitive to probability in their plea decisions. A mixed-effects multiple regression was 
run to test the interaction between Delay until Trial and Impulsivity (H3i), and the 
interaction term was nonsignificant (B = -.004, SE = .01, p > .1; see Table 22). 
Situated-Person Predictors: Blameworthiness and Innocence 
Consistent with H3j, participants experiencing more self-blame for the accident 
and child’s injury had higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than did participants 
experiencing less self-blame (B = .26, SE = .04, p < .001). Consistent with H2k, 
participants who perceived themselves be less innocent of the crime charge had higher 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores compared to participants who perceived themselves to 
be more innocent (B = -.51, SE = .07, p < .001).54 
Counter to H3l, Blameworthiness interacted with Probability of Trial Conviction 
to predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = -.001, SE = .0002, p < .001). Figure 30 
shows nearly parallel lines with a subtle conversion of the two groups’ regression lines at 
95% and 99% probabilities. But consistent with H3m, Perceptions of Innocence did not 
interact with Probability of Trial Conviction to predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores 
(B = .0008, SE = .0005, p > .1). However, using the Perceptions of Guilt or the composite 
score produced significant interaction terms (see Table 22). Figure 31 used the composite 
 
54 Participants who perceived themselves be more guilty of the crime charge had higher 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores than did participants who perceived themselves to be 
less guilty (B = .47, SE = .07, p < .001). Additionally, because the continuous 
measurements of Perceptions of Innocence and Perceptions of Guilt were correlated at -





Perceptions of Innocent values to create an interaction plot analogous to those seen in 
Studies 1 and 2 using those studies’ ordinal innocence measures, and it may be seen that 
participants who believed themselves to be innocent were more sensitive to Probability 
once it was more likely than not (i.e., greater than 50%) that they would be convicted at 
trial than their guilty and in-between counterparts. 
Cross-Construct Modeling 
As performed by Clatch and Borgida (2021) and in the two previous chapters of 
this dissertation, multiple regressions with experimental and non-experimental Person 
(and Situated Person) variables were conducted to test whether the effects of Person 
variables account for variance in plea-bargain decisions above and beyond the effects of 
the independent variables.55 Thus, the preliminary step was to enter experimental 
variables (Probability of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, Waiting for Trial Location, 
and Factual Innocence) into a model predicting Subjective Trial Aversion scores (see 
Model 1 in SM 44).56 Next, in Model 2, the demographic variable of Gender and Race 
were entered into the model. Model 2 was significantly better than Model 1 (c2(4) = 
11.74, p < .05; Model 1’s AIC was 73373 and Model 2’s AIC was 73369). Model 2’s 
betas and standard errors can be seen in Table 23. 
Next, in Model 3, the controls of Personal Involvement and Behavioral Personal 
Involvement were entered into Model 2.57 Models 2 and 3 did not differ in their 
 
55 Like in Studies 1 and 2, to reduce the tables referenced in this section, the statistical 
information for any steps in the hierarchical regressions conducted that did not produce a 
significant improvement in the model were placed in supplemental materials. 
56 Unlike Study 1, the starting point was a multiple regression testing the four-way 
interaction between all four experimental factors. 





predictive utility (c2(2) = 2.49, p = .29); Model 3’s AIC was 72510, which was higher 
than Model 2’s AIC 72508,58 and neither Personal Involvement nor Behavioral Personal 
Involvement were significant predictors, so they were left out in the next model. Model 
3’s betas and standard errors can be found in SM 45. 
Next, in Model 4, the individual-difference measure of Impulsivity (interacted 
with Probability of Trial Conviction) was added to Model 2 (not Model 3 because it 
offered no added predictive utility). Models 4 was significantly better than Model 2 
(c2(2) = 43.13, p < .001; Model 2’s AIC was 73369 and Model 4’s AIC was 73330). 
Model 4’s betas and standard errors can be seen in Table 24. 
Next, in Model 5, the situated-person variables of Blameworthiness and Perceived 
Innocence59 (each interacted with Probability of Trial Conviction) were added to Model 
4. Adding these variables significantly increased the Model’s predictive utility (c2(4) = 
39.69, p < .001; Model 4’s AIC was 73330 and Model 5’s AIC was 73298). Model 5’s 
betas and standard errors can be seen in Table 25. 
Discussion 
Overall, Study 3 provided the opportunity to test a new situation variable, Factual 
Innocence, which is psychologically and legally relevant to plea-bargain decision-
making. As the third study in a series of studies testing similar experimental 
manipulations and measuring similar person variables, this study arguably acts as a tie-
breaker when Studies 1 and 2 provided conflicting findings, and when Studies 1 and 2 
 
58 Model 2 has a different AIC here than the previous paragraph because it’s a slightly 
different dataset due to model comparisons only being possible on datasets of the same 
length—and because there was some missing data in the Personal Involvement measures 
a new dataset had to be run with Model 2. 




provide consistent findings, this study reproduces those findings on a new sample to 
further increase confidence in their robustness. This discussion section will describe the 
impact of the following predictor categories on Subjective Trial Aversion: (1) situation 
variables including the experimental factor of Factual Innocence, (2) person variables, 
including demographic and trait-level individual differences, and (3) situated-person 
variables, including Blameworthiness and Perceptions of Innocence. Procedural justice 
will be discussed at the end as a bridge to Study 4, which uses insights from the present 
study’s findings to include Procedural Justice as a formal outcome variable. 
Situation Variables 
 Consistent with Clatch and Borgida’s (2021) findings and Study 2 of this 
dissertation, the present study’s findings suggest that increases in Probability of Trial 
Conviction result in more accepted plea bargains; increases in Delay until Trial result in 
more accepted plea bargains (especially in the Jail condition when Probability of 
Conviction is 50% or lower; see Figure 20 for Study 2’s data and Figure 28 for Study 3’s 
data); and waiting in jail for trial results in more accepted plea bargains. Additionally, the 
present study replicated the three-way interaction among these variables that was first 
found by Clatch and Borgida (2021; Study 3) and then confirmed in Study 2 of this 
dissertation.60 Replication of these findings across various online sampling platforms 
(now MTurk, Lucid, and Prolific) and using different measurement methods (this study 
expanded the range of Subjective Trial Aversion scores further by increasing the first 
 
60 The re-writing of the plea-bargain decision-making task to make the Wait-for-Trial 
Location more prominent than in Studies 1 and 2 may be the cause of the increase (from 





plea-bargain offer from 60 to 120 days in prison) increases confidence in the reliability of 
the findings. Moreover, Study 2’s nationally representative sample followed by the 
present study’s oversample of Black Americans argues for generalizability of these 
findings. 
 But Delay, Probability, and Waiting-for-Trial Location were not the only situation 
variables manipulated in the present study. The Factual Innocence manipulation provided 
the ability to test whether innocent and guilty criminal defendants respond to the plea-
bargaining process differently. The answer is that largely, innocent and guilty criminal 
defendants respond to the plea-bargaining process in very similar ways with a small but 
detectable group-mean difference in plea-bargain decision-making such that guilty 
participants accept more pleas. Because the titration procedure requires participants to 
make a series of decisions, not only is Subjective Trial Aversion a measure of how many 
times they would be willing to accept a plea (as opposed to trial) but it is also a measure 
of how harsh of a plea they would be willing to accept to avoid trial because the plea-
option’s criminal sanction increases each time the participant accepts a plea, so guilty 
participants accepted harsher pleas on average than innocent participants. 
In that context, it is striking that nearly a third of Innocent participants (29.38%, 
47 of 160 participants in the innocent condition) accepted the plea every time it was 
offered despite the fact that the associated criminal sentence increased to be nearly as 
harsh (i.e., just a 3-day difference) as trial’s criminal sentence. And this rate only 
increased by 11% in Guilty participants: 41.28% accepted the plea every time it was 




time a plea bargain was offered, and this rate only increased by 4% in Innocent 
participants: 15.63% chose the trial option every time it was offered. 
And these different rates of all-trial and all-plea plea-bargaining strategies 
between innocent and guilty participants is what, likely, accounts for the present study’s 
confirmation of the “guilty hypothesis” as tested by mean differences—that guilty 
participants, on average, accept more plea-bargains than innocent participants. Figure 25 
shows the largely overlapping distributions of the two groups (innocent and guilty 
participants), in all of the histogram’s bars except the two bars capturing the all-trial and 
all-plea plea-bargaining strategies.61 
 Moreover, this main-effect difference between innocent and guilty participants is 
qualified by an interaction with the most robust situational feature in this dissertation’s 
research: Probability of Trial Conviction. In particular, innocent participants were 
especially influenced to accept pleas once their likelihood of being falsely convicted at 




 Study 3 suggests that Education- and Gender-based differences in plea-bargain 
decisions are not highly reliable. Both Study 2 and 3 failed to replicate Study 1’s finding 
that college graduates chose to go to trial more often than other groups. Study 3 also 
failed to replicate that men go to trial more often than women. 
 
61 Note, however, that those outer bars capture more than just the all-trial strategy 




 The present study was also the first study in this dissertation research to find that 
there are race differences in plea-bargain decision-making, and this may be due to the 
oversample of people of color enabling large enough sub-groups to power the 
comparisons. Unfortunately, Study 3 did not find any differences in the racial groups’ life 
or legal experiences that explain the findings, and this may be because the legal 
experience questions do not tap the right constructs, or it may be because there is cross-
race consensus in perceptions of the criminal justice system. The present study, however, 
did find that Blacks’ stronger preference for trial can be explained by a variety of 
situational features. 
First, Black participants’ exhibited relative insensitivity to their likelihood of trial 
conviction relative to Whites (see Table 21 for statistical results and Figure 23 for the 
graphical representation). To my knowledge, no research to date directly explains this. 
However, because there were a variety of situational variables manipulated in the present 
study’s experimental context, and in order to fully query the data, two three-way 
interactions among Probability of Trial Conviction, Race, and other experimental 
variables were conducted. Specifically the first three-way interaction involved Factual 
Innocence and the second involved Waiting-for-Trial Location (see Table 21 for 
statistical results and Figure 24’s two panels).  
Figure 24’s top panel shows that being White and innocent made people more 
responsive to the likelihood of their conviction at trial. So Innocent-White participants 
were sensitive to the environmental cue of probability of trial conviction to make their 
decisions relative to Guilty-White and all Black participants. At low likelihoods of losing 




accepted the plea more. Additionally, Figure 24’s bottom panel shows that being Black 
and waiting in jail made people less responsive to the likelihood of their conviction at 
trial. So Black-Jail participants resisted the environmental cue of probability of trial 
conviction to make their decisions relative to Black-Bail participants and all White 
participants. This can be interpreted as a form of reactance. Knowing that they are a 
member of a group that is overrepresented in the criminal justice system and then being 
told that their likelihood of conviction at trial is increasing (in subsequent within-
participants blocks within the experimental paradigm) and that they are awaiting trial in 
jail, they respond by resisting the plea offer more than other groups.  
Together, these three-way interactions suggest that the initially-observed 
difference in Blacks’ and Whites’ extent of probability discounting may be attributable to 
different reactions to other situational cues (factual innocence for Whites and waiting in 
jail pre-trial for Blacks). 
Trait-Level Individual-Difference Variable: Impulsivity 
 Study 3’s null Impulsivity-main-effect finding is consistent with Study 2’s null 
effect and suggests that Study 1’s finding that higher impulsivity was related to a 
preference for trial may have been anomalous. If this is the case, it would suggest that 
impulsivity does not influence plea-bargain decisions directly, encouraging people either 
to choose to go to trial or accept the plea more often. Moreover, across all three of the 
studies to this point, impulsivity interacts with probability of trial conviction to predict 
plea-bargain decisions. And the direction of the effect is the same: For lower-impulsivity 
participants, the likelihood of losing at trial is a stronger motivator for accepting pleas 




losing at trial—just to a lesser degree. Figure 3 (Study 1), Figure 16 (Study 2), and Figure 
29 (Study 3) all show this pattern, and the intersection point of the regression lines is 
consistently below 50%, suggesting that once it becomes equally likely that a participant 
will win or lose at trial, low-impulsivity participants are more uncomfortable with that 
risk than high-impulsivity participants. 
 Last, Study 1’s finding that impulsivity interacts with delay until trial to predict 
plea-bargain decisions did not replicate in Study 2 or Study 3, which taken together with 
the robust Impulsivity-by-Probability effects, suggest that Impulsivity’s effect in plea 
bargaining is mostly about risk aversion not aversion to delayed outcomes. 
Situated-Person Variables 
Blameworthiness 
 The hypothesized effects involving Blameworthiness have been consistently 
significant across all three dissertations studies. First, Study 3 replicates Study 1 and 
Study 2’s finding that participants who blame themselves more for the injury and car 
accident accept more (and harsher) pleas. Additionally, Study 3 replicates the two 
previous studies’ findings that, counter to the hypothesized null effect, self-blame 
interacts with probability of losing at trial to predict plea-bargain decisions. Figure 32 
shows the interaction plot for Studies 1–3, showing both Study 2’s Original and Wider 
data since Study 1 used the Original titration and Study 3 used the Wider titration. The 
exact nature of the interaction varies across studies, but in general, as probability  of 
losing at trial increases the lines representing above- and below-median blameworthiness 
groups get closer or intersect. This suggests that as probability of trial conviction 




Perceptions of Innocence 
 Study 3 replicated the finding from Studies 1 and 2 that participants who perceive 
themselves to be more guilty, accept more (and harsher) pleas. To determine the 
consistency of the findings of the interaction between Perceptions of Innocence and 
Probability of Trial Conviction, it is important to take into account how Perceptions of 
Innocence are measured, and in Study 2, how Subjective Trial Aversion was measured. 
Table 26 shows a summary of the findings across studies by how they were measured. 
The continuous measure of perceptions of guilt was the only variable with perfectly 
consistent results: when participants felt more guilt about the accident and injury, 
probability of trial conviction mattered less in participants’ plea bargain-decisions. 
Presumably this is because once people have fairly intense feelings of guilt, they are 
accepting harsher pleas and the situational indicator of likelihood of conviction is a 
secondary concern to quelling feelings of guilt. In this sense, the situated-person variable 
of perceptions of guilt have primary psychological impact on plea-bargaining behavior 
and the situational variable of probability of trial conviction has secondary impact. The 
inconsistent findings regarding the continuous measure of perceptions of innocence and 
the continuous composite measure may be due to different samples or varying ranges in 
Subjective Trial Aversion (produces by Original vs. Wider procedures). 
Limitations and Future Studies 
 Study 3 showed that factual innocence is not only important legally, but also 
psychologically important to plea-bargain decision-making, and Study 3 highlighted that 
Black and White participants react differently to factual innocence and waiting for trial in 




the cell size of comparison groups. In particular, because Factual Innocence and Waiting-
for-Trial Location were manipulated between participants, the conclusions regarding 
those variables’ interactions with Probability of Trial Conviction and Race should be 
interpreted cautiously and retested in future studies.62 Additionally, Studies 1–3 have 
focused entirely on a single dependent measure, Subjective Trial Aversion, and although 
this is the central behavioral variable of interest, the comprehensive psychological study 
of plea-bargaining should ideally involve more than a single outcome measure. To begin 
to address this, Study 4 will also test a series of hypotheses pertaining to perceptions of 
procedural justice. 
 Last, although Studies 1–3 have focused on producing internally valid scientific 
conclusions about plea-bargain decision-making, that focus is at the expense of a degree 
of external validity. Study 4 will shift its focus to prioritize external validity more than in 
Studies 1-3. 
 
62 Figure 24’s top panel only summarizes data from 38 Black-Jail participants and 40 
Black-Bail participants, and the bottom panel only summarizes data from 44 Black-





Study 3 Demographics Regression Analyses 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2 95% CI 
Gender   0.004  
       Other 42.19* 20.47 0.004 (2.13, 82.2) 
       Women 3.59 5.88  (-7.92, 15.1) 
Race   0.006  
       Other 25.18* 9.81 0.006 (5.97,44.40) 
        White 11.88m 7.01 0.003 (-1.83, 25.6) 
Age 0.19 0.24 0.001 (-0.28, 0.66) 
Education   0.003  
         High School 14.33 5.89  (-90.8, 119) 
         Part of College 4.56 53.55  (-99.9, 109) 
         College Graduate 3.06 53.41  (-101.1, 107) 
         Graduate School  15.08 53.53  (-89.3, 120) 
Gender*PTC   0.32  
     Other 50.27* 22.12 0.002 (6.99, 93.55) 
     Women 4.15 6.36  (-8.29, 16.59) 
     PTC 1.42*** 0.03 0.19 (1.36, 1.47) 
     Other:PTC -0.13 0.13  (-0.39, 0.13) 
     Women:PTC -0.01 0.04  (-0.09, 0.07) 
Gender*DUT   0.02  
     Other 28.65 21.25 0.001 (-12.92, 70.22) 
     Women 3.76 6.11  (-8.18, 15.71) 
     DUT 0.48*** 0.07 0.005 (-0.34, 0.63) 
     Other:DUT 0.83* 0.35 0.001 (0.15, 1.52) 
     Women:DUT -0.01 0.10  (-0.21, 0.19) 
Gender*DUT*WTL   0.04  
     Other 54,08 38.55 0.001 (-21.02, 129.19) 
     Women 7.87 8.49 0.001 (-8.67, 24.42) 
     DUT -0.002 0.10  (-0.20, 0.20) 
     Jail 12.66 8.62 0.001 (-4.13, 20.46) 
     Other:DUT 0.28 0.64  (-0.98, 1.54) 
     Women:DUT -0.02 -0.14  (-0.30, 0.26) 
     Other:Jail -39.30 45.85  (-128.63, 50.03) 
     Women:Jail -8.10 11.95  (-31.38, 15.19) 
     DUT:Jail -0.96*** 0.14 0.005 (0.68, 1.24) 
     Other:DUT:Jail 0.50 0.77  (-1.01, 2.00) 
     Women:DUT:Jail 0.03 0.20  (-0.37, 0.42) 
Education*PTC   0.32  
      Middle School -70.70 57.80 0.001 (-183.48, 42.08) 
      High School 2.12 11.15  (-19.65, 23.88) 
      Part of College -25.54** 9.09 0.004 (-43.28, -7.80) 
      College Graduate -19.92* 8.05 0.003 (-35.63, -4.22) 
      PTC 1.31*** 0.04 0.10 (1.23, 1.38) 
      Middle School:PTC 0.89* 0.35  (.21, 1.58) 
      High School:PTC -0.05 0.07 0.001 (-0.18, 0.09) 
      Part of College:PTC 0.24*** 0.06 0.001 (0.13, 0.35) 
      College Graduate:PTC 0.13** 0.05 0.001 (0.03, 0.22) 
Education*DUT   0.01  
      Middle School -18.34 55.54  (-126.71, 90.02) 




      Part of College -10.55 8.74 0.001 (-27.60, 6.49) 
      College Graduate -9.12 7.74 0.001 (-24.21, 5.97) 
      DUT 0.56*** 0.10 0.004 (-.37, 0.76) 
      Middle School:DUT 0.20 0.91  (-1.59, 1.99) 
      High School:DUT 0.01 0.18  (-0.34, 0.35) 
      Part of College:DUT 0.002 0.14  (-0.28, 0.28) 
      College Graduate:DUT -0.18 0.13  (-0.43, 0.07) 
Education*DUT*WTL   0.04  
      Middle School -27.18 54.48  (-132.86, 78.50) 
      High School 1.10 14.16  (-26.38, 28.57) 
      Part of College -3.27 12.64  (-27.78, 21.25) 
      College Graduate 0.14 10.85  (-20.91, 21.19) 
      DUT 0.08 0.14  (-0.20, 0.36) 
      Jail 18.81 11.85 0.002 (-4.17, 41.79) 
      Middle School:DUT -0.23 0.91  (-2.01, 1.56) 
      High School:DUT -0.10 0.24  (-0.57, 0.36) 
      Part of College:DUT 0.05 0.21  (-0.36, 0.47) 
      College Graduate:DUT -0.21 0.18  (-0.57, 0.15) 
      High School:Jail 0.72 21.16  (-40.34, 41.77) 
      Part of College:Jail -14.01 17.12  (-47.23, 19.21) 
      College Graduate:Jail -17.37 15.11 0.001 (-46.68, 11.94) 
      DUT:Jail 0.91*** 0.20 0.002 (0.52, 1.30) 
      High School:DUT:Jail 0.53 0.35  (-0.16, 1.22) 
      Part of College:DUT:Jail -0.14 0.29  (-0.70, 0.42) 
      College Graduate:DUT:Jail 0.13 0.25  (-0.26, 0.63) 
Race*PTC   0.33  
      Other 3.67 10.61  (-17.08, 24.42) 
      White -3.96 7.58  (-18.78, 10.87) 
      PTC 1.20*** 0.04 0.08 (1.13, 1.28) 
      Other:PTC 0.35*** 0.06 0.003 (0.22, 0.47) 
      White:PTC 0.25*** 0.05 0.003 (0.16, 0.35) 
Race*DUT   0.02  
      Other 20.64* 10.19 0.003 (0.70, 40.57) 
      White 12.99 m 7.28 0.002 (-1.25, 27.23) 
      DUT 0.50*** 0.10 0.003 (0.30, 0.70) 
      Other:DUT 0.28 m 0.17  (-0.05, 0.61) 
      White:DUT -0.07 0.12  (-0.30, 0.17) 
 
Note. The R2 column presented in the above table when representing simple linear 
regressions is equal to R2m. The same column, when representing multiple linear 
regressions is the partial coefficient. Anything less than 0.01 is excluded from the table.  





Study 3 Procedural Justice Regressions 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
Race   0.02  
    Other -0.33m 0.17  (-0.66, 0.005) 
    White 0.09 0.12  (-0.15, 0.33) 
Gender   0.01  
    Other -0.23 0.36  (-0.94, 0.47) 
    Women -0.13 0.10  (-0.33, 0.07) 
Age 0.004 0.004 0.00 (-0.005, 0.01) 
Education   0.03  
         High School 1.21 0.92  (-0.61, 3.03) 
         Part of College 0.88 0.92  (-0.91, 2.69) 
         College Graduate 1.23 0.92  (-0.57, 3.03) 
         Graduate School  1.30 0.92  (-0.50, 3.11) 
Legal Experience   0.01  
       Civil 0.05 0.20  (-0.34, 0.44) 
       Criminal -0.29 0.21  (-0.71, 0.13) 
       None -0.08 0.19  (-0.42, 0.26) 
        Silent 0.01 0.36  (-0.70, 0.73) 
Criminal Legal Experience    0.00  
       Own -0.08 0.16  (-0.39, 0.24) 
       Both -0.15 0.16  (-0.46, 0.17) 
Trust of Real-World Judge 0.01** 0.003 0.06 (0.003, 0.02) 
Trust of Real-World Lawyer 0.01m 0.003 0.02 (-0.007, 0.01) 
Overall Eval. of Legal Syst. Exper.  0.01** 0.003 0.06 (0.003, 0.02) 
Factual Innocence -0.50*** 0.10 0.07 (-0.70, -0.31) 
Perceptions of Innocence (contin) -0.005*** 0.0006 0.15 (-0.01, -0.00) 
WTL_Jail -0.27** 0.10 0.02 (-0.47, -0.08) 
STA*Perceptions of Innocence (contin)   0.15  
        STA 0.003 0.009  (-0.002, 0.002) 
        Perceptions of Innocence -0.01*** 0.002  (-0.01, -0.002) 
        STA:Perceptions of Innocence 0.000004 0.00001  (-0.00002, 0.00003) 
STA*Factual Innocence    0.09  
         STA 0.003** 0.001  (0.009, 0.01) 
         Innocent -0.003 0.28  (-0.56, 0.56) 
         STA:Innocent  -0.002m 0.001  (-0.01, 0.004) 





Study 3 Race Regressions  
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE 95% CI 
Legal Experience Overall ~ Race    
      Other 10.92 9.19 (-7.25, 29.09) 
       White 0.04 5.35 (-10.54, 10.62) 
Legal Experience Judge Trust ~ Race    
       Other 7.37 9.30 (-11.04, 25.77) 
        White -4.01 5.42 (-14.72, 6.71) 
Legal Experience Lawyer Trust ~ Race    
         Other -2.01 9.15 (-20.12, 16.09) 
         White -5.28 5.33 (-15.82, 5.27) 
Personal Involvement Adject ~ Race    
         Other  -1.13* 0.50 (-2.12, -0.15) 
         White -0.29 0.36 (-0.99, 0.41) 
Personal Involvement Behavior ~ Race    
          Other  -1.33 1.06 (-3.01, 0.75) 
          White -1.33m 0.75 (-2.81, 0.15) 
Personal Involvement Behavior ~ Age*Race    
         Age -0.01 0.05 (-0.11, 0.10) 
         White 3.05 2.67 (-2.22, 8.31) 
         Age:Race -0.10 0.06 (-0.23, 0.02) 
Personal Involvement Adject. ~ Age*Race    
         Age -0.02 0.03 (-0.07, 0.03) 
         White -3.13* 1.30 (-5.69, -0.56) 
         Age:Race 0.06* 0.03 (0.003, 0.12) 
Factor.Importance_composite ~ Race    
         Other  -3.12* 1.45 (-5.96, -0.27) 
         White  -4.32*** 1.03 (-6.35, -2.29) 
STA ~ Race*Personal Involvement Adject.    
Personal Involvement 2.95 2.38 (-1.70, 7.59) 
Race_Other 94.50 64.53 (-31.19, 220.18) 
Race_White 101.26* 47.37 (9.00, 193.53) 
Personal Involvement*Race_Other -4.10 3.85 (-11.60, 3.41) 
Personal Involvement* Race_White -5.22m 2.73 (-10.54, 0.09) 





Study 3 Subjective Trial Aversion Race Regressions 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
Race*PTC   0.33  
    PTC 1.20*** 0.04 0.08 (1.13, 1.28) 
    Race [Other] 3.67 10.61  (-17.08, 24.4) 
    Race [White] -4.00 7.58  (-18.78, 24.42) 
    PTC:Other 0.35*** 0.06 0.003 (0.22, 0.47) 
    PTC:White 0.25*** 0.05 0.003 (0.16, 0.35) 
Race*DUT   0.02  
     DUT 0.50*** 0.10 0.003 (0.30, 0.70) 
    Race [Other] 20.64* 10.19 0.003 (0.70, 40.57) 
    Race [White] 12.99m 7.28 0.002 (-1.25, 27.23) 
    DUT:Other 0.28m 0.17  (-0.05, 0.61) 
    DUT:White -0.07 0.12  (-0.30, 0.17) 
Race*Factual Innocence   0.02  
    Innocent -21.00m 11.86 0.003 (-44.10, 2.1) 
    Race [Other] 18.71 14.01 0.002 (-8.57, 46.0) 
    Race [White] 13.99 9.29 0.002 (-4.11, 32.1) 
    Innocent:Other 16.24 19.48 0.001 (-21.70, 54.2) 
    Innocent:White -2.42 13.88  (-29.45, 24.6) 
Race*WTL   0.02  
     Jail 9.05 11.67 0.001 (-13.69, 31.8) 
     Race [Other] 14.42 14.36 0.001 (-13.54, 42.4) 
     Race [White] 2.00 9.59  (-16.67, 20.7) 
     Jail:Other 16.78 19.35 0.001 (-20.90, 54.5) 
     Jail:White 19.53 13.69 0.002 (-7.12, 46.2) 
Race*DUT*PTC   0.35  
    PTC 1.31*** 0.05 0.06 (1.22, 1.41) 
    Race [Other] -14.59 11.22 0.001 (-36.53, 7.35) 
    Race [White] -5.62 8.01  (-21.29, 10.05) 
    DUT 9.19*** 1.41 0.004 (6.42, 11.95) 
    PTC:Other 0.57*** 0.08 0.004 (0.41, 0.73) 
    PTC:White 0.30*** 0.06 0.002 (0.19, 0.41) 
    PTC:DUT -0.07*** 0.02 0.001 (-0.11, -0.03) 
    DUT:Other 11.25*** 2.31 0.002 (6.72, 15.78) 
    DUT:White 1.05 1.65  (-2.19, 4.28) 
    PTC:Other:DUT -0.14*** 0.03 0.002 (-0.20, -0.07) 
    PTC:White:DUT -0.03 0.02  (-0.07, 0.02) 
Race*WTL*PTC   0.34  
     PTC 1.35*** 0.05 0.05 (1.23, 1.46) 
    Race [Other] -5.90 15.57  (-36.24, 24.45) 
    Race [White] -4.90 10.40  (-25.16, 15.36) 
    Jail 27.44* 12.66 0.002 (2.78, 52.11) 
    PTC:Other 0.33*** 0.10 0.001 (0.14, 0.52) 
    PTC:White 0.11m 0.06  (-0.02, 0.24) 
    PTC:Jail -0.30*** 0.08 0.001 (-0.45, -0.14) 
    Jail:Other 11.63 20.98  (-29.26, 52.52) 
    Jail:White 1.19 14.84  (-27.73, 30.12) 
    PTC:Other:Jail 0.08 0.13  (-0.17, 0.34) 
    PTC:White:Jail 0.29** 0.09 0.001 (0.11, 0.48) 




     DUT 0.21 1.42  (-2.58, 3.00) 
    Race [Other] 13.17 14.92  (-15.90, 42.24) 
    Race [White] 2.97 9.96  (-16.45, 22.38) 
    Jail -6.89 12.13  (-30.52, 16.74) 
    DUT:Other 0.77 2.51  (-4.14, 5.69) 
    DUT:White -0.60 1.67  (-3.88, 2.69) 
     DUT:Jail 9.82*** 2.04 0.003 (5.83, 13.82) 
    Jail:Other 13.89 20.11  (-25.29, 53.07) 
    Jail:White 20.22 14.23 0.001 (-7.50, 47.93) 
    DUT:Other:Jail 1.78 3.38  (-4.84, 8.40) 
   DUT:White:Jail -0.41 2.39  (-5.10, 4.27) 
Race*Factual Innoc*PTC   0.34  
    PTC 1.28*** .05 .052 (1.18, 1.38) 
    Race [Other] .92 15.16  (-28.63, 30.46) 
    Race [White] 15.87 10.06 .001 (-3.73, 35.46) 
    Innocent -9.76 12.84  (-34.78, 15.25) 
    PTC:Other 0.29** .09 .001 (-0.10, 0.47) 
    PTC:White -0.03 .06  (-0.15, 0.09) 
    PTC:Innocent -0.18* .08  (-0.34, -0.03) 
    Innocent:Other 7.11 21.08  (-33.98, 48.19) 
    Innocent:White -40.35** 15.02 0.003 (-69.63, -11.07) 
    PTC:Other:Innocent .14 .13  (-0.11, 0.40) 
    PTC:White:Innocent .61*** .09 .004 (0.43, 0.79) 
Race*Factual Innoc*DUT   0.03  
     DUT 2.66m 1.37  (-0.02, 5.34) 
    Race [Other] 11.94 14.56  (-16.43, 40.31) 
    Race [White] 11.96 9.66 0.001 (-6.86, 30.77) 
    Innocent -29.69* 12.33 0.004 (-53.71, -5.68) 
    DUT:Other 4.17 m 2.45  (-0.62, 8.96) 
    DUT:White 1.25 1.62  (-1.93, 4.43) 
    DUT:Innocent 5.36** 2.07 0.001 (1.30, 9.41) 
    Other:Innocent 22.18 20.25  (-17.27, 61.62) 
    White:Innocent 4.91 14.43 0.001 (-23.20, 33.02) 
    DUT:Other:Innocent -3.66 3.40  (-10.32, 3.002) 
   DUT:White:Innocent -4.52 2.42  (-9.26, 0.23) 
Race*WTL*Factual Innoc   0.04  
      Jail 7.01 15.49  (-22.9, 36.90) 
     Other 3.83 18.79  (-32.4, 40.10) 
     White 6.54 11.95  (-16.5, 29.61) 
     Innocent -30.55 m 16.74 0.003 (-62.9, 1.76) 
     Jail:Other 28.49 27.39 0.001 (-24.4, 81.34) 
     Jail:White 14.82 18.29 0.001 (-20.5, 50.12) 
     Jail:Innocent 14.10 23.44  (-31.1, 59.34) 
     Other:Innocent 30.34 28.62 0.001 (-24.9, 85.56) 
     White:Innocent -3.17 19.48 0.001 (-40.8, 34.42) 
     Jail:Other:Innocent -29.42 38.64 0.001 (-104.0, 45.16) 
     Jail:White:Innocent 2.96 27.33  (-49.8, 55.70) 
 








Study 3 Hypothesized Relation Regressions 
  Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables  B SE R2m 95% CI 
PTC 1.41*** 0.01 0.32 (50.85, 63.22) 
DUT 0.50*** 0.05 0.01 (0.40, 0.59) 
WTL 24.33*** 5.69 0.02 (13.2, 35.5) 
PTC*DUT   0.34  
   PTC 1.58*** 0.02 .29 (1.53, 1.63) 
   DUT 11.41*** 0.69 .03 (10.06, 12.75) 
   PTC:DUT -0.10*** 0.009 .02 (-0.12, -0.09) 
PTC*WTL   0.34  
    PTC 1.46*** 0.03 .21 (1.40, 1.51) 
    Jail 29.89*** 6.17 0.01 (17.81, 41.98) 
    PTC:Jail -0.09* 0.04  (-0.17, -0.01) 
DUT*WTL*PTC   0.37  
    DUT 1.12 0.96 0.15 (30.91, 49.09) 
     Jail -2.89 6.51 0.02 (-0.76, 3.00) 
     PTC 1.49*** 0.03 0.01 (-15.63, 9.85) 
     DUT:Jail  20.25*** 1.34  (1.42, 1.55) 
     DUT:PTC -0.02 0.01  (-0.05, 0.01) 
     Jail:PTC 0.18*** 0.05  (0.09, 0.27) 
     DUT:Jail:PTC -0.17*** 0.02  (-0.20, -0.13) 
Blameworthiness 0.26*** 0.04 0.03 (0.18, 0.34) 
Blame*PTC   0.35  
     PTC 1.59*** 0.04 0.11 (1.49, 1.66) 
     Blameworthiness 0.34*** 0.05 0.02 (0.25, 0.43) 
     PTC:Blame -0.001*** 0.0002  (-0.002, -0.0007) 
Factual Innocence -19.05** 5.75 0.01 (-30.3, -7.77) 
Factual Innocence*WTL   0.03  
      Innocent -28.32*** 8.03 0.01 (-44.00, -12.6) 
      Jail 20.47** 7.76 0.01 (5.30, 35.6) 
      Innocent:Jail 12.72 11.21  (-9.18, 34.6) 
Factual Innocence*PTC   0.33  
       Innocent -33.82*** 4.32 0.18 (-46.02, -21.62) 
       PTC 1.30*** .03 0.01 (1.24, 1.35) 
       Innocent:PTC 0.24*** .04  (0.16, 0.31) 
Innocence_Categ   .03      .26  
      Guilty 41.46*** 7.59 .03  (26.60, 56.30) 
      Between 22.28** 8.23 .007  (6.17, 38.40) 
Perception of Innocence -0.51*** 0.07 0.04 (-0.65, -0.36) 
Perception of Guilt 0.47*** 0.07 0.03 (0.33, 0.61) 
Percepts. of Innoc. [Composite] -0.26*** 0.04 0.04 (-0.33, -0.19) 
PTC*Perceptions of Innocence   0.36  
         PTC 1.38*** 0.03 0.17 (1.32, 1.43) 
         Innocence -0.56*** 0.08 0.03 (-0.71, -0.40) 
         PTC:Innocence 0.0008 0.0005  (-0.0002, 0.002) 
PTC*Perceptions of Guilt   0.35  
         PTC 1.55*** 0.03 0.16 (1.48, 1.62) 
         Guilt 0.62*** 0.08 0.03 (0.47, 0.78) 
         PTC:Guilt -0.002*** 0.0005  (-0.003, -0.001) 




         PTC 1.42*** 0.02 0.34 (1.38, 1.46) 
         Innocence -0.31*** 0.04 0.02 (-0.39, -0.23) 
         PTC:Innocence 0.0009*** 0.0002  (0.0004, 0.001) 
Impulsivity 0.11 0.82 0.00002 (-1.49, 1.71) 
Impulsivity*PTC   0.32  
         Imp 2.29** 0.88 0.14 (0.56, 4.02) 
         PTC 1.65*** 0.04 0.01 (1.57, 1.73) 
         Imp:PTC -0.03*** 0.005 0.01 (-0.05, -0.02) 
Impulsivity*DUT    0.01  
         Imp 0.17 0.84  (-1.49, 1.83) 
          DUT 0.52*** 0.11  (0.31, 0.73) 
         Imp:DUT -0.004 0.01  (-0.03, 0.02) 
Impulsivity*Factual Innocence   0.01  
         Imp -0.32 1.14  (-2.54, 1.91) 
         Innocent -22.93m 12.36  (-47.07, 1.22) 
         Imp:Innocent 0.57 1.61  (-2.58, 3.72) 
Impulsivity*DUT*WTL   0.04  
       Imp 0.15 1.18  (-2.16, 2.45) 
       DUT -0.07 0.15  (-0.37, 0.23) 
        Jail 7.67 12.70  (-17.15, 32.49) 
       Imp:DUT 0.01 0.02  (-0.03, 0.05) 
       Imp:Jail 0.01 1.66  (-3.15, 3.33) 
       DUT:Jail 1.14*** 0.21 0.002 (0.72, 1.55) 
       Imp:DUT:Jail -0.02 0.03  (-0.08, 0.03) 
Legal Experience [Own]   0.00  
         Civil 0.74 11.49  (-21.7, 23.2) 
         Criminal -5.02 12.31  (-29.0, 19.0) 
         None 3.74 9.94  (-15.7, 23.1) 
         Silent 14.64 20.97  (-26.3, 55.6) 
Criminal Justice System Experience    0.00  
         Own -5.93 9.26  ( -24.1, 152.8) 
         Both -6.40 9.26  (-24.5, 11.7) 
 
Note.  An R2 statistic for the marginal (i.e., fixed effects) is provided and denoted as 
“R2m”. The multiple regression predictor parameters’ semi-partial correlations that are 
greater than or equal to .001 appear in the R2m column but in the rows of each parameter 
rather than the model-specification row. 







Study 3 Cross-Construct Multiple Regression Model 2 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Model 2   0.39 0.65  
   PTC 1.38*** 0.04 0.11  (1.31, 1.45) 
   DUT  0.11 0.10   (-0.07, 0.30) 
   Jail -0.20 6.39   (-12.64, 12.3) 
   Factually Innocent -38.73*** 6.01 0.02  (-50.43, -27.0) 
   Gender [Other] 35.52m 19.55 0.01  (-2.51, 73.5) 
   Gender [Women] 5.94 5.60   (-4.95, 16.8) 
    Race[Other] 24.63** 9.45 0.01  (6.26, 43.0) 
    Race[White] 13.03m 6.68   (0.04, 26.0) 
    PTC:DUT -0.002 0.001   (-0.005, 0.0006) 
    PTC:Jail 0.15** 0.05   (0.06, .25) 
    DUT:Jail 2.02*** 0.13 0.02  (1.76, 2.29) 
    PTC:Factually Innocent 0.25*** 0.04   (0.18, 0.32) 








Study 3 Cross-Construct Multiple Regression Model 4 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Model 4   0.39 0.65  
   PTC 1.62*** 0.05 0.08  (1.51, 1.72) 
   DUT  0.11 0.10   (-0.07, 0.30) 
   WTL -0.03 6.39   (-12.45, 12.4) 
   Factually Innocent -37.98*** 6.02 0.02  (-49.70, -26.3) 
   Gender [Other] 35.51m 19.58 0.01  (-2.51, 73.5) 
   Gender [Women] 5.94 5.61   (-4.95, 16.8) 
   Race[Other] 24.65** 9.46 0.01  (6.27, 43.00) 
   Race[White] 13.06m 6.71 0.01  (0.04, 26.1) 
   Impulsivity 2.03* 0.84   (0.40, 3.65) 
   PTC:DUT -0.002 0.001   (-0.005, 0.0006) 
   PTC:WTL 0.15** 0.05   (0.06, 0.24) 
   DUT:WTL 2.02*** 0.13 0.02  (1.76, 2.29) 
   PTC: Factually Innocent 0.24*** 0.04   (0.16, 0.31) 
   PTC:Impulsivity -0.03*** 0.01   (-0.04, -0.02) 








Study 3 Cross-Construct Multiple Regression Model 5 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Model 5   0.42 0.65  
   PTC 1.79*** 0.08 0.04  (1.55, 1.86) 
   DUT  0.11 0.10   (-0.07, 0.30) 
   WTL -0.93 6.15   (-12.85, 11.00) 
   Factually Innocent -15.62* 6.90   (-28.99, -2.26) 
   Gender [Other] 24.71 18.67   (-11.44, 60.86) 
   Gender [Women] 4.74 5.32   (-5.56, 15.04) 
    Race[Other] 26.70** 8.98 0.01  (9.31, 44.08) 
    Race[White] 13.44* 6.38 0.01  (1.08, 25.80) 
    Impulsivity 2.07* 0.80   (0.51, 3.62) 
    Blameworthiness 0.14* 0.07   (0.00, 0.28) 
    Perceptions of Innocence -0.16* 0.07   (-0.30, -0.03) 
    PTC:DUT -0.002 0.001   (-0.005, 0.0006) 
    PTC:WTL 0.15** 0.05   (0.06, 0.25) 
    DUT:WTL 2.02*** 0.13 0.01  (1.76, 2.29) 
    PTC:Factually Innocent 0.22*** 0.04   (0.14, 0.31) 
    PTC:Impulsivity -0.03*** 0.05   (-0.04, -0.02) 
    PTC:Blameworthiness -0.0007 0.0005   (-0.002, 0.0002) 
    PTC:Perceptions of Innocence 0.0004 0.0004   (-0.001, 0.0004) 








Three-Study Perceptions of Innocence*Probability of Trial Conviction Comparison 
 










63 ns64 ns65 sig. pos.66 
Continuous 
Innocence not measured sig. neg.
67 ns68 ns69 
Continuous 
Guilt not measured sig. neg.





not measured ns73 ns74 sig. pos.75 
 
 
63 See Table 4’s statistics. 
64 See SM 25 for statistics. 
65 See SM 25 for statistics. 
66 B = .07, SE = .03, p < .01 
67 B = -.0008, SE = .0003, p < .01 
68 B = .0005, SE = .0005, p > .1 
69 See Table 22 for statistics. 
70 B = -.0007, SE = .0003, p < .05 
71 B = -.001, SE = .0005, p < .01 
72 See Table 22 for statistics. 
73 B = -.000007, SE = .0001, p > .1 
74 B = .0003, SE = .0003, p > .1 






























































































Study 3 Perceptions of Innocence by Probability of Trial Conviction Interaction 
 
Note. Although the ordinal Innocence question was not measured in Study 3, this graph 
was made to look like Study 1 and 2’s ordinal innocence interaction graphs. Using the 
composite continuous innocence/guilt measure, a score of 100 was classified as 
“Innocent” with 17 participants in that group. A score of -100 was classified as “Guilty” 
with 69 participants in that group, and a score between -99 and 99, inclusive, was 





























    
 






Chapter 5: Study 4 – Attorney Advice and Plea-Bargain Decision-Making 
The primary purpose of Study 4 was to increase the external validity of the plea-
bargain decision context examined in the past three studies. First, because the crime in 
the hypothetical scenario is one of criminal negligence, it is likely that most criminal 
defendants charged with a similar crime would be let out on bail, rather than waiting in 
jail for trial. So, the Waiting-for-Trial Location manipulation was removed from this 
study and all participants were told they were out on bail. Second, the presence of 
criminal defense attorneys and the content of their advice to clients are central features of 
the plea-bargain decision-making context, so new manipulations were created to address 
this gap. Third, because attorneys are not a required part of the plea-bargain decision 
context, some participants were given the choice about whether they wanted attorney 
advice—enabling them to select a situational feature of their plea-bargain decision-
making context that they may believe is in their best interest. The present study will also 
replicate this dissertation’s past experimental findings of probability, delay, and factual 
innocence as well as the trait-level person effects and situated-person effects on plea-
bargain decision making; however, this introduction will focus on the hypotheses related 
to the new manipulation of attorney advice. 
The existing experimental literature on the effect of attorney advice on plea 
decisions is mixed. For example, Henderson and Shteynberg (2020) found that an 
attorney’s recommendation to an ambiguously innocent participant to accept or reject a 
plea deal had a persuasive effect on participants’ plea decisions, especially when the 
attorney was perceived as trustworthy. Henderson and Levett (2018) similarly found that 




were more vulnerable to the social influence of their attorney’s recommendation than 
guilty participants. In contrast, Zimmerman and Hunter (2018) found no effect of 
attorney recommendation on participants’ plea decisions, which is particularly striking 
given that all participants were innocent in the hypothetical crime scenario, so according 
to Henderson and Levett (2018), they should have been particularly vulnerable to the 
attorney’s persuasion. Accordingly, the following was hypothesized: 
H4a. Attorney advice will have a persuasive effect on participants’ plea-bargain 
decisions. Specifically, participants given plea advice will be more likely to accept plea 
bargains than will participants given trial advice. 
H4b. Attorney advice will interact with participant innocence, such that advice 
that is consistent with the criminal justice system’s most efficient outcome for defendants 
(i.e., guilty defendants accept the plea and innocent defendants go to trial) will produce 
that effect: innocent participants who are given trial advice will be the group that is most 
likely to choose to go to trial and guilty participants who are given plea advice will be 
the group that is most likely to accept the plea. 
Additionally, extrapolating from H4b and Henderson and Shteynberg (2020)’s 
finding that the persuasive effect of an attorney is especially strong when the attorney 
was perceived to be trustworthy, the following was hypothesized: 
H4c. Attorney advice, attorney trustworthiness, and factual innocence will 
interact such that the relation between attorney advice and attorney trustworthiness on 





Extending past research on the effect of attorney advice, the present study 
examines whether the key trait-level individual difference of impulsivity affects plea-
bargain decision-making. Specifically, all three past studies in this dissertation found that 
participants with lower impulsivity were more affected by probability of trial conviction, 
with higher probabilities causing them to accept more pleas. Attorney encouragement of 
low-impulsivity participants to choose to go to trial may temper risk aversion. Thus, the 
following was hypothesized: 
H4d. Participant impulsivity, attorney advice, and probability of trial conviction 
will interact to predict plea-bargain decisions. 
In addition to the new manipulation of attorney advice, the traditional discounting 
manipulations of Probability and Delay will still be manipulated. Consistent with Study 
2’s finding that the interactive effect of Probability and Delay on plea-bargain decision 
was conditioned on Waiting-for-Trial Location—such that there was no interactive effect 
when participants were out on bail—the following was hypothesized: 
H4e. A significant interaction between Probability of Trial Conviction and Delay 
until Trial should not appear because all participants were out on bail, but the direction of 
the probability effect should be consistent with those found by Clatch and Borgida (2021) 
and Studies 2 and 3 in Chapters 3 and 4 above. 
Furthermore, the present study will expand on the procedural justice relations 
examined in Study 3. Equipped with the knowledge from Study 3 that innocent 
participants viewed their plea-bargaining process as less procedurally just and that greater 
acceptance of plea-bargain decisions predict stronger perceptions of procedural justice, 




H4f. Innocent participants will view their plea-bargaining process as less 
procedurally just than guilty participants. 
H4g. Factual innocence will interact with participants’ plea-bargain decisions to 
predict their perceptions of procedural justice. Specifically, innocent participants who 
accepted pleas will have the lowest perceptions procedural justice. 
Then, because an attorney’s advice can be persuasive, participants may view their 
attorney as being a part of a just, or unjust criminal justice system, attempting to 
encourage a particular plea-bargain decision. And when a person chooses to receive 
attorney advice, taking a degree of control in creating their plea-bargaining environment, 
rather than simply being given advice, it may influence perceptions of procedural justice. 
Thus, the following was hypothesized: 
H4h and 4i. Participants who are asked whether they want attorney advice (and 
say yes, then receiving it) will perceive more procedural justice in their plea-bargaining 
process than will participants who are simply given attorney advice. And this effect will 
not be dependent on what advice they actually receive (trial vs. plea advice). 
Because Study 3 showed a positive relation between more pleas and procedural 
justice perceptions, prediction H4b’s predictors (Attorney Advice and Factual Innocence) 
are also expected to interact, but affecting a different outcome variable: procedural 
justice. Participants likely have a basic understanding about what the criminal justice 
system’s “best” outcome is for their case depending on their innocence/guilt. And when 
that “best” outcome is vocalized by their attorney, as their guide to the system, 





H4j. Innocent participants who are given trial advice and guilty participants who 




 Participants were recruited on Prolific and received $3.50 for their participation. 
Prolific is a source of online convenience samples and is an increasingly-used alternative 
to Amazon Mechanical Turk. The final sample (N = 479) was nationally representative 
based on gender, race and age,76 except that Black Americans were oversampled to allow 
for better race sub-group comparisons. Similar to Study 3, this study strove to balance 
generalizability to the population of the United States (on the basis of gender and age) 
with collecting a large enough sample of Black Americans to make cross-race 
comparisons of plea-bargain decision-making. This latter purpose derives from a 
motivation to recognize that people of color, especially black men, have long been 
overrepresented in the U.S. criminal justice system (Spohn, 2011). 
The final sample consisted of 49% (n = 234) women and 47% (n = 225) men and 
had a mean age of 41.98 (SD = 14.20). The dataset consists of 53% self-identifying White 
participants (n = 254), 31% (n = 147) Black participants, 7% (n = 32) Asian participants, 
 
76 Using the same percentages as Studies 2 and 3, which utilized the United States Census 
Bureau’s estimates for age, gender, race, and ethnicity categories of the United States 
population up to the year 2019. Using those estimates the following quotas were entered 
into Qualtrics: 18-24 aged people (13%), 25-34 aged people (18%), 35-44 aged people 
(18%), 45-54 aged people (19%), 55-64 aged people (16%), over-65 aged people (17%); 
men (49%), women (51%); White-only (72%), Black/African American only (13%), 
Asian only (5%), Native American (1%), Other, including Native Hawaiian and people 





0.4% (n = 2) Native American, and 6% (n = 28) participants identifying as multi-racial or 
as an other racial identity. Thirty-two (7%) participants self-identified as Hispanic, with 
430 (90%) identifying as Non-Hispanic. 
One participant completed only middle school, 33 (7%) participants completed 
only high school, 109 (23%) completed only part of college, 178 (37%) completed only a 
college degree, and 143 (30%) completed a graduate degree.  
 There were 23 (5%) participants who identified as extremely conservative, 60 
(13%) participants who identified as conservative, 37 (8%) who identified as slightly 
conservative, 106 (22%) who identified as moderate, 47 (10%) who identified as slightly 
liberal, 109 (23%) who identified as liberal, and 82 (17%) who identified as extremely 
liberal.  
Design 
 This study employed a 2 (Advice Delivery) x 3 (Advice Content) x 2 (Factual 
Innocence) x 4 (Probability of Trial Conviction) x (Delay until Trial) mixed-factor design 
with three between-participants factors: Advice Delivery with two levels (Given vs. 
Asked), Advice Content with three levels (No Advice vs. Plea Advice vs. Trial Advice) 
and Factual Innocence with the same two levels, and same manipulation language as 
Study 3 (Innocent vs. Guilty, see SM 35 for the manipulation language). Despite being 
between-participants factors, Advice Delivery and Advice Content were not fully 
crossed. 
Specifically, when participants were not asked whether they wanted attorney 
advice (i.e., randomly assigned to the Advice Delivery: Given condition), participants 




advice, no advice. In contrast, when participants were asked whether they wanted 
attorney advice, they were only assigned to Advice Content’s conditions that were 
responsive to their choice. For example, if participants did not want attorney advice, then 
they did not receive it. See the table immediately below for a tabular representation of 
these two factors’ manipulations, which identifies which combinations of the two 



















Answered No Randomization 
Trial   N/A 
2 groups not 
randomly 
determined 
Plea   N/A 
2 groups not 
randomly 
determined 
No Advice  N/A  







2 groups randomly 
assigned after 
“Yes” response 
only 1 group  
 
Waiting-for-Trial Location was held constant with participants being told that 
they would be waiting for trial while out on bail (see SM 38 the manipulations’ wording). 
Thus, participants were randomly assigned to one of the following four conditions: 
Innocent-and-Given-Advice, Innocent-and-Asked-Advice, Guilty-and-Given-Advice, and 
Guilty-and-Asked-Advice.  
The two within-participants factors are Probability of Trial Conviction with four 
levels (20%, 75%, 95%, 99%) and Delay until Trial with three levels (1 day, 1 month, 1 
year).78 Each participant received all three levels of Delay until Trial, and all levels were 
 
77 Note. Although there are various cells/groups that cannot be compared in the same way 
as typical “full-crossed” participants can be, some comparisons can still be made. 
Additionally, I will calculate how many participants ended up in each cell/group. It’s 
possible, for example, that all participants assigned to the “Asked” condition, respond 
that they do want attorney advice. In that case, the worry about randomization violations 
are moot. 
78 This was reduced to three levels to reduce survey length, but the lowest and highest 
delays used in this dissertation’s previous studies were retained to be able to compare it 




presented in random order to reduce the chance of order effects. Each participant received 
all four levels of Probability of Trial Conviction, and the blocks were shown in ascending 
order within each Delay block. 
The first outcome variable in this study was Subjective Trial Aversion, and this 
operationalization of Subjective Trial Aversion is exactly the same as in Study 3. The 
second outcome variable in this study is Procedural Justice, and this variable will be 
measured very similarly as in Study 3, by using all the items in Study 3 and an additional 
item (for participants who received attorney advice) asking about how much their 
attorney’s advice addressed their concerns (SM 36 for the exact wording of the items). 
There is currently no feasible way to calculate standard effect sizes for individual 
model terms such as main effects and interactions in mixed effects models because of the 
way variance is partitioned in mixed models (Rights & Sterba, 2019). As a best 
approximation, G*Power was used based on a repeated measures ANOVA with 1 
between-participants variable and 1 within-participants variable interacted. Given an 
effect size f of .1 (taken from Clatch & Borgida, Study 3, 2021, highest order interaction 
model term, i.e., Delay*Probability*Waiting-for-Trial Location), an alpha of .05, power 
of .8, number of between-participants conditions equal to 6,79 number of within-
participants measurements equal to 4 (i.e., Probability with largest number of levels of 
the two within-participants variables), a correlation among the repeated measures of .03 
(calculated based on Clatch & Borgida, Study 3, 2021, correlation of Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores based on Delay’s level), and nonsphericity correction equal to 1, the total 
 
79 2 Factual Innocence * 3 Attorney Advice Content (i.e., all 6 cells) was used in the 




sample size required is 462 (see SM 46 for G*Power screenshot). In order to allow for a 
degree of missing data, 480 participants’ data was collected.80 
Materials, Measures and Procedure 
 The study materials consisted of an online survey nearly identical to Study 3’s 
survey. One key difference was the addition of an attorney advice manipulation. The 
Trial Advice read as follows:  
“Based on the police report and what I know about the evidence in this 
case, I think we should bring the case to trial. The Fed Ex driver was far 
away from you, and although the prosecutors might introduce evidence of 
the times texts were sent and received from your phone, the Fed Ex 
driver’s testimony won’t be able to isolate the exact time he allegedly 
saw your head down. Also, the prosecutor won’t be able to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that you touched the phone at the time of the accident. 
The biggest hurdle, though, is that when a child is the victim, the jury is 
protective of the child, and usually wants to see someone convicted. Take 
a moment and think about your preference. Remember that there are pros 
and cons about each choice, and the choice is yours. Overall, though, it’s 
my recommendation that we go to trial.”  
 
The Plea Advice read as follows:  
“Based on the police report and what I know about the evidence in this 
case, I think the plea is your best option. The prosecutors are going to 
have the Fed Ex driver as their key witness and be able to triangulate 
within a few minutes when he allegedly saw you with your head down 
driving through the neighborhood. Also, when a child is the victim, the 
jury is protective of the child, and usually wants to see someone 
convicted. The one thing that would help us at trial, is that because of the 
way texting is recorded, the prosecutor might not be able to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that you touched the phone at the time of the accident. 
Take a moment and think about your preference. Remember that there are 
pros and cons about each choice, and the choice is yours. Overall, though, 
it’s my recommendation that you accept the plea bargain offered.” 
 
80 To this point I had only used Prolific to collect data in one study (Study 3 of this 
dissertation), and although I had less than 1% missingness in my dependent variable, I 
had more than 1% missingness using the strictest listwise rule. In this study I allowed for 




Additionally, for participants in Advice Delivery’s Asked condition, before 
attorney advice was given, they were asked whether they would like an attorney’s advice. 
The last differences are that participants were asked a series of questions about their 
attorney advice and a series of questions about their perceptions of the criminal justice 
system, relating particularly to plea-bargain and trials. More details on these last two 
additions are presented below. 
Study 4’s survey contained the same attention checks and data quality checks as 
this dissertation’s past studies (SM 2). Study 4’s vignette/scenario (SM 35), legal 
decision-making questions (SM 5), and trait-level individual-difference measures exactly 
matched Study 3’s materials. After reading the scenario, many participants were given 
attorney advice, and then were asked to make a series of binary, forced-choice plea 
bargain questions. Then, participants were asked the situated-person variable questions: 
Blameworthiness and Innocence, Attorney Trustworthiness, and Procedural Justice 
questions (presented in random order to reduce order effects). Next, the Impulsivity scale 
was presented to participants, and last, participants answered the driving, personal 
involvement, criminal and legal experience, and demographic questions. 
Attorney Advice Content and Advice Delivery 
As Snyder and Ickes (1985) describe, most experimental social psychology 
studies do not allow participants to shape their environment (or elect into a particular 
situation). Attempting to address this in Study 4, participants assigned to the Asked (but 
not Given) level of Advice Delivery will be enabled to choose whether they would like 
an attorney’s advice. Those that chose to be provided an attorney’s advice were randomly 




provided attorney’s advice proceeded directly to the legal decisions, as in this 
dissertation’s previous studies. Using a sample of 112 Lucid participants, this new 
manipulation was pilot tested to ensure that the two advice scripts (trial and plea) did not 
differ in participants’ ratings of attorney trust (B = -.20, SE = .21, p > .1), attorney 
competence (B = -.37, SE = .20, p = .06), and attorney persuasiveness (B = -.21, SE = .24, 
p > .1). Because there was a marginal difference in participants’ ratings of attorney 
competence such that participants rated the Trial Advice as marginally less competent 
advice, these three measures were also included in Study 4. 
Two hundred and forty participants were assigned to the Not Asked condition of 
Advice Delivery, and 241 were assigned to the Asked condition. Within the Not Asked 
condition, 83 participants received no advice, and within the Asked condition, only 13 
participants answered that they did not want attorney advice. Because of this small latter 
cell size, no tests of either advice-related variable used these 13 participants. 
Procedural Justice. SM 36 shows the Study 3 Procedural Justice questions plus 
an additional question asked participants who received attorney advice how much that 
advice addressed their concerns. This study’s reliability for the five-item Procedural 
Justice measure (identical to Study 3’s) was .87, and this study’s reliability for the six-
item Procedural Justice measure including the question about attorney advice addressing 
a participant’s concerns was .88. 
Attorney Trustworthiness. Participants were asked to what extent they trusted 
their attorney’s advice, how competent they thought their attorney was, and how 
persuasive they thought their attorney was (all measures used in the Attorney Advice 




SE = .09, p > .1) or attorney credibility (B = -.08, SE = .08, p > .1). However, unlike the 
pilot study, Trial advice was associated with significantly lower persuasiveness (B = -.26, 
SE = .11, p < .05). A follow-up analysis revealed that higher ratings of attorney 
persuasiveness was related participants accepting more plea bargains (B = 6.09, SE = 
2.98, p < .05). 
Criminal Justice System Beliefs. In an attempt to follow-up on the race 
differences in plea-bargain decisions in Study 3, a series of questions was written to 
assess participants’ general feelings (positive, negative, trust, and skepticism) about the 
criminal justice system, their perceptions of the plea-bargaining system, and their 
perceptions of criminal trials (see SM 47 for wording of the items). After recording the 
negative and skepticism feelings as well as the negatively worded plea and trial 
questions, these 14 items had a reliability of α =.77, so they were averaged to create a 
single score. 
Legal Cynicism. Legal cynicism is a cultural frame in which people perceive the 
law to be illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill equipped to ensure public safety. 
In an attempt to follow-up on the race differences in plea-bargain decisions in 
Study 3, seven items were compiled from the Urban Institute (2019, p. 11; reverse-coded) 
and two items about police effectiveness were compiled from Kirk and Papachristos 
(2011) to capture legal cynicism (see SM 48 for the items’ wording). These nine items 
had a reliability of α = .80. 




Hypothesis 4a. Attorney advice will have a persuasive effect on participants’ 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores. Specifically, participants given plea advice will have 
higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants given trial advice. 
Hypothesis 4bi. Factual Innocence will predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores 
such that participants who are guilty will have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores 
than will innocent participants. 
Hypothesis 4bii. Attorney Advice will interact with Factual Innocence, such that 
Innocent participants who are given Trial Advice will be the group that is most likely to 
choose to go to trial and Guilty participants who are given Plea Advice will be the group 
that is most likely to accept the plea. 
Hypothesis 4c. Attorney Advice, Attorney Trustworthiness, and Factual 
Innocence will interact such that the relation between Attorney Advice and Attorney 
Trustworthiness on Subjective Trial Aversion scores will be stronger for Innocent 
participants than for Guilty participants. 
Hypothesis 4d. Participant Impulsivity, Attorney Advice, and Probability of Trial 
Conviction will interact to predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
Hypothesis 4e. The two-way interaction between Probability of Trial Conviction 
and Delay until Trial on Subjective Trial Aversion scores will be nonsignificant. 
Hypothesis 4f. As shown in Study 3, Probability of Trial Conviction and Factual 
Innocence will interactively predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores such that there 
should be a flattened (potentially non-significant) effect of Probability of Conviction on 




Hypothesis 4g. Highly impulsive participants will not prefer the uncertain/risky 
option, trial, evincing lower Subject Trial Aversion scores, relative to less impulsive 
participants; that is, Impulsivity should not predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
Hypothesis 4h. Participants’ impulsivity will interact with Probability of Trial 
Conviction, such that low-impulsivity participants will be especially sensitive to 
probability, evincing a stronger positive relation between Probability of Trial Conviction 
and Subjective Trial Aversion scores than highly impulsive participants.  
Hypothesis 4i. Participants’ impulsivity will not interact with Delay until Trial, to 
predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
Hypothesis 4j.   Participants experiencing more self-blame for the accident and 
child’s injury will have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants 
experiencing less self-blame.  
Hypothesis 4k.  Participants who perceive themselves to be less innocent of the 
crime charged will have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than will participants 
who perceive themselves to be more innocent.  
Hypothesis 4l and 4m. Consistent with the past three studies’ findings, 
participants’ self-blame will interact with Probability of Trial Conviction to predict 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores. Also, consistent with Study 3’s findings, the interaction 
between participants’ Perceptions of Innocence and Probability of Trial Conviction will 
depend on the measurement of Perceptions of Innocence. Specifically, the ordinal 
measure and the continuous measure of innocence are predicted to be nonsignificant, but 
the continuous measure of guilt and the composite continuous measure are predicted to 




Procedural Justice Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 4n. Innocent participants will view their plea-bargaining process as 
less procedurally just than will guilty participants. 
Hypothesis 4o. Factual innocence will interact with participants’ Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores to predict their perceptions of procedural justice. Specifically, innocent 
participants who have higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores will have the lowest 
perceptions of procedural justice. 
Hypotheses 4p and 4q. Participants who are asked whether they want attorney 
advice (and say yes, then receiving it) will perceive more procedural justice in their plea-
bargaining process than will participants who are simply given attorney advice. And this 
effect will not be dependent on what advice they actually receive (trial vs. plea advice). 
Hypothesis 4r. Innocent participants who are given trial advice and guilty 
participants who are given plea advice will be the groups with the highest perceptions of 
procedural justice. 
Results 
The present study’s analyses consisted of two sets of preliminary analyses: 
demographics predicting Subjective Trial Aversion scores and race-based differences on 
a variety of outcome measures including Subjective Trial Aversion, Procedural Justice, 
and criminal justice system beliefs. Then, Study 4’s analyses involved testing hypotheses 
for two key outcome variables: Subjective Trial Aversion and Procedural Justice. All 
analyses that involve Subjective Trial Aversion as the outcome variable used mixed-
effects regressions because the variable was measured 12 times across levels of 




Probability of Trial Aversion, or Delay until Trial, used fixed-effects linear regression 
because nothing varied within participants.81 
Preliminary Analyses 
Demographic Analyses 
 Table 27 shows the linear regressions of gender, race, age, education, age*race, 
gender*race, and political ideology predicting Subjective Trial Aversion scores.82 There 
were no race differences on Subjective Trial Aversion scores, including when Race was 
interacted with gender or age (see Table 27). Age also did not predict Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores. A continuous measure of Education significantly predicted Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores such that as education increased, Subjective Trial Aversion scores 
decreased (B = -7.53, SE = 3.18, p < .05), and Table 27 shows the follow-up regressions 
using a categorical measure of Education, each with a different reference category in 
brackets for clarity. Participants who went to graduate school had significantly lower 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores than college graduates (B = 17.84, SE = 7.05, p < .05), 
high school graduates (B = 24.08, SE = 12.13, p < .05), and marginally lower Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores than did participants who completed part of college (B = 15.53, SE 
= 7.99, p = .05). Political affiliation also predicted Subjective Trial Aversion scores: as 
participants’ conservatism increased, their Subjective Trial Aversion scores decreased (B 
= -3.58, SE = 1.61, p < .05). 
 
81 When Subjective Trial Aversion was used in a regression but the experimental factors 
of delay and probability were not, then participants’ average Subjective Trial Aversion 
was used, consolidating each participant’s 12 Subjective Trial Aversion measures. 
82 Non-binary-gender-identifying individuals had significantly higher Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores than Men (B = -62.08, SE = 28.40, p < .05), and marginally higher 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores than Women (B = -53.61, SE = 28.39, p = .06), but non-





 Although the present study’s Demographic Analyses section indicated that there 
were no race differences in participants’ patterns of plea-bargain decision-making, 
follow-up analyses were conducted because Study 3 found significant differences and 
Study 4 measured new variables designed to detect race-based differences. 
 First, participants’ responses about what factors were important to their plea-
bargain decisions were analyzed. Next, a series of regressions testing the interaction 
between Race and the experimental factors was run. Last, race differences in Legal 
Cynicism and Criminal Justice System Beliefs were assessed. 
 First, SM 49 shows the Decision-Making Reasons’ correlations with each other, 
and the reliability of four factors’ importance ratings (used in Study 3: probability, delay, 
criminal charge and sentence, and waiting-for-trial location) was α = .68, and the 
reliability of five factors’ importance ratings (the first four with the additional attorney 
item) was α = .73. Whites rated this constellation of situational features (probability, 
delay, criminal charge and sentence, waiting-for-trial location, and attorney advice) as 
marginally less important to their plea-bargain decisions than Blacks (B = -.322, SE = 
.13, p = .08). Additionally, consistent with Study 3, Whites rated the importance of their 
factual innocence as less important to their plea-bargain decisions than Blacks (B = -.40, 
SE = .19, p < .05). 
Because the direction of the effect was the same as Study 3’s significant 
findings,83 a series of multiple regressions was performed to determine whether the 
 
83 Additionally, participants ratings of the importance of this constellation of situational 
features was marginally related to Subjective Trial Aversion: higher importance ratings 




experimental factors did in fact influence plea-bargain decisions differentially for Blacks 
and Whites. Participant Race interacted with Probability of Trial Conviction to predict 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B = .15, SE = .05, p < .01), and Figure 33’s right panel 
shows that white participants’ Subjective Trial Aversion scores were more influenced by 
Probability of Trial Conviction than black participants’ scores: the gray line starts off 
lower than the black line and ends higher than the black line. And this two-way 
interaction is qualified by a three-way interaction among participant Race, Probability of 
Trial Conviction, and Factual Innocence (B = .24, SE = .11, p < .05). Figure 34’s bottom 
panel shows that the White participants’ (left) graph has lines that converge as 
Probability increases and the Black participants’ (right) graph has lines that diverge as 
Probability increases. No other two-way or three-way interactions with Race predicted 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores.84 
Furthermore, participant Race did not predict Legal Cynicism (see Table 28). 
Race also did not predict composite Criminal Justice System Beliefs scores (see Table 
28). However, when the 14 Criminal Justice System Beliefs items were divided into 
Criminal Justice Feelings (α = .87), Criminal Justice Trial Beliefs (α =.82),85 and 
Criminal Justice Plea Negative Beliefs (α = .86),86 participant Race predicted Criminal 
Justice Trial Beliefs. Specifically, white participants had more positive views about trial 
 
84 The only other significant three-way interaction found in Study 3 was 
Race*PTC*WTL, and because Waiting-for-Trial Location was not manipulated in Study 
4 this could not be tested. 
85 The three-item measure had this reliability. The four-item measure, including the 
question about trial allowing guilty people to “game” the system to avoid harsher 
penalties, had a reliability of α = .53, so the three-item measure was used. 
86 The negative items were items 1, 2, and 4 (see SM 50), and the positive items were 




on average—that trial allows people to share their point of view, defend their 
Constitutional rights, and defend their innocence—relative to black participants (B = 
3.56, SE = 1.77, p < .05). But, as noted above, because there was no main effect of race 
on Subjective Trial Aversion scores follow-up analyses were conducted to determine 
whether Criminal Justice Trial Beliefs predicted Subjective Trial Aversion scores. The 
interaction between Participant Race and Criminal Justice Trial Beliefs was only 
marginally significant (B = .66, SE = .38, p < .09) such that black participants with more 
positive views about trial counterintuitively had higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores. 
Subjective Trial Aversion Hypothesis Testing 
 This section is divided into hypothesis tests using experimental predictors like 
Probability of Trial Conviction, tests using trait-level predictors like impulsivity, and 
situated-person predictors like blameworthiness. 
Experimental Predictors 
 Attorney Advice and Factual Innocence.  
Testing H4a’s prediction that the attorney’s Advice Content would influence 
participant’s plea decisions returned a null result (see Table 29). H4bi’s prediction 
(confirmed in Study 3) that guilty participants would have higher Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores than innocent participants was confirmed (B = -25.06, SE = 5.66, p < 
.001). These two experimental predictors also interacted to predict Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores (see Table 29).87 In particular, as shown by Figure 35, Innocent 
 
87 This regression was conducted using the Advice Delivery: Not Asked subset of data 
because participants were randomly assigned to this condition and then randomly 
assigned to attorney Advice Content (None vs. Plea vs. Trial), whereas in the Advice 
Delivery: Asked subset, true randomization was violated because participants were given 




participants were less influenced by attorney Advice, as evinced by the nearly flat green 
line, relative to Guilty participants’ heavily sloped pink line. And regarding the specific 
group comparison, the only significant group differences involved Guilty participants in 
the Plea Advice condition. Specifically, this group had significantly higher Subjective 
Trial Aversion scores than Innocent participants who were given trial advice (t(71) = -
3.72, p <  .001), significantly higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than Innocent 
participants given trial advice (t(62) = -3.79, p <  .001), and significantly higher 
Subjective Trial Aversion scores than Guilty participants given trial advice (t(75) = 2.43, 
p <  .05). 
 Next, testing the predicted tree-way interaction between Advice Content, 
Attorney Trustworthiness, and Factual Innocence (H4c) produced a nonsignificant result 
(see Table 29). Last, testing the predicted three-way interaction among Advice Content, 
Participant Impulsivity, and Probability of Trial Conviction (H4d) produced a 
nonsignificant result (see Table 29).88 
 Probability and Delay. As anticipated (in H4e), there was a nonsignificant two-
way interaction between Probability of Trial Conviction and Delay until Trial (see Table 
30) and as Probability of Trial Conviction increased, so did Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores (B = 1.41, SE = .03, p < .001). Consistent with H4f, there was a nonsignificant 
two-way interaction between Probability of Trial Conviction and Factual Innocence (see 
Table 30) such that Innocent participants had a stronger effect of Probability of Trial 
Conviction on Subjective Trial Aversion scores than Guilty participants (B = .11, SE = 
.05, p < .05). 
 





Impulsivity. Consistent with H4g, Impulsivity does not predict Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores as a main effect (see Table 30). Consistent with H4h, Impulsivity 
interacts with Probability of Trial Aversion to predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores (B 
= -.02, SE = .001, p < .001). Figure 36 shows this effect as the below-median-impulsivity 
group has a steeper line than the above-median-impulsivity group. Last, consistent with 
H4i, Delay until Trial does not interact with Impulsivity to predict Subjective Trial 
Aversion scores (B = -.02, SE = .001, p < .001). 
Situated-Person Predictors 
 Blameworthiness and Innocence. Consistent with H4j, participants experiencing 
more self-blame for the accident and child’s injury had higher Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores compared to participants experiencing less self-blame (B = .36, SE = .04, p < 
.001). Blameworthiness and Probability of Trial Conviction had a marginally significant 
relation (B = -.001, SE = .0003, p = .06). Figure 37 shows the below-median and above-
median groups, with the below-median group’s line getting closer to the above-median 
group’s line at the high Probabilities of Trial Conviction, reflecting increasing sensitivity 
to Probability of Trial Conviction. 
Consistent with H4k, all measures (Ordinal Innocence, Continuous Innocence, 
Continuous Guilt, and Composite Innocence-Guilt) predicted Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores in the expected directions (see Table 30). Consistent with H4l, Continuous Guilt 
interacted with Probability of Trial Conviction to predict Subjective Trial Aversion 
scores (B = -.003, SE = .0007, p < .001), demonstrating that as participants’ perceptions 




decisions decreased. Also as expected, Continuous Innocence did not interact with 
Probability of Trial Conviction to predict Subjective Trial Aversion scores (see Table 
30). Two unexpected marginal effects remain: Ordinal Innocence* PTC (B = -.05, SE = 
.03, p = .09) and Composite Continuous Perceptions (B = .001, SE = .0003, p = .06). 
Procedural Justice Hypothesis Testing 
Consistent with H4n, Innocent participants perceived there to be less procedural 
justice in their plea-bargain decision-making process (B = -2.82, SE = .99, p < .01). As 
seen in Table 31, the data did not support H4o, predicting an interaction between 
Subjective Trial Aversion and Factual Innocence (B = -.02, SE = .02, p > .1). Consistent 
with H4p, participants who were Not Asked whether they wanted attorney advice 
reported less procedural justice in their plea-bargain decision-making process (B = -6.68, 
SE = .95, p < .001), and as predicted (H4q), this main effect was not qualified by a 
Delivery*Content interaction (see Table 31)The data only provided marginally 
significant evidence of an interaction between Factual Innocence and attorney Advice 
Content on Procedural Justice (B = 3.85, SE = 2.12, p = .07), and post-hoc t-tests showed 
that Guilty participants given Plea Advice perceived there to be significantly more 
procedural justice in their plea-bargain decision-making process than Innocent 
participants given that same advice (t(74) = 2.91, p <  .01), but no other mean differences 
were significant (see SM 50). 
Discussion 
Overall, Study 4 provided the opportunity to make the plea-bargaining situation, 
which was tested across this dissertation’s studies, more realistic, and externally valid. 




study also tested many of the same relations that were previously tested in this 
dissertation to determine their reliability. This discussion section will describe the impact 
of the following predictor categories’ impact on Subjective Trial Aversion scores: (1) 
situation variables including the experimental factors of attorney advice and factual 
innocence, (2) person variables, including demographic and trait-level individual 
differences, and (3) situated-person variables, including Blameworthiness and 
Perceptions of Innocence. This discussion with finish by summarizing the findings of the 
Procedural Justice hypotheses. 
Situation Variables 
 Probability, Delay, and Factual Innocence 
 Consistent with Clatch and Borgida’s (2021) findings, and Studies 2 and 3 of this 
dissertation, the present study’s findings indicate that increases in Probability of Trial 
Conviction result in more accepted plea bargains and that waiting for trial while out on 
bail nullifies the effect of delay until trial on plea-bargain decisions. Replication of these 
findings across various samples increases confidence in their reliability. Additionally, 
consistent with Study 3 of this dissertation, and past research (see, e.g., Tor et al., 2010), 
Innocent participants reject more pleas than Guilty participants, but these two groups of 
participants are far from categorically distinct in terms of their plea-bargain decisions. 
Figure 38 shows Study 3 and Study 4’s distributions of Subjective Trial Aversion scores 
based on Factual Innocence with largely overlapping frequency bars.  
Similar to Study 3, nearly a third of Innocent participants (30.7%, 73 of 1238 
participants in the innocent condition) accepted the plea every time it was offered despite 




day difference) as the trial’s criminal sentence. And this rate only increased by 7% in 
Guilty participants: 37.3% accepted the plea every time it was offered. On the other end, 
8.7% of Guilty participants exercised their trial right every time a plea bargain was 
offered, and this rate only increased by 10% in Innocent participants: 18.1% chose the 
trial option every time it was offered. And these different rates of all-trial and all-plea 
plea-bargaining strategies between innocent and guilty participants is what, likely, 
accounts for the present study’s confirmation of the “guilty hypothesis” as tested by mean 
differences—that guilty participants, on average, accept more plea-bargains than innocent 
participants. 
Moreover, this main-effect difference between innocent and guilty participants is 
qualified by an interaction with Probability of Trial Conviction. In particular, innocent 
participants were more sensitive to the increase in probability of trial conviction—they 
accepted incrementally more pleas than guilty participants as that probability increased 
(see Figure 39’s converging lines). 
 Attorney Advice 
 Although the attorney advice offered to participants did not seem to influence 
their plea-bargain decisions (see the lack of main effect in Table 29), this null finding was 
qualified by an interaction with Factual Innocence. Figure 35 shows that innocent 
participants were less malleable, with Trial and Plea advice producing only a 10-day 
difference in their group means, whereas guilty participants were very responsive to 
attorney advice with a 30-day difference in their group means.89 
 
89 In fact, Innocent participants in the two Advice Content conditions did not differ in 
their Subjective Trial Aversion (t(73) = -.54, p > .1), but Guilty participants in the two 




 Furthermore, although this predicted interaction was tested and confirmed using 
Advice Delivery’s Given condition’s subset of data, follow-up analyses tested the same 
interaction using Advice Delivery’s Asked condition’s subset of data. Interestingly, when 
participants opted into receiving attorney advice, the interaction between Factual 
Innocence and Advice Content became nonsignificant (B = -25.55, SE = 16.67, p > .1; 
relative to Table 29’s regression results). This suggests that there are different 
psychological processes at hand when attorney advice is simply a given, or default, 
versus when it is chosen. In particular, one possibility is that when attorney advice is a 
given, people are less likely to think about whether they agree with the advice—thus the 
greater malleability in the Given condition—than when they opt in for it. In other words, 
when people opt in for attorney advice they may be more deliberative and thoughtful 
about how the advice fits their interpretation of their situation, rather than more blindly 
accepting the attorney’s argument that plea/trial is the better option.  
 Moreover, although the predicted interaction between Impulsivity, Advice 
Content, and Probability of Trial Conviction was nonsignificant using Advice Delivery’s 
Given condition’s subset of data, follow-up analyses using Advice Delivery’s Asked 
condition’s subset of data revealed a different result. Specifically, the predicted three-way 
interaction was significant (see Table 34). Figure 40 shows the Given advice condition 
(bottom panel) compared to the Asked advice delivery condition (top panel) and shows 
that when participants opted in for advice and received Plea advice, their person-level of 
impulsivity influenced how much risk aversion they displayed. Specifically, the low- and 
high-impulsivity groups’ lines in the upper-left panel diverged from each other, in a 




So getting plea advice after opting in for attorney advice was the only condition in which 
participants’ impulsivity interacted with Probability. This suggests that studying plea-
bargain decision-making with attorney advice as part of the decision-making context is 
important because otherwise researchers may overestimate the importance of trait-level 
person variables like impulsivity. Impulsivity matters, but only under certain conditions. 
 The two differences between the Given and Asked conditions of the Advice 
Delivery variable, suggest than once participants opt in for attorney advice they may be 
more deliberative about whether they agree with that advice and they may be more likely 
to evaluate their decisions more on the basis of their own trait-level proclivities compared 
to when participants simply receive attorney advice as a routine measure. 
Last, although the predicted interaction between Advice Content, Attorney 
Trustworthiness, and Factual Innocence was nonsignificant, follow-up analyses revealed 
that Advice Content and Attorney Trustworthiness interacted (once Factual Innocence 
was removed from the model) to predict plea-bargain decisions (B = -19.66, SE = 3.58, p 
< .001). Specifically, as trust in one’s attorney increased, the attorney’s advice was more 
influential on one’s plea-bargain decisions (to go to trial or accept the plea). 
Person Variables 
Demographic Variables 
 Participants’ gender and education have had inconsistent effects on plea-bargain 
decisions, but a pattern seems to be developing. In particular, the gender effects seem to 
be small such that they are either nonsignificant or occasionally suggest that one group 
(most often the small non-binary group) made significantly different plea-bargain 




a slightly clearer picture: when education significantly predicts plea-bargain decisions, as 
education increases, participants are more likely to choose to go to trial rather than accept 
the plea bargain. 
 Participants’ age has not predicted plea-bargain decisions, but other research 
looking at adolescents (under 18; Green et al., 1999; Helm et al., 2018) has shown 
differences in plea-bargain decision-making. Additionally, the present study was the first 
to suggest that political ideology may predict differences in plea-bargain decisions, and 
future work should explore whether this finding is reliable, and what explains why 
conservatives are more resistant to accepting plea offers. 
 Studies 3 and 4 of this dissertation research conducted a variety of follow-up 
analyses to examine whether there are race differences in plea-bargain decision-making, 
and if so, to assess the nature of race’s influence in this context. The two findings that 
were consistent across Studies 3 and 4 were that Race affected the impact of Probability 
of Trial Conviction on plea-bargain decisions and Race affected the multiplicative impact 
of Probability of Trial conviction and Factual Innocence on plea-bargain decisions. 
Figure 34 gives insight into the latter finding, and highlights that the addition of attorney 
advice into the study materials of Study 4 may have particularly impacted Innocent-
White participants. Specifically, Innocent-White participants’ sensitivity to their 
likelihood of conviction at trial seen in Study 3 was drastically reduced with the 
introduction of attorney advice, however, it was not reduced enough to make the 
interaction null. This indicates that Innocent-White participants, relative to Guilty-White 
participants and all Black participants, overemphasized the importance of the likelihood 




 Another notable observation regarding the three-way interactions seen in Study 3 
and the present study is that the Black participants’ graphs have lines (Innocent vs. 
Guilty) that are closer to each other, relative to the White participants’ graphs. This 
suggests that Black participants may have less faith that their factual innocence or guilt 
matters—or put a different way, Black participants did not think that their factual 
innocence or guilt should influence their plea decisions as much as White participants 
did. Kassin (2008) suggests that the phenomenology of innocence typically reflects a 
strong, nearly unshakeable belief that one’s innocence matters and will eventually come 
to light to save them. So the present study suggests that the phenomenology of innocence 
in plea-bargain decision-making may be qualified by demographic differences. This 
finding may be partially explained by the fact that White participants felt more positively 
about trial relative to how Black participants felt about trial,90 which may have 
empowered White innocent participants in particular to choose to go to trial more and 
prevented Black innocent participants from the doing the same. 
Trait-Level Individual-Difference Variable: Impulsivity 
 Study 4 affirms the conclusions of the previous chapter. Specifically Study 1’s 
findings that Impulsivity directly influences plea-bargain decisions and interactively 
influences plea-bargain decisions with Delay until Trial appear to be anomalous—this 
dissertation’s three most recent studies found nonsignificant effects. But across all four 
studies for lower-impulsivity participants, probability of losing at trial is a stronger 
motivator for accepting pleas relative to higher-impulsivity participants, who still are 
influenced by probability of losing at trial—just to a lesser degree. 
 






 Study 4 affirms the past three studies’ finding that more self-blame predicts 
accepting more (and harsher) pleas. Study 4’s marginal effect of Blameworthiness* 
Probability of Trial Conviction on Subject Trial Aversion highlights that although the 
past three studies have found a significant effect, this effect is small. 
Perceptions of Innocence 
 Study 4 replicated the findings from Studies 1–3 that participants who perceive 
themselves to be more guilty accept more (and harsher) pleas. As was mentioned in 
Study 3’s discussion, to determine the consistency of the findings of the interaction 
between Perceptions of Innocence and Probability of Trial Conviction, it is important to 
take into account how Perceptions of Innocence are measured and how Subjective Trial 
Aversion is measured. Study 3 and 4 have the most similarities on these methodological 
factors, and Study 4 affirms Study 3’s finding that when participants felt more guilt about 
the accident and injury, probability of trial conviction mattered less in participants’ plea 
bargain-decisions. 
Limitations and Future Studies 
 Study 4 showed that various situational factors including likelihood of trial 
conviction and factual innocence as well as person variables including impulsivity and 
race matter in plea-bargain decision-making. Although the goal of this research study was 
to create a more externally valid plea-bargain decision-situation, the plea-bargaining 




First, defense attorneys most often meet (however briefly) with their clients to 
talk about the prospect of a plea bargain because of the consequentiality of the decision. 
Communicating in person, as opposed to via a paragraph of text, introduces nonverbal 
cues that can increase or decrease clients’ confidence, trust, and skepticism in their 
attorney.  
Second, allowing participants to choose to receive attorney advice may be more 
realistic than an experimental paradigm that simply introduces attorney advice as a 
paragraph in the study environment, but in most cases, at early hearings, the judge will 
suggest to clients the benefits of an attorney, so the ease of the opt-out in the present 
study was not especially externally valid.  
Third, most attorneys that I’ve discussed this research with, especially criminal-
law attorneys, say that they would never communicate with their client in terms of 
numerical probabilities and they often do not know the exact delay until trial, so future 
work should study the impact of communication through informal probabilities like “you 
have a good shot of winning at trial” and delay ranges like “it will be at least a month 
before we will get in front of a judge” to see if the effects hold. Adding greater ambiguity 
to the plea-bargain situation may actually evoke a stronger influence of the participant’s 
(and real criminal defendant’s) personal characteristics. 
 Fourth, although I have observed plea bargaining in action while shadowing a 
Hennepin County Attorney in Minneapolis, no research to date has documented the 
extent of the negotiation that goes on between prosecutors and defense attorneys. During 
my observation, it depended heavily on whether the prosecutor had video evidence of the 




one plea deal—and even if the defense attorney came back a second time to discuss, the 
deal did not change. Thus, although the plea-bargaining process is assuredly more 
dynamic than the single plea-bargain decision made in many experimental psychology-
and-law studies, it may also be more dynamic in many cases than the titration 
procedures—with the prosecutor sometimes acquiescing and other times not. Future 
research should be mindful of this high variability in case negotiation as well as the 
potential for the plea-bargain decision-making process to take substantially longer than 
what is allowed for in experimental studies. 
 Fifth, all four dissertation studies used the same crime scenario, which involved 
criminal negligence while driving. Indubitably, this single crime is not representative of 
the full criminal code, and future work should attempt to replicate this dissertation’s 
findings across crime categories involving a variety of mens rea (i.e., guilty mind) 
requirements. For example, many possession crimes do not require that the possessor is 
actually aware of the object on their person, so that would be another category of crimes 
that it would be important to test as a bridge to another category of crimes that requires 
knowledge of wrongdoing.91 
 
91 The variety of mens rea requirements in crimes is only one facet of crime types that 
may affect the psychological process of plea-bargain decision-making. The actual content 
of criminal behavior may also matter. For example, property crimes as opposed to drug 
and violent crimes may involve different resistance to accept guilty pleas. The criminal 






Study 4 Demographics  
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE 95% CI 
Gender    
       Other 62.08* 28.40 (6.27, 117.88) 
       Women 8.47 5.86 (-3.06, 19.99) 
Gender    
       Man -62.08* 28.40 (-117.88, -6.27) 
       Women -53.61m 28.39 (-109.29, 2.17) 
Race    
       Other 2.71 8.91 (-14.80, 20.21) 
        White 2.01 6.54 (-10.83, 14.85) 
Gender*Race    
        Gender Other 62.15 63.40 (-62.45, 186.74) 
        Women 4.54 10.43 (-15.95, 25.02) 
         Race Other -14.24 14.24 (-42.21, 13.74) 
         White 1.52 9.33 (-16.81, 19.86) 
         Gender Other:Race Other NA NA NA 
         Women:Race Other 28.40 19.12 (-0.18, 65.98) 
          Gender Other:White -2.67 71.01 (-142.21, 136.87) 
         Women:White  0.20 13.12 (-25.58, 25.98) 
Age -0.08 0.21 (-0.48) 
Age*Race    
        Age -0.04 0.44 (-0.90, 0.82) 
         Other 7.32 31.19 (-53.98, 68.62) 
        White 4.73 21.24 (-37.00, 46.47) 
         Age:Other -0.12 0.73 (-1.55, 1.31) 
         Age:White -0.05 0.51 (-1.06, 0.95) 
Education -7.53* 3.18 (-13.77, -1.29) 
Education [ref: Middle School]    
         High School -5.04 63.74 (-130.30, 120.22) 
          Part of College -13.59 63.09 (-137.56, 110.38) 
         College Graduate -11.27 62.97 (-135.02, 112.48) 
         Graduate School  -29.11 63.02 (-152.95, 94.72) 
Education [ref: College Grad]    
           Graduate School -17.84* 7.05 (-31.70, -3.99) 
           High School 6.23 11.90 (-17.16, 29.62) 
           Middle School 11.27 62.97 (-112.48, 135.02) 
           Part Of College  -2.32 7.64 (-17.33, 12.69) 
Education [ref: Graduate School]    
           College Graduate  17.84* 7.05 (3.99, 31.70) 
           High School 24.08* 12.13 (0.4, 47.91) 




           Part Of College  15.53m 7.99 (-0.17, 31.22) 
Political Affiliation  -3.58* 1.61 (-6.74, -0.43) 
Gender*PTC    
    Other  58.26m 32.86 (-6.06, 122.58) 
    Women 0.07 6.79 (-13.21, 13.35) 
    PTC 1.35*** 0.03 (1.28, 1.42) 
    Other:PTC  0.05 0.23 (-0.40, 0.50) 
    Women:PTC 0.12* 0.05 (0.02, 0.21) 
Gender*DUT    
    Other  53.64 m 29.36 (-3.85, 111.12) 
    Women 9.25 6.06 (-2.62, 21.12) 
    DUT 0.003 0.06 (-0.11, 0.12) 
    Other:DUT  0.45 0.40 (-0.33, 1.23) 
    Women:DUT -0.04 0.08 (-0.20, 0.12) 
Education*PTC    
     Edu_contin -1.77 3.68 (-8.97, 5.44) 
     PTC 1.72*** 0.10 (1.52, 1.92) 
     Edu_contin:PTC -0.08** 0.03 (-0.13, -0.03) 
Education*PTC    
     Middle School -88.98 72.88 (-231.38, 53.43) 
     High School 13.47 14.02 (-13.93, 40.88) 
     Part of College 0.67 9.23 (-17.37, 18.72) 
     College Graduate -1.98 8.16 (-17.92, 13.95) 
     PTC 1.24*** 0.04 (1.16, 1.32) 
     Middle School:PTC 1.63** 0.51 (0.64, 2.63) 
     High School:PTC 0.15 0.10 (-0.04, 0.34) 
     Part of College:PTC 0.21** 0.06 (0.08, 0.33) 
     College Graduate:PTC 0.27*** 0.06 (0.16, 0.39) 
Education_contin*DUT    
     Education_contin -7.31* 3.29 (-13.75, -0.87) 
     DUT 0.03 0.18 (-0.32, 0.39) 
     Education_contin:DUT -0.01 0.04 (-0.10, 0.08) 
Race*PTC    
     Other -4.11 10.36 (-24.39, 16.17) 
     White -8.84 7.56 (-23.64, 1.38) 
     PTC 1.30*** 0.04 (1.22, 1.38) 
     Other:PTC 0.12 0.07 (-0.02, 0.26) 
     White:PTC 0.15** 0.05 (0.05, 0.25) 
Race*DUT    
     Other 4.47 9.29 (-13.71, 22.65) 
     White 2.07 6.75 (-11.14, 15.28) 
     DUT 0.002 0.07 (-0.14, 0.15) 
     Other:DUT -0.09 0.13 (-0.34, 0.16) 
     White:DUT -0.003 0.09 (-0.18, 0.18) 
Note. Only one participant was in the Middle school group. 






Study 4 Race Predicting Legal Cynicism and Criminal Justice System Beliefs 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE 95% CI  
Legal Cynicism ~ Race    
          Other 0.57 0.76 (-0.93, 2.08) 
          White -0.32 0.55 (-1.29, 0.75) 
CJ Perception [Total] ~ Race    
          Other  -28.67 28.08 (-83.85, 26.52) 
          White 28.12 19.55 (-10.30, 66.54) 
CJ Negative Plea Bargaining ~ 
Race 
   
          Other  -2.94 2.96 (-8.77, 2.88) 
          White 0.42 2.05 (-2.62, 4.45) 
CJ [Trial] ~ Race    
          Other  1.58 2.54 (-3.41, 6.57) 
          White 3.56* 1.77 (-0.09, 7.03) 
CJ [Feels] ~ Race    
          Other  -17.31 15.41 (-47.59, 12.96) 
          White 7.25 10.71 (-13.81, 29.30) 
Procedural Justice ~ Race    
         Other -4.05*  -1.58 (-7.15, -.95) 









Study 4 Attorney Advice and Factual Innocence Regressions on Subjective Trial 
Aversion 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2 95% CI 
Advice Content [ref: Plea]   0.002  
      No Advice -4.60 7.90  (-20.1, 10.87) 
      Trial Advice -9.25 6.45  (-21.9, 3.38) 
Factual Innocence -25.06*** 5.66 0.02 (036.1, -14) 
Factual Innoc.*Advice_Content*Trust     
      Innocent -80.93 64.25  (-207.87, 46.01) 
      Trial Advice 65.81 64.21  (-61.05, 192,67) 
      Trust 6.27 5.97  (-5.53, 18.07) 
      Innocent:Trial Advice 108.30 81.13  (-52.53, 268.61) 
      Innocent:Trust  6.32 6.85  (-7.21, 19.84) 
      Trust:Trial Advice -10.66 6.78  (-24.04, 2.73) 
     Innocent:Trial Advice:Trust -10.78 8.95  (-28.46, 6.90) 
Factual Innocence*Advice [Given]   0.05  
       Innocent -53.39*** 13.72  (-80.40, -26.38) 
       No Advice -30.47* 13.47  (-57.00, -3.94) 
       Trial Advice -27.73* 13.55  (-54.42, -1.04) 
       Innocent:No Advice 49.15* 19.04  (11.65, 86.66) 
       Innocent:Trial Advice 36.08m 19.15  (-1.65, 73.81) 
Impulsivity*Advice*PTC   0.26  
       Impulsivity  -0.31 1.75  (-3.71, 3.09) 
       No Advice 21.99 17.12 0.001 (-54.32, 12.30) 
       Trial Advice -41.21* 17.61 0.003 (-75.47, -6.95) 
       PTC 1.35*** 0.08 0.04 (1.18, 1.52) 
       Impulsivity:No Advice -0.39 2.66  (--5.56, 4.78) 
       Impulsivity:Trial Advice 1.94 2.59  (-3.10, 6.97) 
       Impulsivity:PTC -0.007 -0.01  (-0.03, 0.02) 
       No Advice:PTC 0.21m 0.12 0.001 (-0.03, 0.45) 
       Trial Advice:PTC 0.43*** 0.12 0.002 (0.19, 0.68) 
       Impulsivity:No Advice:PTC 0.006 0.02  (-0.03, 0.04) 
       Impulsivity:Trial Advice:PTC -0.02 0.02  (-0.06, 0.01) 
 
 







Study 4 Remaining Subjective Trial Aversion Hypothesis-Testing Regressions 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
Factual Innocence*PTC   0.24  
    Innocent -32.88*** 6.58 0.007 (-45.78, -19.99) 
    PTC 1.35*** 0.03 0.12 (1.28, 1.41) 
    Innocent:PTC 0.11* 0.05  (0.02, 0.20) 
PTC*DUT   0.22  
   PTC 1.41*** 0.03 0.15 (1.35, 1.47) 
   DUT 0.23 0.78  (-1.30, 1.76) 
   PTC:DUT -0.005 0.01  (-0.02, 0.02) 
Impulsivity -1.08 0.66 0.003 (-2.37, 0.21) 
Innocence_Categ   .04  
     Guilty 52.06*** 7.76 .04 (36.90, 67.20) 
     Between 28.53*** 8.39 .01 (12.10, 45.00) 
Perceptions of Innocence (contin) -0.92*** 0.07 0.06 (-0.77, -0.47) 
Perception of Guilt 0.63*** 0.08 0.06 (0.49, 0.78) 
Perception of Innocence_composite -0.35*** 0.04 0.06 (0.08, 0.05) 
Blameworthiness 0.36*** 0.04 0.06 (0.28, 0.45) 
Procedural Justice 0.52m 0.27 0.004 (-0.01, 1.05) 
Procedural Justice*Race   0.01  
      Procedural Justice 0.57 0.48 0.001 (-0.38, 1.51) 
      Other -15.25 25/92 0.002 (-65.82, 35.32) 
      White 13.03 20.59  (-27.15, 53.32) 
      Procedural Justice:Other 0.81 0.82 0.001 (-0.79, 2.41) 
      Procedural Justice:White -0.30 0.62 0.001 (-1.50, 0.90) 
Perceptions of Guilt (contin)*PTC   0.28  
      Guilt 0.80*** 0.09 0.02 (0.63, 0.98) 
      PTC 1.56*** 0.05 0.09 (1.47, 1.65) 
      Guilt:PTC -0.003*** 0.0007 0.001 (-0.00, -0.00) 
Perceptions of Innocence (contin)*PTC   0.28  
      Innocence -0.61*** 0.09 0.01 (-0.78, -0.44) 
      PTC 1.41*** 0.04 0.12 (1.34, 1.48) 
      Innocence:PTC -.0002 -0.0006  (-0.002, 0.001) 
Perceptions of Innocence (ordinal)*PTC   0.27  
      Innocence -21.69*** 4.32 0.007 (-30.15, -13.23) 
      PTC 1.44*** 0.03 0.16 (1.38, 1.50) 
      Innocence:PTC -0.05m 0.03  (-0.12, 0.01) 
Perceptions of Innoc_composite*PTC   0.29  
        Innocence -0.39*** 0.05 0.02 (-0.49, -0.30) 
        PTC 1.41*** 0.02 0.23 (1.36, 1.46) 
        Innocence:PTC 0.001m 0.0003  (-0.00002, 0.001) 
Blameworthiness*PTC   0.28  
       Blame 0.41*** 0.05 0.02 (-.30, 0.50) 
       PTC 1.50*** 0.06 0.06 (1.39, 1.61) 
       Blame:PTC -0.001m 0.0003  (-0.001, -0.00002) 
Impulsivity*PTC   0.23  
       PTC 1.49*** 0.04 0.13 (1.42, 1.56) 
       Impulsivity 0.13 0.76  (-1.36, 1.63) 
       PTC:Impulsivity -0.02*** 0.01 0.001 (-0.03, -0.01) 




       DUT -0.07 0.06  (-0.19,0.05) 
       Impulsivity -1.31m 0.68 0.002 (-2.65, 0.03) 
       DUT:Impulsivity 0.01 0.01  (-0.01, 0.03) 
Factual Innoc*Impulsivity   0.02  
     Innocent -36.76*** 8.47 0.02 (-53.32, -20.20) 
     Impulsivity -2.33* 0.91 0.006 (-4.10, -0.55) 
     Innocent:Impulsivity 2.31m 1.29 0.003 (-0.21, 4.83) 
Factual Innoc*Perceptions of Innoc 
(contin) 
  0.06  
        Innocent -10.22 9.26 0.001 (-28.33, 7.90) 
        Innocence (contin) -0.63*** 0.12 0.02 (-0.87, -0.39) 
        Innocent:Innocence (contin) 0.10 0.17  (-0.23, 0.43) 
Factual Innoc*Perceptions of Guilt 
(contin) 
  0.06  
       Innocent -3.27 12.69  (-28.10, 21.55) 
       Guilt (contin) 0.61*** 0.13 0.02 (0.35, 0.87) 
       Innocent:Guilt (contin) -0.01 0.17  (-0.35, 0.34) 
Factual Innoc*Perceptions of Innoc 
(composite) 
  0.06  
        Innocent -1.37 6.47  (-14.03, 11.30) 
        Innocence -0.35*** 0.07 0.02 (-0.49, -0.22) 
        Innocent:Innocence 0.02 0.09  (-0.16, 0.20) 
Blameworthiness*PTC*Factual 
Innocence 
  0.28  
      Blameworthiness 74.69*** 20.21 0.003 (35.16, 114.22) 
      PTC 1.32*** 0.13 0.009 (1.07, 1.58) 
      Innocent -9.01 19.39  (-46.94, 28.92) 
      Blame:PTC 0.02 0.15  (-0.28, 0.33) 
      Blame:Innocent -4.98 24.52  (-52.94, 42.99) 
      PTC:Innocent -.20 0.15  (-0.09, 0.49) 
      Blame:PTC:Innocent -0.15 0.18  (-0.51, 0.22) 
Blameworthiness*PTC*Advice   0.28  
      Blameworthiness 75.70** 22.98 0.003 (3085, 120.60) 
      PTC 1.63*** 13.66 0.01 (1.36, 1.89) 
      Plea Advice 7.70 22.03  (-35.30, 50.74) 
      Trial Advice 5.69 21.22  (-35.74, 47.15) 
      Blame:PTC -0.18 0.17  (-0.52, 0.17) 
      Blame:Plea 16.52 28.49  (-39.13, 72.13) 
      Blame:Trial -4.15 27.75  (-58.36, 50.02) 
      PTC:Plea -0.27 0.17  (-0.59, 0.06) 
      PTC:Trial -0.06 0.16  (-0.38, 0.25) 
      Blame:PTC:Plea 0.10 0.21  (-0.32, 0.51) 
      Blame:PTC:Trial -0.002 0.21  (-0.41, 0.41) 
 








Study 4 Procedural Justice Hypothesis Testing 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2a 95% CI 
Factual Innoc [Innocent] -2.82** 0.99 0.02 (-4.78, -0.87) 
STA* Factual Innoc   0.02  
     STA 0.02m 0.01  (-0.001, 0.05) 
     Innocent 0.58 2.68  (-4.68, 5.84) 
     STA:Innocent -0.02 0.02  (-0.05, 0.01) 
Delivery [Not Asked] -6.68*** 0.95 0.09 (-8.55, -4.80) 
Delivery*Advice Content   0.54  
      Not Asked -2.34 2.18  (-6.63, 1.95) 
      Plea Advice 18.52*** 2.14  (14.31, 22.73) 
      Trial Advice 18.23*** 2.14  (14.04, 22.44) 
      Not Asked:Plea Advice 0.83 2.44  (-3.96, 6.62) 
      Not Asked:Trial Advice 1.90 2.44  (-2.89, 6.69) 
Factual Innoc *Advice   0.68  
      Innocent -5.22*** 1.49  (-8.16, -2.28) 
      No Advice -20.83*** 1.48  (-23.75, -17.90) 
      Trial Advice -1.20 1.48  (-4.13, 1.72) 
      Innocent: No Advice 2.86 2.10  (-1.28, 6.99) 











Study 4 Attorney Trust * Attorney Advice Content on Subjective Trial Aversion 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables  B SE R2a 95% CI 
Advice Content*Trust   0.17  
     Trial Advice 153.39*** 30.80  (92.55, 214.23) 
     Attorney Trust  13.38*** 2.50  (8.44, 18.32) 
     Trial Advice:Trust -19.66 3.58  (-26.74, -12.58) 
 










Study 4 Opted-In for Attorney Advice: Impulsivity*Advice Content *PTC 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
Impulsivity*Advice Content*PTC   .21  
    Impulsivity 1.23 1.53  (-1.75, 4.21) 
    Trial Advice 1.62 14.52  (-26.70, 29.95) 
    PTC 1.59*** 0.07 .08 (1.45, 1.72) 
    Imp.:Trial Advice -2.59 2.18 .001 (-6.85, 1.67) 
    Imp.:PTC -0.06*** 0.01 .006 (-0.08, -0.04) 
    Trial Advice:PTC -0.37*** 0.10 .002 (-0.56, -0.17) 
    Imp.:Trial Advice:PTC 0.08*** 0.02 .005 (0.05, 0.11) 
 






Studies’ 3 and 4 Race*Probability of Trial Conviction Interaction on Subjective Trial 
Aversion 
 








Studies’ 3 and 4 Race*Probability of Trial Conviction*Factual Innocence Interaction 


























































































Note. Top panel is using the subset of participants randomly assigned to the Advice Delivery’s Asked condition, and they replied 
“yes,” thus opting in for advice and being randomly assigned to receive either Plea or Trial advice. The bottom panel is using the 






Chapter 6: General Discussion 
The broadest goals of this dissertation are to understand plea-bargain decision-
making and contribute to discounting theory by studying the non-monetary loss 
commodity inherent to plea bargaining: criminal sanctions. This general discussion will 
first highlight key implications of the present work’s emphasis on the person-by-situation 
approach for discounting theory, then outline practical implications of the work for the 
plea-bargaining system, and finally describe limitations and future studies.  
Adopting the person-by-situation approach from personality and social 
psychology in this dissertation highlights the ways in which personal and situational 
features can qualify the seemingly straightforward human tendency to like immediate and 
certain good things and dislike immediate and certain bad things. First, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, that general human tendency is qualified by non-monetary losses evincing 
reverse discounting such that people sometimes prefer to get bad outcomes over with 
rather than delay them (see, e.g., Harris, 2012). In addition to this broad situational 
moderator of commodity valence and type, the use of the person-by-situation approach 
produced hypotheses about broad group-level differences in the likelihood to accept pleas 
based on person variables like gender and situation variables like factual innocence.  
The person-by-situation approach also historically has focused on how 
methodological features influence findings. For example, strong experimental situations 
have been shown to produce near-universal participant responses, whereas weak 
experimental situations, allowing for greater variation in response, have the tendency to 
detect dispositional, or personal, differences in a sample (see Mischel, 1997; Monson & 






had the potential to shape participants’ responses, and although the manipulated 
independent variables produced a relatively strong situation, all four studies measured a 
set of situated-person variables to attempt to capture the extent to which individual 
perceptions and interpretations varied within the experimental situation.  
Theoretical Implications 
 The theoretical implications of the present research can be categorized into three 
sub-types. First, there are theoretical implications concerning person variables to answer 
the question, do different types of people discount differently. Second, there are 
implications concerning the extent to which situational variables qualify discounting 
patterns in the plea-bargaining context. Last, the situated-person variables address the 
extent to which people’s reactions to and perceptions of the experimental scenario 
influence their decisions. 
Person Variables 
 Measuring and testing person variables such as gender and impulsivity addresses 
the question of whether different groups of people make different decisions when 
confronted with complex binary decisions. Testing the interaction between these person 
variables and the situational variables of probability and delay tests why the groups made 
different decisions. Specifically, testing the interaction between person variables and the 
probability and delay assesses whether the group-based differences are due to differential 
weighting of probability and/or delay, resulting in different degrees of discounting across 
groups. 
 This dissertation research suggests that men sometimes make different decisions 






2 found significant effects, whereas Studies 3 and 4 found null effects), and that those 
gender-differences are best explained by different rates of probability discounting 
(Studies 2 and 4 found significant interaction effects, whereas Studies 1 and 3 found null 
effects) rather than different rates of delay discounting (only Study 1 produced a marginal 
interaction effect). Specifically, men were more likely to choose trial than women, and 
women’s plea-bargain decisions were more influenced by probability than men’s. It is 
possible that men, on average, interpreted acceptance of a guilty plea as a concession of 
sorts—or walking away from a fight—which motivated their willingness to go to trial.  
This research also suggests that individuals with more education sometimes, as a 
group, make different decisions when confronted with complex binary decisions relative 
to individuals with less education (Studies 1 and 4 found significant effects, whereas 
Studies 2 and 3 found null effects). Those education-based differences are best explained 
by different rates of probability discounting (all four studies found significant interaction 
effects) rather than different rates of delay discounting (all four studies found null 
interaction effects). Specifically, people with graduate degrees chose to go to trial more 
than most other groups, and this may be because people with graduate degrees feel that 
having a criminal record is more detrimental to their lives than do people without 
graduate degrees, irreparably damaging their professional reputation and employability. 
People with graduate degrees were also less influenced by probability than most other 
groups, which may indicate that they were more skeptical to the omniscient probability of 
trial convictions they were presented with, instead coming to their own conclusion about 






Last, in terms of demographic differences, this research suggests that when large 
enough sub-samples are collected, Blacks and Whites sometimes make different 
decisions when confronted with complex binary decisions (Study 3 found a marginal 
effect, whereas Study 4 found a null effect). Although they only sometimes differ as a 
group in what decisions they make, Blacks and Whites consistently have different rates of 
probability discounting (Studies 3 and 4 found significant interaction effects) rather than 
different rates of delay discounting (Studies 3 and 4 found null interaction effects). 
Specifically, Whites accepted more pleas than Blacks, and Whites were more influenced 
by probability than Blacks. This may suggest that Blacks may be more skeptical of the 
plea-bargaining process, feeling that being told that their likelihood of conviction is 
increasing is a strategic ploy to coerce their guilty plea, making them more likely than 
Whites to choose to go to trial and less sensitive to probability. 
This dissertation research suggests that the trait-level individual-difference of 
impulsivity more often than not does not cause people to make different decisions when 
confronted with complex binary decisions. However, across all four studies, people’s 
impulsivity influences the degree to which they weighted probability in those decisions. 
Specifically, low-impulsivity people allowed increases in probability to affect their 
decisions more than high-impulsivity people. Additionally, people’s impulsivity, 
combined with the situational feature of waiting in jail for trial, influenced the degree to 
which they weighted delay in their decisions. Specifically, low-impulsivity people 







Overall, demographic characteristics influence the extent to which people 
discount probabilistically, and impulsivity influences the extent to which people 
discounting probabilistically and temporally. Thus, discounting scholars interested in the 
generalizability of their findings should test the extent to which monetary outcomes and 
other non-monetary outcomes are discounted by different groups. 
Situation Variables 
 In this dissertation, Factual Innocence, Attorney Advice, and Waiting-for-Trial 
Location were the three tested situational moderators of probability and delay discounting 
in plea-bargain decision-making. Factual Innocence influenced participants’ rates of 
probability discounting such that for innocent individuals, probability of losing at trial 
more steeply influenced the number (and harshness) of the pleas they accepted relative to 
guilty individuals. Waiting-for-Trial Location influenced participants’ delay discounting 
such that for people out on bail, the delay of trial meant little to nothing to them, but for 
people waiting in jail, the delay of trial was significantly aversive. Thus, these two 
situational moderators were of a different kind: the former situational moderator was one 
that determines the degree of probability discounting, and the latter situational moderator 
was one that determined the existence of a delay effect. Thus, discounting of non-
monetary losses is dependent on situational moderators, and future researchers studying 
new commodity types should carefully consider what those situational moderators might 
be. 
Situated-Person Variables 
 Because blameworthiness and perceptions of guilt consistently interacted with 






candidates to be conceptualized as mediators and measured in future studies after 
participants read the scenario but before the plea-bargain decisions. Although people vary 
on the extent to which they blame themselves for the car accident and child’s injury as 
well as their perceptions of guilt, based on the current research’s placement of these 
variables’ in the survey it is unclear whether participants are responding differently to the 
scenario—the base facts—or to the probabilities manipulated within-participants in their 
plea-bargain decision-making, or both. Measuring perceptions of guilt and 
blameworthiness before the plea-bargain decisions would isolate the scenario’s content as 
the potential cause of their guilt/self-blame (as opposed to the within-participants 
manipulation of probability), which then, if self-blame and perceptions of guilt still 
influence the impact of probability on decisions, suggests that people’s differential 
reactions to the scenario is a lens through which they then see the plea-bargain decisions. 
 In sum, the present research demonstrates the various person and situated-person 
variables influence rates of discounting, at least in a non-monetary loss context.92 
Traditional discounting scholars, interested only in monetary outcomes, could also 
benefit from testing whether different groups of people, with different demographic 
characteristics, different trait-level tendencies, and different situated perceptions discount 
to varying degrees. Even if in monetary decisions these person and situated-person 
variables matter less, or not at all, that provides insight into why monetary gains and 
losses produce different discounting effects, especially for delay, from non-monetary 
losses like loss of freedom.  
 
92 All three studies testing cross-construct models demonstrated that person and situated-
person variables contributed unique value to explaining plea-bargaining behavior (see 








 Men make up the vast majority of criminal offenders, but there are over 10,000 
women in federal prisons currently (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2021). This dissertation 
suggests that women are more sensitive to the likelihood of their conviction relative to 
men, and accordingly accept more pleas than men when their probability of conviction is 
high. Criminal defense attorneys, armed with this information, may not want to 
disproportionately influence women to accept pleas relative to men. To avoid 
disproportionately influencing women to take pleas, defense attorneys may choose to 
communicate information about their client’s likelihood of conviction in a different way, 
such as being especially careful not to overstate the likelihood of the woman defendant’s 
conviction. 
 This dissertation also suggests that lower educational-degree achievement 
sensitizes people to the likelihood of their conviction relative to people with higher 
educational-degree achievement. So criminal defense attorneys may want to be especially 
careful not to overstate their client’s likelihood of conviction at trial, especially when 
their client has only a high school degree or only completed part of college. This may 
mean that defense attorneys have to be careful about overstating their client’s likelihood 
of conviction at trial with most of their clients because inmates of state and federal 
prisons tend to be less educated than the general U.S. population (see, e.g., Harlow, 
2003). 
 Blacks are disproportionately represented in the United States’ criminal justice 






into more externally valid future studies—it would suggest that when confronted with the 
same choices between trial and plea-offers as white participants,93 black participants are 
more resistant to accepting plea bargains on the basis of increasing probabilities of 
conviction. If this is the case, it suggests that they would exercise their trial rights more 
than similarly situated white defendants. This finding is the reverse of what was 
hypothesized by previous law-and-economics scholars (Savitsky, 2012) who believed 
that Blacks’ skepticism about the criminal justice system would make them plea more. 
But this dissertation’s finding is consistent with findings by Metcalfe and Chiricos (2018) 
who examined a random sample of 500 felony plea cases in Florida between 2002 and 
2010 (out of over 275,000 records). Specifically, Metcalfe and Chiricos (2018) found that 
the odds of a plea decrease by about 46.4% when the defendant is black rather than white. 
Similar archival work done using a Tennessee county’s public defender records from 
2016 to 2019 also showed that black defendants were less likely to plead guilty as 
charged than white defendants, suggesting that they pled to a lesser charge and/or chose 
to go to trial more often (Ector, 2021). No research yet conclusively explains why this 
pattern exists, but from a psychological standpoint, it is possible that black defendants 
believe that their rights will be more protected by the trial process as opposed to the back-
room deals of plea-bargaining. 
Situation Variables 
 
93 This is a huge assumption. Likely, Blacks are confronted with harsher trial sentences, 
including mandatory minimums, and harsher plea-offers than Whites with substantially 
the same facts. In that vein, archival research has found that in a sample of misdemeanor 
marijuana cases in New York, black defendants were less likely to receive charge-







 A higher probability of trial conviction causes people to be more willing to accept 
harsher pleas, and waiting in jail for longer lengths of time also makes them more willing 
to accept harsher pleas. In the criminal justice system’s plea-bargaining, probability of 
trial conviction is linked to the extent of evidence that the prosecutor wields, and the 
strength of the evidence against a criminal defendant is a legally relevant and acceptable 
factor to influence plea decisions. The outcome of bail hearings is not legally relevant to 
the ultimate question of fact whether a criminal defendant beyond a reasonable doubt 
committed the crime charged, so the fact that the outcome of bail hearings impact plea 
decisions is problematic. Scholars have been arguing fervently for bail reform since the 
1960s (see, e.g., Mitchell, 1969; Thomas, 2020), and ideally experimental work like this 
dissertation can be used to motivate reform. 
 Study 4 of this research also suggests that only individuals who are factually 
guilty are persuaded by their attorney’s recommendation to go to trial or accept a plea, 
but this finding should be interpreted with caution because the attorney advice 
manipulation does not contain as much social force as an attorney would present in 
person, speaking with their client. Additionally, the fact that guilty individuals were more 
persuaded by attorney advice than innocents (Study 4) and innocents were more 
persuaded by probability of their conviction (Study 3 and Study 4) should not be 
overinterpreted by suggesting that these two groups value different situational cues. 
Rather, in plea-bargain decisions made outside of an experimental paradigm like those 






communicated by the defense attorney.94 So while it is possible that innocent participants 
would be more influenced by the informal probabilities of conviction that attorneys 
communicate (“we’ve got a fighting chance”) than guilty participants, that would need to 
be tested. 
 Furthermore, allowing participants to choose their situation influenced at least 
two processes. First, when participants opted in to receive attorney advice, that advice 
influenced guilty and innocent participants differently than their counterparts that had not 
been asked whether they wanted attorney advice. Figure 41 shows Figure 35’s Given 
Advice graph with a slightly different y-axis scale on the right and an Opted In graph on 
the left. When guilty participants were simply given attorney advice, they were persuaded 
by that advice, but when they opted in, that advice did not have an impact on them. And 
no matter whether innocent participants were simply given attorney advice, or whether 
they opted in, they were not persuaded by the advice.95 So, possibly, opting in for 
attorney advice made guilty participants more skeptical of the attorney’s 
recommendation. In real-world plea-bargain decision-making simply being given a public 
defender may be analogous to simply being given advice, and choosing your own 
criminal defense attorney is akin to opting in for attorney advice, and future research may 
want to test the extent to which criminal defendants are influenced by their attorney’s 
advice when their attorney is appointed versus selected because, ironically, when they 
 
94 A translational study similar to Clatch and Borgida’s (2021) Study 1 could be done to 
quantify attorney phrases such as “it’s pretty likely” and “we don’t have great odds,” 
which can later be used in experimental manipulations of probability. 
95 Note that the Opted In graph on the left had a barely marginal effect of Advice on 







choose their attorney they may be more resistant to that attorney’s recommendations, 
feeling that the attorney’s recommendation impinges their decisional freedom, producing 
reactance. 
 Second, allowing participants to choose their situation in Study 4 qualified the 
first three studies’ finding that impulsivity influences the impact of probability on their 
plea decisions. Attorney advice nullifies the effect of impulsivity on probability 
discounting in plea-bargaining except when participants opted in for advice and the 
attorney gave plea advice. This effect is best explained by the fact that the high-
impulsivity pink line in Figure 40’s upper-left quadrant is less steeply sloped than all the 
other quadrants’ high-impulsivity pink lines, meaning that when high-impulsivity 
individuals opt in for advice and are given plea advice there is a reactance effect such that 
they go to trial more than if they had opted in and received trial advice or if they had 
simply been given the plea advice without being asked. The null impulsivity-by-
probability effect in the other three quadrants also highlights the importance of 
manipulating attorney advice in this setting—attorney advice is essentially a moderator of 
the moderator of impulsivity since impulsivity in past studies moderated the effect of 
probability discounting. 
Situated-Person Variables 
 Self-blame and perceptions of guilt, on the one hand, are arguably extralegal 
factors. The extent to which people feel bad for their past acts does not necessarily 
indicate that they committed a crime—crimes are about the facts. On the other hand, a 
guilty mind at the time of the act (mens rea) is a well-known implicit requirement of 






immediately after the act is a good proxy for a guilty mind during the act, especially in a 
study using a hypothetical scenario. Regardless of whether these psychological 
tendencies of a criminal defendant are extralegal or not, defense attorneys should be 
mindful of their clients’ perceptions of blame and guilt about the act in question because 
they may be a lens through which they view the entire encounter with their attorney. 
 In sum, defendants’ situation-specific self-perceptions influence their plea 
decisions, and defense attorneys striving to be their clients’ strongest advocates should be 
attuned to their clients’ self-perceptions. The next section looks forward, identifying 
theoretical and practical next steps for research. 
Future Studies 
 Future work can extend in at least two broad directions. First, discounting 
researchers may want to examine discounting patterns of other non-monetary loss 
contexts, such as health decisions, and determine whether in addition to having different 
patterns of delay discounting, monetary (and property-based) decisions exhibit less 
variability across different groups of people. Second, researchers interested in plea 
bargaining may want to examine other aspects of the plea-bargaining decision context. 
 The present body of work suggests that the dual discounting paradigm, which 
simultaneously measures delay and probability in binary choices can be used in non-
monetary contexts to understand decision-making. Scholars have pointed to the potential 
use of discounting paradigms to explain non-monetary decisions like smoking cessation, 
exercising, and healthier eating (see, e.g., Petry & Madden, 2010; Vanderveldt et al., 
2015), and Clatch and Borgida’s (2021) Study 1 shows the initial rank-ordering that has 






experimentally examined by scientists will reveal whether all non-monetary losses are 
categorically distinct from monetary outcomes in terms of their reverse delay discounting 
and whether all non-monetary losses are similar to each other. Moreover, expanding the 
variables of interest beyond probability and delay, to person and situated-person 
variables, will help clarify the commodity-type-by-commodity-valence differences. What 
is it about non-monetary losses that make people’s reactions to them more variable? Why 
are they different from monetary losses and non-monetary gains? These are questions for 
future researchers to tackle. 
 The present paradigm, which measures likelihood of accepting a plea bargain as 
well as the harshness of a plea someone would be willing to accept, can be used to test a 
variety of unanswered, yet important, real-world plea-bargaining questions. For example, 
how do mandatory minimums influence plea-bargain decision-making? How does charge 
bargaining (i.e., in addition to negotiating for a lower prison sentence, also negotiating 
for a low criminal charge, say from felony to gross misdemeanor) influence plea-bargain 
decision-making? How does crime type influence these patterns?96 In addition, future 
researchers may want to operationalize attorney advice in a more externally valid way, 
with confederates or, at least, pre-recorded videos. 
Conclusion 
 
96 A recent unpublished study conducted with the work of my research assistant, Jessica 
Berman, and with funding from the American-Psychology-Law Society’s Undergraduate 
Research Award, manipulated Crime Type using this dissertation’s negligent driving 
crime scenario as one of its two levels and designed a negligent fire crime as the other 
level. Preliminary findings suggest that the Factual Innocence, Delay, and Probability 
effects are consistent across both crime types. This initial step is promising, and future 







This dissertation work aimed to improve our understanding of how criminal 
defendants make plea decisions as well as to inform discounting theory. Criminal 
defendants seem likely to be making nuanced plea decisions based on both situational 
factors such as their likelihood of conviction at trial, their factual innocence and, if they 
are not out on bail, the time until their trial date as well as personal factors like defendant 
gender, race, and impulsivity. Discounting theory built its founding principles on single-
discounting (i.e., not dual discounting) empirical studies of monetary gains, and this 
work’s focus on the dual discounting of non-monetary losses may be an example of how 
to examine the boundary conditions of discounting theory by studying more complex 
decision contexts. Additionally, this work’s emphasis on the person-by-situation 
approach to studying human behavior may provoke a richer understanding of the 
decisional processes at play in both gains- and losses-contexts. It is my hope that this 










Study 4 Asked vs. Given Attorney Advice: Factual Innocence*Advice Content on 
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Eggplant Data Quality Check 
 
 
Note. To detect VPN-use to hide participants’ lack of presence in the United States, the 
picture of eggplants was used to exclude participants suspected of not being in the United 
States. The name “aubergine” is used in the UK, Ireland, and France, and the name 
“brinjal” is used in South Asia. Sixty-three participants called the eggplants brinjal and 

































  Failed Passed Passed % 
SC1 223 301 57% 
SC2 212 312 60% 
SC3 160 364 69% 
 
Note. The first two questions are the two attention checks used in Study 1. The next three 
questions are the three reading comprehension or “scenario” questions. The next two 
figures are typical of a Shirker analysis and show the mean Subjective Trial Aversion of 
participants grouped based on their number of scenario questions that they answered 
correctly and the number of attention check questions that they answered correctly. These 






overlapping. However, the comprehension and attention rates were not ideal, so we 
excluded any participant that did not answer at least Scenario Question #1 or #3 correct 
because it was imperative to the study that the participant knew they were the subject of a 
criminal charge. In order to be included we also required that participants got at least one 
of the two Attention Check items correct, especially considering the second attention 
check started off with the same language, so should have flagged even the minimally 







Study 1 Hypothetical Scenario 
 
You were driving within the speed limit in a residential area, when you received a text 
from your friend.  You used the voice-activation feature to read the text to you.  As you 
were dictating your response, a child ran in front of your car, chasing a ball.  You 
slammed on your brakes, but your vehicle struck the child, breaking his leg.  The police 
were called and you have been charged with negligent driving resulting in physical 
injury, a felony.  
  
While it is legal to send texts on your cell phone in hands-free mode, it is not legal to 
hand-type a text while driving.  The cell phone technology can demonstrate that you 
received and sent text messages at the time of the accident, but it cannot establish 
whether the texts were hand-typed or voice-activated. However, a Fed-Ex delivery 
employee was in the vicinity during the accident and remembers your head was down 






Study 1 Example Plea-Bargaining Decision Tree (& Study 2 Original Titration) 
 
 
Note. Each participant saw the top decision (with probability and delay specified instead of “uncertain and delayed”) and then, based 
on their response, they saw a second decision. If they selected the plea in the first decision, then they saw the second decision 
connected by the single line, running down to the left. If they selected trial in the first decision, then they saw the second decision 
connected by two lines, running down to the right. This continued for four decisions per delay for Study 1, and then reset for the next 
delay, starting the participant back at the top of the decision tree, cycling through five times (once for each level of Delay until Trial). 









Please read the details of your options below. When you have made a decision, click on 
the radio button of the option you prefer. When you have clicked on the radio button your 
answer will be automatically recorded and new options will appear on the screen. Your 
new options may differ slightly so please review them carefully.  
  
Background Information 
Taking a plea offer is effective immediately, whereas the decision to go to trial results in 
a delay of the sentence start date because trial does not start until [DELAY] from now, 
and the trial process could take up to a week. [Jail condition: During the time waiting for 
trial to start and complete you will be waiting in jail; note that credit for time served is at 
the prosecutor’s discretion.] [Bail condition: During the time waiting for trial to start and 
complete you will be out on bail, preparing for trial, but otherwise maintaining your daily 
routines.] Based on the evidence, your lawyer thinks you have a [PROBABILITY]% 
chance you will be found guilty of the felony and be sentenced to 8 months in 
prison ([1-PROBABILITY]% chance of being found not guilty). 
  
The prosecutor has decided to charge you with a felony, and is asking for a sentence of 8 
months in prison if you choose to go to trial. However, the prosecutor is offering a plea 
deal of a gross misdemeanor, with a jail sentence of 60 days (2 months). 
 
 
Which option do you choose? Click on your preferred option. 
o ([1-PROBABILITY]% chance of freedom in trial in [DELAY]; 
PROBABILITY% chance of being found guilty of a felony and sentenced to 240 
days (8 months) in jail 
o 100% certainty of a gross misdemeanor with a sentence of 60 days (2 months) in 
jail starting today 
 
 
Note. The text highlighted in blue is present only in Waiting-for-Trial Location’s Jail 
conditions. The text highlighted in yellow is present only in the Bail conditions, and 





















Note. The first two questions are the Negative Contemplative Emotion question stems. 
Both question stems had two sliders, one with upper anchor “I would extremely like the 
experience” and one with upper anchor “I would extremely dislike the experience.” So 
participants answered four slider questions to measure contemplative emotions, and 
participants were randomly assigned to an order of the like/dislike questions. Participants 
answer to the “wait for your trial” dislike item was subtracted from the “wait for your 
trial” like item; and the same was done for the two “during trial” questions. The original 
questions from Molouki et al. (2019): “How pleasurable or positive would the 
[anticipation/memory] of this event be? In other words, how would you feel right now 
while [waiting for/remembering] it?” and they responded on a scale ranging from 0 
([waiting/remembering] would be not at all pleasurable) to 100 ([waiting/ remembering] 
would be extremely pleasurable). Next, participants were asked, “How displeasurable or 
negative would the [anticipation/memory] of this event be? In other words, how would 




ranging from 0 ([waiting/remembering] would be not at all displeasurable) to 100 
([waiting/remembering] would be extremely displeasurable). The third screenshot shows 
the two Blameworthiness items. The fourth screenshot shows the question used to assess 






Study 1 Trait-Level Individual-Difference Measures: Need for Cognitive Closure, 









ADAPTATION OF SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION SCALE  
[1 (strongly agree) to 9 (strongly disagree), Likert] 
Original Item Modified Item 
In general, you find society to be fair. In general, I think the criminal justice system 
is fair. #1 
In general, the American political system 
operates as it should. 
In general, the criminal justice system 
operates as it should. #2 
American society needs to be radically 
restructured. (reverse-scored) 
The American criminal justice system needs 
to be radically restructured [reverse scored] 
#3 
The United States is the best country in the 
world to live in. 
The United States is the best country in the 
world to live in. #7 
Most policies serve the greater good. Most criminal justice policies serve to protect 
the public. #8 
Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and 
happiness. 
Everyone has a fair shot when they are tried 
for a criminal offense. #9 
Our society is getting worse every year. 
(reverse-scored) 
The criminal justice system gets worse every 
year [reverse scored] #10 
Society is set up so that people usually get 
what they deserve. 
Society is set up so that people usually get 
what they deserve. #11 
 ~ In America, a criminal defendant’s right to a 
criminal trial serves to protect the innocent. #4 
 ~ In America, the plea-bargaining system 
problematically pressures innocent criminal 
defendants to plead guilty. [reverse scored] 
#5 
 ~ In America, a criminal defendant’s ability to 
make a deal (i.e., a guilty plea deal) with the 













Note. The first screenshots show the Need for Cognitive Closure items. The table and 
following screenshot show the original and adapted System Justification Scale items. 
Items that I added to the scale are marked with “~”. The last screenshot shows the I-7’s 









Study 1 Life Experience and Demographic Items: Criminal Experience, Driving and 























Note. The first two screenshots show the criminal experience questions. The next series 
of screenshots show the demographic items, and the last group of screenshots shows the 
driving and accident questions (with their display logic). For Study 1, the variables 
pertaining to accident experience were calculated by counting “Yes I’ve been in an 
accident” as 1 and “No” as 0 and then multiplying the degree of upset the accident caused 















Study 1 Qualitative Coding Manual 
 
Qualitative Coding Overview   
 
- The Excel Spreadsheet you will be working with contains participants’ responses 
to the open-ended response questions (Q1-Q4) from Study 2. These variables Q1-
Q4 make up the columns and each participant of the study has one row (rows 2-
396). The themes (shown below) make up the four columns to the right of each 
question (the theme names appearing in the header cell).  
- You will be going through the open-ended responses in order to code them based 
on the applicable themes. 
- If you see Googled Shirker (or bot) responses like those below OR “NA” or “0” 
in response to all four questions, highlight the whole row in purple: 
o Bot response examples 
§ “Plea bargains serve a purpose for courts. Some reasons 
prosecutors offer them include: Reducing the number of cases 
going to court.” 
§ “Plea bargains serve a purpose for courts.” 
§ Rule: two bot responses and you’re out (full row highlighted) 
o Then, create a Word document with the original row numbers that are to 
be deleted (e.g., Rows deleted from dataset: 27, 29, 31, 33, 37…), confirm 
with co-RA to agree on which rows will be deleted. 
o Last, create a second tab in the same Excel document with those purple 
rows deleted  
o Lauren will use the second tab to compute kappas 
 
Question Stems  
 
- Q1) Why do you think most people take plea bargain deals? Please take a moment 
and be as specific as possible.  
- Q2) When you chose a plea bargain deal, why did you choose it? Please take a 
moment and be as specific as possible. 
- Q3) Why do you think most people choose to go to trial? Please take a moment 
and be as specific as possible. 
- Q4) When you chose to go to trial, why did you choose it? Please take a moment 




- STEP 1: Start with Q1 and code for Innocence by reading each individual 
cell/response (starting with reading cell A2 and ending with A396).  
o STEP 1a: Since the themes for Innocence overlap, there are four columns 




Type “1” in the cell of the applicable column if the response pertains to 
any of the four sub-theme codes. If it does not, type “0” in the cell.  
§ For example, if the sentence reads, “To prove my innocence 
because I was not guilty,” type “1” in columns A and B and “0” in 
columns C and D. See Innocence’s sub-themes below. 
- STEP 2: Repeat Step 1 for Q2, Q3, and Q4.  
- STEP 2: Repeat Steps 1 – 2 for Delay theme, excluding Step 1a.  
- STEP 3: Repeat Steps 1 – 2 for Probability theme, excluding Step 1a, EXCEPT 
o Instead of “1”s you will be typing an “A”, “B”, or “C” in the cell if the 
particular sub-theme is present. If no sub-theme is not present, enter a “0”. 
- STEP 4: Repeat Steps 1 – 2 for Punishment Amount theme, excluding Step 1a, 
EXCEPT 
o Instead of “1”s you will be typing an “A” or “B” in the cell if the 
particular sub-theme is present. If no sub-theme is not present, enter a “0”. 
- Note: if a response demonstrates that they are ignoring the question stem (e.g., 
talking about accepting a plea in response to Questions 3 and 4), then code a “0” 
- Note: if you notice an odd response, look at other responses in that row to give 




Innoc_Code: “Innocence”  
Code A: responses showing that the participant believed they were innocent  
§ (i.e. “To prove innocence”) 
Code B: responses showing participant believed they were not guilty  
§ (i.e. “I was not guilty”) 
 
Delay_Code: “Delay” 
Q1 & Q2: 
Code: responses showing that the immediacy of the plea/offer was attractive  
§ (i.e. “to get it resolved quicker”) 
Q3 & Q4: 
Code: responses showing that the delay of the trial was attractive  
§ (i.e. “deal with it later”) 
 
Prob_Code: “Probability” 
Q1 & Q2: 
Code A: responses showing participant was attracted to the certainty of the plea 
§ (i.e., “I liked that the plea was a sure thing”) 
Code B: responses showing participant didn’t like their chances at trial  
§ (i.e. “I didn’t want to roll the dice”) 
 
Q3 & Q4:  
Code A: responses showing participant was attracted by the possibility of 




§ (i.e. “There was a 75% chance of conviction, so I liked the idea of 
a one in four chance of being free”) 
   
 
Punish_Amt: “Punishment Amount”  
Q1 & Q2: Note codes A, B, and G are distinct categories; you should not code the same 
phrase as two things but if responses mentions two things code them both. For example, 
“I wanted a nicer charge and lesser sentence” should be coded “A B”; if, on the other 
hand, “nicer charge” is alone in the response, code “G.” 
Code A: responses showing participant wanted to avoid a certain criminal charge 
(e.g., felony vs. misdemeanor) 
§ (i.e. “As long as I wouldn’t have a felony on my record”) 
§ Has to be using “charge” as more than colloquial/short-hand for 
“criminal charge" 
 
Code B: responses showing participant wanted to reduce sentencing/prison time  
§ (i.e. “To get the shortest sentence possible”) 
Code G: responses showing general desire for lesser punishment 
§ CAN be “I wanted lesser criminal charge” 
§ Also includes: “lesser punishment”  
  
Location 
 Code B: responses show that they were out on bail or living their life as usual 
while waiting for trial, and that affected their decision; This is most likely an attractive 
feature for trial (i.e., Q3 and Q4); also, if responses suggests that the jail option was the 
only possibility for never doing jail time (which implies they believed they were out on 
bail and would not be convicted at trial). 
 Code J: responses show that they were in jail while waiting for trial, and that 
affected their decision; MAKES TRIAL LESS ATTRACTIVE, SO MOSTLY IN Q1 








Qualitative Coding Kappas 
 
Code Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 
Innoc_A .663 1.0097 .936 .899 
Innoc_B 1.0098 .708 .68 .775 
Delay .76 .752 .765 .932 
Probability .615 .75 .742 .756 
Punish_Amount .811 .828 n/a n/a 





97 Pre-RA discussion this kappa was consistently low, and had a value of .514 at the end 
of all coding pre-discussion. 
98 Pre-RA discussion this kappa was consistently low, and had a value of .328 at the end 






Study 1 Correlations, ANOVAs, and Boxplots of Demographic Variables and Trait-
Level Individual-Difference Measures 
 
Study 1 Zero-Order Pearson Correlations 
 Age Imp. NFCC ASJS NCE Blame. 
Age 1      
Impulsivity -.27*** 1     
NFCC -.02 .26*** 1    
ASJS -.08 -.02 -.17*** 1   
NCE -.28*** .64*** .18*** -.12* 1  
Blameworthiness -.01 .18*** .20*** -.12* .14** 1 
 
Study 1 One-Way ANOVAs for Demographic Categories on Individual Differences 
 Imp. NFCC ASJS NCE Blame. 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Gender 3.85* 2.20 8.84*** 8.56*** 2.67m 
      Men 7.84 (5.03) 58.90 (11.22) 52.36 (10.31) -60.20 (86.49) 112.83 (56.73) 
      Women 7.17 (5.19) 60.78 (10.58) 52.09 (10.91) -87.42 (91.87) 125.65 (58.62) 
       Other 1.25 (.96) 52.75 (16.32) 74.5 (4.43) -200 (0) 95 (78.46) 
Race 4.49** .27 2.07 3.17* .86 
      White, Non-Hisp. 6.28 (4.95) 59.62 (11.01) 52.72 (11.81) -92.69 (91.36) 110 (59.78) 
      White, Hispanic 8.19 (5.11) 59.96 (11.12) 51.63 (10.60) -63.32 (88.29) 122.09 (56.85) 
      Black, Non-Hisp. 7.73 (4.96) 59.33 (9.97) 55.87 (10.86) -64.24 (88.83) 119.56 (60.56) 
      Other 5.74 (5.25) 58.28 (12.15) 53.34 (8.90) -94.17 (94.91) 116.93 (57.89) 
Education 10.67*** .33 1.18 25.39*** 1.04 
      High School 4.65 (4.91) 58.15 (11.98) 54.46 (9.21) -139.35 (69.37) 125.38 (79.93) 
      Some College 4.93 (4.51) 58.95 (10.14) 54.17 (11.79) -144.80 (67.33) 106.68 (75.57) 
      College Graduate 8.38 (4.99) 59.97 (11.09) 52.20 (10.54) -52.64 (83.44) 120.56 (50.58) 
      Graduate School 7.60 (5.12) 60.03 (11.28) 51.15 (11.11) -62 (96.64) 119.38 (55.03) 
 
Note. “NFCC” stands for Need for Cognitive Closure; “ASJS” stands for adjusted System 
Justification Scale; “NCE” stands for Negative Contemplative Emotions. The top panel 
shows the Pearson correlations between Age, Impulsivity, Need for Cognitive Closure, 
adapted System Justification, Negative Contemplative Emotions, and Blameworthiness. 
The only individual difference measures not significantly correlated with each other were 




negatively, correlated with Impulsivity and Negative Contemplative Emotions, meaning 
that older participants had lower Impulsivity scores and had more negative emotions 
about trial than younger participants. 
The lower panel shows the one-way ANOVAs conducted for Gender, Race, and 
Education on Age, Impulsivity, Need for Cognitive Closure, adapted System 
Justification, Negative Contemplative Emotions, and Blameworthiness. Of the three 
demographic variables, Gender most frequently showed statistically significant 
differences between its groups on the individual differences. To mention a few Gender 
differences, Men felt more positively toward trial, felt less blame, and had marginally 
lower Need for Cognitive Closure scores than Women. Additionally, of the individual 
difference measures, Impulsivity and Negative Contemplative Emotions were the only 
measures that differed significantly across all three demographic variables. Men, White-
Hispanics, and individuals with at least a college degree had higher Impulsivity scores 
and less negative feelings toward trial than many of their respective reference categories. 
The rows of the table in the lower panel with variable names (e.g., Gender) have the F 
statistic, and the rows with variable-level names (e.g., Men) have the group mean and 
standard deviation. Follow-up t-tests revealed that Men and Women did not have 
significantly different Impulsivity scores (t(369) = 1.28, p > .1), but participants who 
selected the “Other” gender response option had significantly lower Impulsivity scores 
than Men and Women (respectively: t(7) = 11.11, p < .001; and t(8) = -9.60, p < .001). 
Follow-up t-tests revealed that all three categories differed on their Negative 
Contemplative Emotions. Men reported feeling significantly more positively toward trial 




(respectively: t(366) = 2.97, p < .01; and t(204) = 23.14, p < .001), and Women reported 
feeling significantly more positively toward trial than did participants who selected the 
“Other” gender response option (t(177) = -16.35, p < .001). Follow-up t-tests revealed 
that Women blamed themselves more than Men (t(369) = -2.17, p < .05). Follow-up t-
tests revealed that Women had marginally higher Need for Cognitive Closure than Men 
(t(378) = -1.68, p = .09). Follow-up t-tests revealed that Men and Women did not have 
significantly different adapted System Justification Scale scores (t(366) = .25, p > .1), but 
participants who selected the “Other” gender response option had significantly higher 
adapted System Justification Scale scores than Men and Women (respectively: t(3) = -
9.50, p < .01; and t(3) = 9.48, p < .001). 







SM 10. (continued) 
Study 1 Individual Differences by Gender Category 
 
    
 













SM 10. (continued) 
Study 1 Individual Differences by Race Category 
 
   
 










SM 10. (continued) 
Study 1 Individual Differences by Education Category 
 
    
 






















Study 2 Qualitative Response Regressions 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE 95% CI 
STA ~ Delay 0.52 3.44 (-6.23, 7.27) 
STA ~ Innocence A -3.41 12.08 (-27.1, 20.3) 
STA ~ Innocence B 4.35 14.77 (-24.6, 33.3) 
STA ~ Probability    
     Prob A 5.76 6.72 (-7.37, 18.88) 
     Prob AB 6.91 12.09 (-16.72, 30.54) 
     Prob B -2.99 2.76 (-8.38, 2.39) 
STA ~ Punishment     
      Punishment A 2.90 20.92 (-37.78, 43.57) 
      Punishment AB -7.67 8.63 (-24.45, 9.11) 
      Punishment AG 26.10 20.92 (-14.58, 66.77) 
      Punishment B -0.91 2.91 (-6.27, 5.05) 
      Punishment BG -13.37 12.13 (-36.95, 10.22) 
      Punishment G 1.54 5.56 (-9.27, 12.35) 
STA ~ Location    
       Location [Bail] -12.23 14.74 (-41.1, 16.61) 










Study 1 Cross-Construct Multiple Regressions Model 2a 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion  
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Model 2a   0.17 0.69  
      PTC 24.39*** 4.13 .04  (16.37, 32.41) 
      DUT 0.11* 0.05 .001  (0.02, 0.20) 
      Ambiguous -2.08 4.22   (-10.28, 6.12) 
      Jail 5.72 4.24 .002  (-2.53, 13.97) 
      Male -2.95 1.84 .005  (-6.53, 0.64) 
      Other 4.52 9.05   (-13.05, 22.10) 
      Education_binary -9.04*** 2.20 .03  (-13.21, -4.77) 
      PTC:Delay -0.11 0.06 .001  (-0.23, 0.02) 
      PTC:Ambiguous 0.93 5.90   (-10.54, 12.40) 
      PTC:Jail -7.71 5.92 .002  (-19.22, 3.76) 
      DUT:Ambiguous -0.03 0.07   (-0.16, 0.10) 
      DUT:Jail 0.28*** 0.07 .003  (0.15, 0.41) 
      PTC:DUT:Ambiguous 0.04 0.09   (-0.15, 0.22) 











Study 1 Cross-Construct Multiple Regressions Model 3a 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion  
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Model 3   .07 .43  
      PTC 7.35 6.75 .06  (-5.36, 20.06) 
      DUT 0.02 0.11   (-0.19, 0.24) 
      Location [Ambiguous] -4.69 6.72 .002  (-17.34, 7.97) 
      Location [Jail] 6.23 8.78 .002  (-10.30, 22.75) 
      Education [Binary] -14.42* 6.58 .03  (-26.77, -2.07) 
      PTC:DUT -0.07 0.15   (-0.37, 0.23) 
      PTC:Ambiguous 3.60 9.52 .001  (-14.33, 21.52) 
      PTC:Jail -4.01 11.02 .001  (-24.75, 16.73) 
      DUT:Ambiguous 0.09 0.15 .001  (-0.21, 0.39) 
      DUT:Jail 0.05 0.20   (-0.34, 0.44) 
      PTC:DUT:Ambiguous  -0.05 0.22   (-0.47, 0.37) 
      PTC:DUT:Jail -0.06 0.25   (-0.56, 0.43) 
      Accident_3mYes -1.77 2.95 .003  (-7.31, 3.76) 
 
 








Study 2 Subjective Trial Aversion Example Slider 
 
 
What is the absolute longest length of time you would agree (through a plea deal) to go 
to jail for when faced with the trial option presented below? 
 
Trial Option = 240 days (8 months) uncertain and delayed 



































Studies 2–4 Personal Involvement Questions 
 
 
To what extent were you [engaged with/attentive to/interested in/involved in] the legal 
decision(s) you mad? 
Response scale 1-5 (1=not at all, 5=extremely) 
 
 
Do you own a cell phone? (Y/N) 
 
Response scale 1-7 (1=never, 7=all the time) 
How often do you look at your phone while driving without picking it up?  
How often do you look at your phone while driving by picking it up?  
How often do you use voice-activation while driving to send a text message?  
How often do you use your hands/fingers to text, change music, check driving directions 












Studies 2–4 Criminal Justice Experience Follow-Up Questions 
 
• Have you, or anyone you’re close with, been criminally charged? 
o I’ve been criminally charged 
o At least one person I’m close with has been criminally charged 
o Neither 
o I’ve been criminally charged and at least one person I’m close with has 
been criminally charged 
• [DISPLAY/SKIP LOGIC: If not “Neither”] 
o Have you, [or anyone you’re close with,] been offered a plea bargain? 
§ Yes 
§ No 
§ I don’t know 
o What did you [person you’re close with] decide? 
§ Trial 
§ Plea 






















Study 2 Correlations, ANOVAs, and Boxplots of Demographic Variables and Trait-
Level Individual-Difference Measures 
 
 
Study 2 Zero-Order Pearson Correlations 
 Age Imp. NFCC ASJS NCE Blame. Innoc. Guilt PSS 
Age 1         
Imp. -0.35*** 1        
NFCC 0.15*** 0.06 1       
ASJS 0.03 -0.01 0.01 1      
NCE -0.44*** 0.40*** -0.09m 0.09m 1     
Blame. -0.08 0.12* 0.18*** -0.00 -0.05 1    
Innoc. -0.06 0.11* 0.02 -0.06 0.15 -0.49*** 1   
Guilt -0.07 0.10* 0.01* 0.10* 0.05 0.67*** -0.66*** 1  





Study 2 One-Way ANOVAs for Demographic Categories on Individual Differences 
 Imp. NFCC ASJS NCE Blame. Innoc. Guilt PSS 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Gender 4.42* 0.00 1.49 8.66** 0.04 3.17m 0.02 0.23 
      Men 6.81 (4.76) 63.27 (12.18) 58.66 (11.03) -65.86 (86.68) 109.84 (61.33) 63.47 (31.50) 48.49 (34.20) 25.97 (5.23) 
      Women 5.84 (4.58) 63.23 (10.87) 57.33 (11.27) -91.35 (89.73) 111.06 (64.11) 57.84 (32.82) 47.61 (33.99) 25.71(5.79) 
Race 1.23 0.48 3.04 0.73 0.77 0.01 0.03 0.18 
      White 6.10 (4.83) 63.56 (11.58) 58.89 (11.20) -80.01 (92.69) 110.88 (64.01) 60.77 (32.35) 48.32 (34.37) 25.91 (5.65) 
      Black 7.14 (4.49) 61.95 (12.87) 56.63 (11.97) -66.58 (81.20) 117.08 (56.66) 60.10 (32.53) 47.44 (32.22) 25.92 (5.27) 
      Other 6.47 (4.24) 63.11 (10.16) 55.64 (9.99) -84.33 (80.93) 103.68 (62.68) 60.33 (32.15) 47.49 (34.71) 25.49 (5.27) 
Education 2.19m 1.45 1 9.19*** 0.22 0.34 1.77 0.68 
      High School 6.91 (4.88) 63.77 (11.34) 57.56 (12.04) -89.65 (79.10) 111.13 (66.81) 58.52 (35.74) 47.55 (36.20) 25.32 (4.71) 
      Some College 5.52 (4.47) 64.48 (9.75) 56.51 (10.68) -114.78 (80.32) 107.18 (64.98) 58.66 (33.28) 40.73 (34.42) 26.09 (6.80) 
      College Graduate 5.95 (4.76) 63.64 (11.94) 58.07 (10.96) -74.52 (85.84) 113.28 (61.02) 61.72 (31.02) 49.32 (33.01) 25.66 (5.81) 
      Graduate School 6.97 (4.47) 61.21 (12.17) 59.36 (11.01) -48.05 (97.83) 108.13 (60.36) 62.22 (30.33) 52.23 (32.97) 26.37 (4.57) 
 
 
        
Note. “Imp.” stands for Impulsivity; “NFCC” stands for Need for Cognitive Closure; “ASJS” stands for adjusted System Justification 
Scale; “NCE” stands for Negative Contemplative Emotions; “Blame.” stands for Blameworthiness; “Innoc.” stands for Perceptions of 
Innocence; “Guilt” stands for Perceptions of Guilt; and “PSS” stands for Perceived Stress Scale. The top table shows the Pearson 
correlations between Age, Impulsivity, Need for Cognitive Closure, adapted System Justification, Negative Contemplative Emotions, 
Blameworthiness, Perceptions of Innocence, Perceptions of Guilty, and the Perceived Stress Scale. None of the trait-level individual-
difference measures (i.e., PSS, aSJS, NFCC, Impulsivity) were significantly correlated with each other. Age, on the other hand, was 
significantly related with both individual difference measures and NCE, a situated-person variable. Specifically, Age was 




participants. Additionally, age was significantly, and negatively, correlated with Impulsivity and Negative Contemplative Emotions, 
meaning that older participants had lower Impulsivity scores and had more negative emotions about trial than younger participants. 
The bottom table shows the one-way ANOVAs conducted for Gender, Race, and Education on Age, Impulsivity, Need for Cognitive 
Closure, adapted System Justification, Negative Contemplative Emotions, Blameworthiness, Perceptions of Innocence, Perceptions of 
Guilty, and the Perceived Stress Scale. Of the three demographic variables, Gender most frequently showed statistically significant 
differences between its groups on the individual differences. To mention a few Gender differences, Men felt more positively toward 
trial, had higher Impulsivity, and had marginally higher Perceptions of Innocence than Women. Race categories did not differ on any 
of the individual differences. Education categories differed significantly on Negative Contemplative Emotions such that participants in 
the part-of-college group had the most negative feelings about trial and participants in the graduate-school group had the least negative 





SM 21. (continued) 
 
Study 2 Individual Differences by Gender Category 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 





SM 21. (continued) 
Study 2 Individual Differences by Race Category 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 




SM 21. (continued) 
Study 2 Individual Differences by Education Category 
 
   
 
   
 



















Note. All three conditions (Wider, Original, and Slider) contain more spread between the 
Delay levels (different colored lines) in the Jail condition relative to the Bail condition. 
Additionally, the Wider Jail graph in the lower right has the most pronounced 









Study 2 NFCC’s Effect on Subjective Trial Aversion Scores’ Range 
 























Original First Placement:  Decision Tree #2 
 First Second Third Never Flip 
 31 15 9 88 
Original  Flip Placement: Decision Tree #1 
 First Second Third Never Flip 
 29 22 10 82 
Original First Placement:  Decision Tree #3 
 First Second Third Never Flip 
 22 10 5 106 
Original First Placement:  Decision Tree #4 
 First Second Third Never Flip 
 26 6 2 109 
Original First Placement:  Decision Tree #5 
 First Second Third Never Flip 
 26 9 11 97 
Wider First Placement:  Decision Tree #1 
 First Second Third Fourth Never Flip 
 31 28 13 11 47 
Original First Placement:  Decision Tree #6 
 First Second Third Never Flip 
 38 12 5 88 
Wider First Placement:  Decision Tree# 2 
 First Second Third Fourth Never Flip 





Wider First Placement:  Decision Tree #6  
 First Second Third Fourth Never Flip 
 23 19 8 1 79 
Wider First Placement:  Decision Tree #5 
 First Second Third Fourth Never Flip 
 27 10 17 8 68 
Wider First Placement:  Decision Tree #4 
 First Second Third Fourth Never Flip 
 12 7 2  5  104 
Wider First Placement:  Decision Tree #3 
 First Second Third Fourth Never Flip 








Three Measurement-Method Follow-Up Regressions 
 
  
 Subjective Trial Aversion  
 Original Titration Wider Titration Slider Titration  
Models/Variables Bo SEo R2m 95% CI Bw SEw R2m 95% CI Bs SEs R2m 95% CI 
Blame*PTC   .18    .20    .18  
      PTC 0.30*** 0.02 .07 (.26, .33) 0.58*** 0.04 .06 (.51, .66) 0.20*** 0.03 .01 (.15, .26) 
      Blame 0.05* 0.21 .005 (.008, .009) 0.19*** 0.04. .02 (.10, .28) 0.11** 0.04 .01 (.03, .19) 
      PTC:Blame -.0003* 0.0001 .001 (-.0006, -.00001) -.0005m 0.0003 .001 (-.001, .00003) .001*** .0002 .007 (.0009, .002) 
Imp*PTC   .19    .24    .15  
      Imp 1.18*** 0.28 .02 (.64, 1.72) -0.75 0.55 .002 -1.84, .33 2.90*** 0.56 .05 (1.83, 4.01) 
      PTC 0.38*** 0.01 .14 (.35, .40) 0.71*** 0.03 .14 .66, .77 0.42*** 0.02 .08 (.37, .46) 
      Imp:PTC -0.02*** 0.001 .02 (-.02, -.01) -0.03*** 0.00 .02 -.04, -.02 -0.01*** 0.00 .004 (-.02, -.01) 
Innoc._Ordin*PTC   .18    .22    .11  
      PTC 0.27*** 0.01 .11 (.24, .29) 0.54*** 0.03 .08 (.48, .59) 0.43*** 0.02 .07 (.39, .47) 
      Innoc. -0.12 0.02 .004 (-4.66, 2.26) -15.76*** 3.91 .02 (-23.42, -8.11) -0.34 3.41 .005 (-7.02, 6.34) 





SM 26.  
 




   
 
 
Note. The Original condition’s significant and negative interaction (SM 25) replicates 
Study 1’s finding, and Figure 5 relative to the top panel, here, shows somewhat similar 
patterns with the High Blame line starting above the Low Blame line at lower 
Probabilities, then going below the Low Blame line at higher Probabilities. This figure 





Blameworthiness had a stronger main effect such that High Blame was associated with 
higher Subjective Trial Aversion scores than Low Blame; additionally, the significant 
interaction in the Slider condition (SM 25) and marginally significant interaction in the 
Wider condition (SM 25) can be seen in the High Blame lines’ various slopes relative to 






SM 27.  
 
Study 2’s Joint Distribution of Two Types of Criminal Experience 
 







 237 (57.11%) 42 (10.12%) 










SM 28.  
 
Study 2 Cross-Construct Multiple Regression Model 1 
 
              Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
PTC*DUT*WTL*Meas. Meth.   0.18  
   PTC 0.28*** 0.02 0.009 (0.24, 0.33) 
   DUT 0.17* 0.07  (0.03, 0.30) 
   Jail -0.81 4.88  (-10.3, 8.72) 
   Slider -16.34*** 4.90 0.003 (-25.9, -6.77) 
   Wider -6.65 4.95  (-16.3, 3.01 
   PTC:DUT -0.002
m 
0.001  (-.004, 0.000008) 
   PTC:Jail -0.04 0.03  (-0.02, 0.11) 
   DUT:Jail 0.16
m 
0.10  (-0.02, 0.35) 
   PTC:Slider 0.10** 0.03 0.001 (0.03, 0.17) 
   PTC:Wider 0.23*** 0.03 0.003 (0.16, 0.29) 
   DUT:Slider -0.09 0.10  (-0.28, 0.10) 
   DUT:Wider -0.20* 0.10  (-0.39, -0.01) 
   Jail:Slider 4.79 6.92  (-8.71, 18.3) 
   Jail:Wider -7.99 7.09  (-21.8, -0.001) 
   PTC:DUT:Jail -0.001 0.001  (-0.003, 0.003) 
   PTC:DUT:Slider 0.0001 0.001  (-0.0007, 0.004) 
   PTC:DUT:Wider 0.002 0.01  (0.05, 0.24) 
   PTC:Jail:Slider -0.09
m 
.05  (-0.19, 0.001) 
   PTC:Jail:Wilder 0.15** 0.05 0.001 (0.05, 0.24) 
   DUT:Jail:Slider 0.04 0.14  (-0.22, 0.31) 
   DUT:Jail:Wider 0.79*** 0.14 0.002 (0.52, 1.06) 
   PTC:DUT:Jail:Slider 0.002 0.002  (-0.001, 0.006) 







SM 29.  
 
Study 2 Cross-Construct Multiple Regression Model 3 
 
  Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
PTC*DUT*WTL*Meas. Meth.   0.19 0.57  
  PTC 0.28*** 0.02 0.009  (0.24, 0.33) 
  DUT 0.17* 0.07   (0.03, 0.30) 
  Jail -0.81 4.88   (-10.9, 8.12) 
  Slider -16.34*** 4.90 0.003  (-27.0, -7.84) 
  Wider -6.65 4.95 0.001  (-17.1, 2.26) 
   PTC:DUT -0.002
m
 0.001   (0.004, 0.000008) 
   PTC:Jail -0.04 0.03   (-0.02, 0.11) 
   DUT:Jail 0.16
m
 0.10   (-0.02, 0.35) 
   PTC:Slider 0.10** 0.03 0.001  (0.03, 0.17) 
   PTC:Wider 0.23*** 0.03 0.003  (0.16, 0.10) 
   DUT:Slider -0.09 0.10   (-0.28, 0.10) 
   DUT:Wider -0.20* 0.10   (-0.39, -0.01) 
   Jail:Slider 4.79 6.92   (-6.95, 20.1) 
   Jail:Wider -7.99 7.09   (-20.9, 6.73) 
   PTC:DUT:Jail -0.001 0.001   (-0.004, 0.001) 
   PTC:DUT:Slider 0.0001 0.001   (-0.003, 0.003) 
   PTC:DUT:Wider 0.002 0.01   (-0.0007, 0.004) 
   PTC:Jail:Slider -0.09
m
 .05   (-0.19, 0.001) 
   PTC:Jail:Wilder 0.15** 0.05 0.001  (0.05, 0.24) 
   DUT:Jail:Slider 0.04 0.14   (-0.22, 0.31) 
   DUT:Jail:Wider 0.79*** 0.14 0.002  (0.52, 1.06) 
   PTC:DUT:Jail:Slider 0.002 0.002   (-0.001, 0.006) 
   PTC:DUT:Jail:Wider -0.008*** 0.002 0.001  (-0.01, -0.005) 
   Gender 5.67* 2.68 0.005  (0.45, 10.9) 
   Personal Involvement 0.25 0.35 0.001  (-0.43, 0.94) 







SM 30.  
 
Study 2 Cross-Construct Multiple Regression Model 4 
 
  Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
PTC*DUT*WTL*Meas. Meth.   0.19 0.57  
   PTC 0.28*** 0.02 0.009  (0.24, 0.03) 
   DUT 0.17* 0.07   (0.03, 0.30) 
   Jail -0.81 4.88   (-11.2, 7.82) 
   Slider -16.34*** 4.90 0.003  (-27.2, -8.12) 
   Wider -6.65 4.95 0.001  (-17.7, 166) 
   PTC:DUT -0.002
m
 0.001   (-0.004, 0.008) 
   PTC:Jail -0.04 0.03   (-0.02, 0.11) 
   DUT:Jail 0.16
m
 0.10   (-0.02, 0.35) 
   PTC:Slider 0.10** 0.03 0.001  (0.03, 0.17) 
   PTC:Wider 0.23*** 0.03 0.003  (0.16, 0.29) 
   DUT:Slider -0.09 0.10   (-0.28, 0.12) 
   DUT:Wider -0.20* 0.10   (-0.39, -0.01) 
   Jail:Slider 4.79 6.92   (-6.79, 20.2) 
   Jail:Wider -7.99 7.09   (-20.6, 7.02) 
   PTC:DUT:Jail -0.001 0.001   (-0.004, 0.001) 
   PTC:DUT:Slider 0.0001 0.001   (-0.003, 0.003) 
   PTC:DUT:Wider 0.002 0.01   (-0.0007, 0.004) 
   PTC:Jail:Slider -0.09
m
 .05   (-0.19, 0.001) 
   PTC:Jail:Wilder 0.15** 0.05 0.001  (0.05, 0.24) 
   DUT:Jail:Slider 0.04 0.14   (-0.22, 0.31) 
   DUT:Jail:Wider 0.79*** 0.14 0.002  (0.52, 1.06) 
   PTC:DUT:Jail:Slider 0.002 0.002   (-0.001, 0.006) 
   PTC:DUT:Jail:Wider -0.008*** 0.002 0.001  (-0.01, 0.005) 
   Gender 5.42* 2.58 0.005  (0.42, 10.4) 
   NFCC 0.18 0.11 0.003  (-0.04, 0.39) 






SM 31.  
 
Study 2 Three-Way Interaction of Non-Methodological Experimental Variables 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
PTC 0.37*** 0.01 .12 (.35, .39) 
DUT 0.10*** 0.02 .002 (.07, .14) 
WTL 5.06m 2.64 .004 (-.12, 10.2) 
PTC*DUT   .13  
    PTC 0.41*** 0.01 .1 (.39, .43) 
    DUT 2.75*** 0.29 .006 (2.19, 3.31) 
    PTC:DUT -0.03*** 0.004 .003 (-.04, -.02) 
PTC*WTL   .13  
    PTC 0.37*** 0.01 .07 (.35, .40) 
    Jail 5.59* 2.82 .002 (.06, 11.11) 
    PTC:Jail -0.01 0.02  (-.04, .02) 
DUT*WTL   .01  
    DUT -0.06 0.24  (-.53, .41) 
    Jail 1.44 2.70  (-3.85, 6.73) 
    DUT:Jail 2.23*** 0.34 .003 (1.57, 2.90) 
DUT*WTL*PTC   .13  
    DUT 0.69m 0.40  (-.10, 1.47) 
    Jail -1.24 2.97  (-7.05, 4.57) 
    PTC 0.39*** 0.01 .05 (.37, .42) 
    DUT:Jail 4.21*** 0.57 .003 (3.09, 5.33) 
    DUT:PTC -0.01* 0.01  (-.02, -.001) 
    Jail:PTC 0.04* 0.02  (.004, .08) 
    DUT:Jail:PTC -0.03*** 0.01 .001 (-.05, -.02) 
 






SM 32.  
 
Study 2 NFCC * Probability of Trial Conviction 
 
 
Note. The highest and lowest quartiles’ lines are parallel, but the middle two quartiles’ 
lines are steeper than the first and fourth quartiles’ lines, suggesting that the mid-level-







SM 33.  
 







Note. Study 1’s NCE distribution appears in the left panel, and Study 2’s NCE 
distribution appears in the right panel.
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 SM 34.  
Studies’ 2 and 3 Subjective Trial Aversion Distributions 
 






















SM 35.  
 
Study 3 and 4’s Scenario with Factual Innocence Manipulation 
 
 
You were driving within the speed limit in a residential area, when you received a text 
from your friend. You picked up your phone and read the text. As you were typing your 
response, You used the voice-activation feature to read the text to you.  As you were 
dictating your response, a child ran in front of your car, chasing a ball.  You slammed on 
your brakes, but your vehicle struck the child, breaking his leg.  The police were called 
and you have been charged with negligent driving resulting in physical injury, a felony.  
  
While it is legal to send texts on your cell phone in hands-free mode, it is not legal to 
hand-type a text while driving.  The cell phone technology can demonstrate that you 
received and sent text messages at the time of the accident, but it cannot establish 
whether the texts were hand-typed or voice-activated. However, a Fed-Ex delivery 
employee was in the vicinity during the accident and remembers your head was down 
with your gaze in your lap at the time of the incident. 
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Studies 3–4 Procedural Justice Outcome Measure 
 
Response scale: (1=not at all ___; 5=extremely ____) 
*How much would you trust the plea bargain system in the future? 
*Thinking about your plea bargain decisions, to what extent do you think it was 
conducted in a fair way? 
*How fair was the outcome of your plea bargain decisions? 
*Thinking about your plea bargain decisions, to what extent did you feel in control of 
what happened to you? 
*How much control did you have over your plea bargain decision? 
How much did you feel your attorney’s advice addressed your concerns? 
 
Note. Adapted from Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler (2008). Items marked with “*” were 
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Studies 3 & 4 New Legal-Decision-Making Instructions and Question Set-Up 
 
You will now make a series of decisions between going to trial and accepting a plea deal. 
Below is background information about the decisions.  
 
The prosecutor has decided to charge you with a felony, and is asking for a sentence of 8 
months in prison if you choose to go to trial. However, the prosecutor is offering a plea 




• Taking a plea offer is effective immediately, whereas the decision to go to trial 
results in a delay of the sentence start date because trial does not start 
until [DELAY] from now, and the trial process could take up to a week.  
• [Jail condition: During the time waiting for trial to start and complete you will be 
waiting in jail; note that credit for time served is at the prosecutor’s discretion.] 
[Bail condition: During the time waiting for trial to start and complete you will be 
out on bail, preparing for trial, but otherwise maintaining your daily routines.]  
• Based on the evidence, your lawyer thinks you have a [PROBABILITY]% 
chance you will be found guilty of the felony and be sentenced to 8 months in 






You just read the background details of your two options (trial and plea). When you have 
made a decision, click on the radio button of the option you prefer. When you have 
clicked on the radio button your answer will be automatically recorded and new options 
will appear on the screen. Your new options may differ slightly so please review them 
carefully.  
 




[Jail condition: During the time waiting for trial to start and complete you will be waiting 
in jail; note that credit for time served is at the prosecutor’s discretion.] [Bail condition: 
During the time waiting for trial to start and complete you will be out on bail, preparing 






Note. The text highlighted in blue is present only in the Jail conditions. The text 
highlighted in yellow is present only in the Bail conditions. The Jail/Bail manipulation 
only applies to Study 3, not Study 4, since Study 4 told all participants who they would 
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Study 3 Correlations, ANOVAs, and Boxplots of Demographic Variables and Trait-
Level Individual-Difference Measures  
 
Study 3 Zero-Order Pearson Correlations 
 Age Imp. Neg. Emot. Blame. Innoc. Guilt 
Age 1      
Impulsivity -0.21*** 1     
Negative Emotions -0.12
m 
0.14** 1    
Blameworthiness 0.01 0.04 -0.13* 1   
Innocence -0.009 0.009 0.17** -0.75*** 1  
Guilt 0.0008 0.01 -0.14** 0.79*** -0.88*** 1 
 
Study 3 One-Way ANOVAs for Demographic Categories on Individual Differences 
 Imp. NCE Blame. Innoc. Guilt 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Gender 0.02 0.82 0.21 0.52 0.82 
      Men 6.81 (3.58) -133.77 (72.77) 133.55 (64.87) 43.51 (35.88) 38. 42 (56. 35) 
      Women 6.76 (3.56) -142,94 (63.92) 133.75 (67.67) 43.20 (38.42) 57. 20 (37.83) 
Race 0.68 2.69m 0.85 0.72 1.02 
      Black 6.41 (3.17) -124.77 (76.68) 142.15 (63.65) 43.28 (36.30) 61.10 (36.78) 
      White 6.95 (3.69) -139.92 (68.03) 132.23 (67.26) 41.66 (37.63) 57.04 (38.20) 
      Other 6.63 (3.76) -153.72 (60.00) 128.17 (64.83) 48.91 (35.60) 51.11 (37.30) 
Education 3.10* 0.69 0.92 1.72 1.66 
      High School 8.05 (3.71) -142.36 (65.79) 148.13 (58.13) 31.90 (35.03) 63.92 (36.43) 
      Some College 7.44 (3.65) -141.03 (60.93) 125.52 (68.76) 50.13 (38.24) 49.95 (38.83) 
      College Grad. 6.15 (3.26) -142.05 (70.42) 132.5 (69.46) 43.06 (37.45) 55.97 (38.15) 
      Graduate Sch. 6.58 (3.76) -127.49 (77.22) 137.12 (61.41) 41.98 (35.42) 62.19 (36.07) 
 
Note. “NFCC” stands for Need for Cognitive Closure; “ASJS” stands for adjusted System 
Justification Scale; “NCE” stands for Negative Contemplative Emotions. The top panel 
shows the Pearson correlations between Age, Impulsivity, Negative Contemplative 
Emotions, Continuous Innocence, Continuous Guilt, and Blameworthiness. Age was 
significantly, and negatively, correlated with Impulsivity and marginally correlated with 
Negative Contemplative Emotions, meaning that older participants had lower Impulsivity 





situation variables of Innocence, Guilt, Blameworthiness, and Negative Contemplative 
Emotions are all significantly correlated. 
The lower panel shows the one-way ANOVAs conducted for Gender, Race, and 
Education on Age, Impulsivity, Negative Contemplative Emotions, Blameworthiness, 
Innocence, and Guilt. The only demographic variable that predicted any of these 
variables was Education. The rows of the table in the lower panel with variable names 
(e.g., Gender) have the F statistic, and the rows with variable-level names (e.g., Men) 
have the group mean and standard deviation.  
m
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Study 3 Four-Way Interaction: Race, Probability of Trial Conviction, Delay until Trial, 
and Waiting-for-Trial Location 
 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m 95% CI 
PTC*DUT*Race*Location   0.38  
      DUT 1.25 1.92  (-2.52, 5.01) 
      Race [Other] -11.33 16.41  (-43.3, 20.66) 
      Race [White] -3.59 10.96  (-25.0, 17.77) 
      Location [Jail] -0.97 13.34  (-25.0, 26.98) 
      PTC 1.37*** 0.07 0.04 (1.24, 1.51) 
      DUT:Other 3.35 3.39  (-3.28, 9.98) 
      DUT:White -0.81 2.26  (-5.24, 3.62) 
      DUT:Jail 16.31*** 2.75 0.003 (10.9, 21.70) 
      Other:Jail -5.72 22.12  (-48.9, 37.39) 
      White:Jail -4.12 15.65  (-34.6, 26.38) 
      DUT:PTC -0.02 0.03  (-0.07, 0.03) 
      Other:PTC 0.39*** 0.12 0.001 (0.16, 0.63) 
      White:PTC 0.11 0.08  (-0.05, 0.26) 
      Jail:PTC -0.13 0.10  (-0.32, 0.06) 
      DUT:Other:Jail 10.69* 4.57  (1.76, 19.63) 
      DUT:White:Jail 3.35 3.23  (-2.98, 9.67) 
      DUT:Other:PTC -0.04 0.05  (-0.13, 0.05) 
      DUT:White:PTC 0.003 0.03  (-0.06, 0.06) 
      DUT:Jail:PTC -0.10** 0.04 0.001 (-0.18, -0.03) 
      Other:Jail:PTC 0.32* 0.16  (0.001, 0.63) 
      White:Jail:PTC 0.39*** 0.11 0.001 (0.17, 0.61) 
      DUT:Other:Jail:PTC -0.14* 0.06  (-0.27, -0.02) 
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Study 3 Cross-Construct Multiple Regressions Model 1 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Model 1   0.28 0.65  
    PTC 1.38*** 0.04 .11  (1.31, 1.45) 
    DUT 0.11 0.10   (-0.07, 0.30) 
    WTL 0.95 6.43   (-11.62, 13.5) 
    PTC:DUT -0.002 0.001   (-0.005, 0.0006) 
    PTC:WTL 0.15** 0.05   (0.06, 0.25) 
    DUT:WTL 2.02*** 0.13 0.02  (1.76, 2.29) 
    PTC:DUT:WTL -0.02*** 0.002 0.01  (-0.02, -0.01) 
    Innocence -37.22*** 6.05 0.02  (-49.06, -25.4) 
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Study 3 Cross-Construct Multiple Regressions Model 3 
 
 
 Subjective Trial Aversion 
Models/Variables B SE R2m R2c 95% CI 
Model 3   0.39 0.65  
   PTC 1.38*** 0.04 0.11  (1.30, 1.45) 
   DUT  0.12 0.10   (-0.07, 0.31) 
   WTL 0.49 6.45   (-12.04, 13.00) 
   Innocence -39.60*** 6.07 0.02  (-51.38, -27.8) 
   Gender [Other] 34.26
m
 19.68   (-3.89, 72.4) 
   Gender [Women] 6.39 5.69   (-4.64, 17.4) 
    Race [Other] 22.98* 9.65 0.01  (4.27, 41.7) 
    Race [White] 12.06
m
 6.80   (-1.12, 25.2) 
    Personal Involvement_Adj. -1.17 1.06   (-3.22, 0.87) 
    Personal Involvement_Beh. -0.61 0.50   (-1.58, 0.36) 
    PTC:DUT -0.002 0.001   (-0.005, 0.0005) 
    PTC:WTL 0.14** 0.05   (0.05, 0.24) 
    DUT:WTL 2.01*** 0.13 0.02  (1.75, 2.28) 
    PTC:Innocence 0.26*** 0.04   (0.19, 0.33) 
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Note. The first four questions were presented in random order. The plea-bargaining-
specific questions were presented in random order, as were the trial-specific questions. 
The plea-bargaining and trial groups of questions were presented in random order to 
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Study 4 Advice Content x Factual Innocence T-test Matrix 
 






Factual Innocence    
      Innocent 34 (7.15) 31.36 (7.51) -1.56 
      Guilty 35.48 (6.33) 36.59 (8.21) .72 
t .88 2.91**  
 
